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EDITED

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS

BY

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श्रीपञ्चास्तिकायसार ।

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OR

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(THE FIVE COSMIC CONSTITUENTS)

BY

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*Philosophical and Historical Introduction, Translation, Notes and an
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
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मङ्गलं भगवान् धीरो, मङ्गलं गौतमो गणो ।

मङ्गलं कुवकुन्दाद्या जैनधर्मोस्तु मङ्गलं ॥

Blessed be the Adorable Vira

Blessed be the Apostle Gautama

Blessed be the Saint Kundakunda

Blessed be the Jaina religion

The publisher acknowledges with thanks that
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Libraries and scholars interested in Jaina
Philosophy and Literature, in loving memory
of his beloved son the late BABU RAJA RAM.

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
This Volume contains 276 pages

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

The Historical Introduction	Page
The Age of Kundakunda or Elacharya .. .	i—xv
A philosophical Introduction	xvi—xxii
Jaina Physics .. .	xxii—xxv
The Conception of Motion	xxv—xxvii
Jaina Metaphysics	xxviii
Kāla	ib.
The Six Dravyas	xxix
Dravya Guṇa and Paryāya .. .	xxix
Jaina Biology	xxxii
Prāṇas	xxxiii
Different Kinds of Births	ib.
Microscopic Beings	ib.
Jaina Psychology	xxxv
Soul and Body. . .	xxxvi
Sensations and Sense Organs	xxxvii
Analysis of Sensations	xxxviii
Sense Perception	xxxix
Jñāna or Knowledge	xl
Affection	ib.
Conation or the Consciousness of Action	xli
Jaina Logic	xlii
Knowledge and the Object of Knowledge (Jñāna and Jñeya)	xlii
Saptabhanga—Jaina Logic... .	li
Works by Śrī Kundakundacharya . . .	lxxxv
English Translation of Panchāstikayasara, with Prakṛit Gāthās (Text), Note, explanatory and critical ...	1—179





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THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

The Age of Kundakunda or Elacharya.

Sri Kundakundacharya the author of our work was a very famous Jaina Philosopher and theologian. He was also a great organiser of Religious institutions. His name is held in great veneration especially by the Digambara Section of the Jainas. Many great religious teachers claimed it an honour to trace their lineage from the great teacher Kundakunda. Several inscriptions that are found in South India and Mysore relating to Jaina teachers begin with *Kundakundavaya*—of the line of Kundakunda. Students of Jaina literature are familiar with such phrases as the following—

Sri Kundakunda Gurupattaparamparāyām ;

Sri Kundakunda Santhanam ,

Sri Kundakundakya munindia vimsa

These are some of the phrases claimed by Jaina writers such as *Sakalabhusana* author of *Upadesaratnamala*, *Vasunandi* author of *Upasakadhyanam*, *Brahma nemi datta* of *Aurathana Kathakosha*. Instances may be multiplied without number, for showing the important place occupied by our author in the hierarchy of Jaina teachers.

Some of the epithets employed to characterise him are also significant of his great importance. *Munindra*—the Indra among the ascetics, *Munichakravati*—the emperor among the munis, *Kaundesa*—Lord Kunda, are familiar designations of the great teacher.

The personality of this great teacher as is generally the case with world famous individuals is lost in obscurity and shrouded with traditions. We have to depend upon so many written and oral traditions to have a glimpse of this great person. The early history of India is but a string of speculations and even as such there are very many gaps. Under these circumstances, we have to be very cautious about the history of our author.

The one great landmark in the chronology of India is Chandragupta Maurya. This great emperor of Magadha is not only referred to in the various literary works of India but is also mentioned by foreign historians especially the Greeks. This emperor Chandragupta especially is of peculiar interest to the students of the early history of the Jains. Lewis Rice and Dr. F. W. Thomas have done considerable service to Indian History by cautiously interpreting several available facts, archæological and epigraphical, relating to that period. 'The early faith of Asoka' and the migration of Bhadrabahu with Chandragupta are now accepted facts of History. The tendency among European scholars to post date the historical events and persons relating to India is a just antidote to the phantastic and legendary notions of indigenous writers who generally measure time by milleniums. Nevertheless we have to point out that the orientalist have sometimes overreached their work. They generally proceed on the assumption that writing is a late acquisition in Indian civilization. The learned arguments put forward on *Panini* by Goldsticker to undermine this assumption have been before the learned public for some decades. The excavations of Jaina stupas at Mathura and Mr. K. P. Jayaswal's discovery of Konika's Statue with the inscriptions try to set back the pendulum of Indian chronology to an earlier period. Speaking about the Jaina stupas Sir Vincent Smith writes as follows—

"The assumption has generally been made that all edifices in this stupa form are Buddhist. When the inscription under discussion was executed not later than 157 A. D., the Vohra stupa of the Jains at Mathura was already so ancient that it was regarded as the work of the gods. It was probably therefore erected several centuries before the Christian era."

Again says he,

"Assuming the ordinarily received date B. C. 527 for the death of Mahavira to be correct the attainment of perfection by that saint may be placed about B. C. 550. The restoration of the stupa may be dated about 1300 years later or A. D. 150. Its original erection in brick in the time of Parasvanath the predecessor of Mahavira would fall at a date not later than B. C. 600 considering the significance of the phrase in the inscription "built by the gods" as indicating that the building at about the beginning of the Christian era was believed to date from a period of mythical antiquity the date B. C. 600 for its

erection is not too early. Probably therefore this stupa of which Dr. Fuhrer exposed the foundations is the oldest known buildings in India".

When we take these historic discoveries with the Jaina traditions that a number of Tirthankaras preceded Lord Mahavira we may not be altogether wrong in supposing that adherents of Jaina faith in some form or other must have existed even anterior to Mahavira and that Mahavira himself was more a reformer than the founder of the faith. If there were Jains influential enough to build stupas in honour of their saints even anterior to 600 B. C., will it be too much to suppose that the followers of this religion might have existed in South India even before Bhadrabahu's migration to the south. In fact it stands to reason to suppose that a large body of ascetics on account of a terrible famine in the north migrated to a country where they would be welcomed by their devoted co-religionists. If the south were instead of a friendly territory waiting to receive the Sangha of learned ascetics a land populated with strangers and of alien faith Bhadrabahu would not have ventured to take with him into strange land a large body of ascetics who would depend entirely upon the generosity of the people. The Jaina tradition that the Pandya King of the South was a Jaina from very early times and that Bhadrabahu expected his hospitality might have some historical background.

Up to the time of Bhadrabahu's migration there was no split in the Jaina fold. That the schism of the Svetambaras arose about the time of Bhadrabahu I on account of the hardships of the famine is more than probable. This fact is evidenced by the complete absence of Svetambaras in the Deccan and South India. The Jains in the South and Mysore always claim to be of *Mulasangha* the original congregation.

One other interesting fact is the Migration of the Digambaras from the south to the north for the purpose of religious propagandism. "One point of agreement comes out clearly and is noteworthy, i.e. the direction of the Digambara migration." It was from the south to the north from Bhadrapur to Delhi and Jaipur. This agrees with the opinion that the Digambara separation originally took place as a result of the migration southwards under Bhadrabahu in consequence of a severe famine in Behar the original home of the undivided Jaina Community" (Prof. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle. *Ind.*

Ant. Vol XXI. Three further Pattavalis of the Digambaras. pp. 60 and 61.)

Professor Hoernle says that he has not been able to identify Bhadalpur. It is no other than Patalipura or Pataliputra which is the old name of Thiruppappuliyur or modern Cuddalore (Reports on the Archæological Survey of India, Vol. 1906-07—Article on the Pallavas by V. Venkayya) suggests that it is not the above place and identifies it with Tiruvadi a place near Panruti with many Jaina antiquities and remains. This is only a matter of detail. But still the reason given by V. Venkayya is not quite sound. The fact that Pathiripuliyur is mentioned in Devaram as sacred to God Siva will not conflict with its being also the centre of the Jainas.

Now this Bhadalpur or Patalipura is associated with our author Sri Kundakunda as we shall show later on.

Before we proceed further let us make sure about the age in which he lived and worked. For this we have clear evidence furnished in the several Pattavalis preserved by the Jainas both Digambaras and Svetambaras. After Mahavira there had been a succession of teachers as shown below —

		Years
I.—Kevalins	Gautama	12
	Sudharma	12
	Jambu	38
II — Sruta-Kevalins,	Vishnu Kumar	14
	Nanda Mitra	16
	Aparajita	22
	Govardhan	19
	Bhadrabahu I	29
III.—Ten-Purvins..	Visaka	10
	Proshtila	15
	Natchatra	17
	Nagasena	18
	Jayasena	21
	Siddharta	17
	Dhritisena	18
	Vijaya	13
	Buddhalinga	20
	Deva, I	14
	Dharasena	14

			Years.
IV.—Eleven Angins	Nakshatra	...	18
	Jayapalaka	...	20
	Pandava	...	39
	Dhruvasena	...	14
	Kamsa	...	32
			<hr/>
Total		...	468

			Years.
V.—Minor-Angins ...	Subhadra	...	6
	Yasobhadra	...	18
Bhadrbahu, II			

In the year 2 after the Acharya Subhadra's (accession to the partificate), the birth of Vikrama took place, and in the year 4 of Vikrama's reign Bhadrabahu II took his seat on the pontifical chair. Further succession will be evident from the following table.—

“Indian Antiquary” Vols. XX and XXI. The several Patta-
vals examined by R. Hoernle.

Serial number.	Names	Dates of recession		House-holder			Monk			Pontiff			Inter-calary days	Total			Remarks
		Samvat	Christian	Years	Months	Days	Years	Months	Days	Years	Months	Days		Years	Months	Days	
1	Bhadrabahu, II.	Ch S 14	BC 53	21	..		30	22	10	27	3	76	11	..	He was a Brahman by caste.
2	Guphigupta	26 Ph S. 14	31	22	..		34	9	6	25	5	65	7	..	A Panvār by caste.
3	Maghanandin, I.	36 A. S 14	21	20	44	4	4	26	4	4	68	5	A Sāh by caste.
4	Jinachandra, I.	40 Ph. S. 14	17	24	9		32	3	..	8	9	6	3	65	9	9	
5	Kundakunda ...	49 P V. 8	8	11	33	51	10	10	5	95	10	15	He had four other names (<i>abhiśā</i>) viz., Padmanandin, Vakragriva, Gridhrapichcha, Elachārya

If we take this date 8 B. C. as the reliable date of his accession to the pontifical chair then the date of his birth would be about 52 B. C. For, only in his forty-fourth year he became pontiff or an *acharya*.

What is his birthplace and scene of his activities? With regard to his birthplace we have no better evidence. Here also we have to depend upon traditions—oral and written. Let us see whether we can have any useful information from these traditions. In a work called *Punyasravakatha* Sri Kunda Kundacharya's life is cited as an example for *Shastradana* or gift of *Shastras*. The account is as follows.—In Bharatha Khanda in Dakshanadesa there was a district called Pidatha Nadu. In a town called Kurumarai in this district there lived a wealthy vaishya by name Karamunda. His wife was Srimati. They had a cow-herd who tended their cattle. His name was Mathivaran. One day when he was driving his cattle to an adjoining forest he saw to his great surprise that the whole forest was consumed by forest fire except a few trees in the centre, which retained the luxuriant green foliage. This roused his curiosity and he went and inspected that place. There he found the dwelling place of some great Muni and also a box containing the *Agamas* or the Jain Scriptures. Illiterate as he was he attributed the safety of the spot to the presence of the *Agamas* which he carried home with great awe and reverence. He put up the *Agamas* in a sanctified place of his master's house and continued to worship the same daily.

Sometime after, a religious monk visited their house. He was offered *Bhiksha* with great veneration by that wealthy vaishya. Just then this cow-herd also offered the *Agamas* to the great *Rishi*. On account of these gifts—food from the Master, and the Scripture from the servant—the *Rishi* was very much pleased and blessed them both. The Master of the house since he had no children was to have an intelligent son and the old and faithful servant would be born as the promised son of the house. The happy event came to pass and the son born to the family became a great philosopher and religious teacher. This was our author. Sir Kunda Kunda.

The story further turns upon his religious tours. The mention of his name as the wisest of mortals in the *Samavasarana* of Sree-Mantharaswami in Purvavideha, the visit of the two *Charanas* to verify the fact, his supposed irreverence to them on account of his

concentration, the return of the *Charanas* in disgust, the explanation of the misunderstood event, the reconciliation between the *Charanas* and Sri Kunda Kunda and the latter's visit to the *Samavāśarana* with the *Charanas* are all incidents mentioned in detail. Further as the fruit of his previous gift of *Shastra* he became a great leader of thought and organiser of institutions. Finally he secured the throne of *Acharya* and thus spent his life in usefulness and glory.

There is another account of his life given in "*Kunda Kundacharya Charitra*" a pamphlet published in 'Digamber Jain' office, Surat. According to this his birth-place is in the country of Malwa. His parents are mentioned as *Kundasreshthi* and *Kundalata*. The young boy Kunda Kunda was apprenticed to religious teacher for the purpose of education. Early in life he showed an ascetic disposition and therefore he was ordained as a monk and admitted into the *Sangha*. The latter part of the story is almost identical with that of the previous one.

Both these versions appear to be quite legendary. The latter judged from the names of the parents is evidently a latter construction by some imaginative mind based upon the name of the hero Kunda Kunda. The places mentioned in the former story are not easily identifiable. The only reliable information there perhaps is that the author belongs to *Dakshana Desa*. Waiving these two stories as of no material use we have to depend more upon circumstantial evidence. Emphasis must be laid upon the fact that Sri Kunda Kunda belonged to *Dravida Sangha*.

"La communauté digambara portait le nom de mūla sangha. Un synonyme de ce terme paraît. Etre Dravila Sangha, qui ne signifie sans double rien de plus que 'communauté "des pays dravidiens." Le mūla sangha comptait plusieurs sectes dont la plus importante était le Kunda Kunda anvaya" (—p. 42. Introduction, Reportaire Epigraphie Jaina).

This suggestion of Guerinot's based upon circumstantial evidence is a useful cue for our purpose.

We have to collect further evidence if possible to corroborate the theory that our author belonged to the Dravidian country.

(1) In an unpublished manuscript treating about 'Mantra Lakshna' we have the following stanza —

Dakshana desā malayā Lamagrame munir mahātma-vest.
Dacharya nāma dravidagani—dhīra dhīman

This sloka is interesting to us. The work treats about a female disciple of Elacharya, who was possessed of a Brahma Rakshasa. This possessed disciple was no doubt well-versed in Shastras but would get up on the summit of a small hill called Nilagiri by the side of the village, Hemagranu in which Elacharya lived, and would laugh and weep alternately with all hystorical violence. She is said to have been cured by Elacharya with the help of Jwalamalini Mantra. Fortunately we are able to identify all the places mentioned in the above sloka.

Malaya is the name of that part of the Madras Presidency comprised by portions of North Arcot and South Arcot traversed by the Eastern ghats. The taluks of Kalla Kurichi, Tiruvannamali and Wandewash perhaps form the central tract of this Malaya. Hemagrama which is the Sanskritised form of Ponnur which is a village near Wandewash. Close to this village there is a hillock by the name Nilagiri. On the top of this hillock on a rock there are even now the foot prints of Elacharya who is said to have performed his *tapas* thereon. Even now pilgrims frequent this village once in a year, to perform puja to the foot prints. Further the sloka mentions Elacharya to be 'Dravidagana disa'. We know very well that Elacharya, is another well-known name for Kunda Kunda.

Now this Elacharya is according to Jaina tradition the author of the great Tamil classic 'Thirukkural'. This is written in the old indigenous "Venba" metre of Tamil language. According to the Jaina tradition this work was composed by Elacharya and given away to his disciple "Thiruvalluvar" who introduced it to the Madura Sangha. This version is not altogether improbable. Because even the non-jaina tradition about the author of Thirukkumal appears to be merely another version of this one. The Hindu tradition makes Thiruvalluvar himself the author of the work. He is claimed to be a Saivite by faith and valluva by birth. His birth place is said to be Thirumayalai or Mylapuri or the modern Mylapore the southern part of the city of Madras. The work was composed under the patronage of one Elala Singh, who was evidently the literary patron of Thiruvalluvar.

This Elala Singh of the Hindu Tradition may be merely a variation of Elacharya. Thiruvalluvar figures in both the traditions, in the one as the author and in the other the introducer before the Sangha. That Mylapuri, had a famous Jain temple dedicated to

Neminath Vide Tamil work "Tirunur ruanthathi," and that it was a seat of Jaina culture is well evidenced by literary remains and antiquarian facts preserved in South India. Though the work is claimed by different religionists—Sivaites Buddhists and Jains, though there is no authentic record as to the exact faith of the author, still an unbiassed study of the work itself with the special view as to the technical terms employed in the couplets and the doctrine, religious and moral embodied in the work will constrain one to conclude that it is a treatise evidently based upon the moral principle of Vitarāga, the corner stone of Jainism. The praise of Agriculture as the noblest occupation is consistent with the traditions of the Vellalas, the landed aristocracy of South India, who were evidently the earliest adherents to Jaina faith in this part of the country.

This identification of Elacharya the author of Kural with Elacharya or Kunda Kunda would place the Tamil work in the 1st century of the Christian era. This is not altogether improbable. Dr. G. U. Pope would bring it down to a period later than the 8th century. There is no sufficient historic evidence for his belief. He is actuated by his personal bias that such a sublime work embodying highest moral ideals could not be due to the indigenous Dravidian culture alone, but must have been influenced by Christianity brought here by the early Christian Missionaries. The tradition about St. Thomas lends weight to the supposition. There is nothing to show from the internal evidence that the author of the work was aware of Christianity. The doctrines treated therein are found widely scattered in Tamil literature especially in those works composed by Jains such as 'Naladiyar' 'Aranericharam' 'Pazamozi' 'Elathi', etc. One who is acquainted with Tamil literature will not grudge the authorship of Kural to purely dravidian scholars and moralists who are uninfluenced by foreign culture. Hence we may believe with very great probability that, Elacharya the author of Kural was identical with Kunda Kunda the author of *Prabhūta triaya*, and that he lived about the beginning of the 1st century A. D.

This identification of Elacharya the author of Kural with Kunda Kunda brings in another important point of historical interest. It is an acknowledged fact that Kural is anterior to *Silappadikaram* and *Manimekhala*. The former was, written by 'Ilangovaligol' the

younger brother of 'Singuttuman Seran' the Chera King of Vangi. The latter work which is merely the continuation of the story of *Silappadikaram* was written by "Kulavanikan Sattanar" a contemporary and friend of Ilangovali. During the *pratishta* of Devi temple (Silappadikaram) Gajabhahu I of Ceylon was present, according to Mahavamsa, he reigned about 113 A. D. Kural therefore must be anterior to this date; so this also goes to corroborate the age of Elacharya or Kunda Kunda.

All these scattered facts of traditions and literary remains produce cumulative evidence to establish that our author was of Dravidian origin. That he was the leader of the Dravidian Sangha and that he was evidently highly cultured in more than one language. This use of the word 'Dravida' in the 'Dravida Sangha' must have a specific reference to the Jainas of South India, the Vellalas of the ancient Tamil literature, who strictly followed 'Kollavratam' or 'Ahimsa-dharma', and it is further evidenced by the popular use of the word in the compound, 'Dravida-brahmins' who are strict vegetarians as contrasted with 'Gouda-brahmins'. It is a well-known fact that the strict vegetarianism in daily life of South Indian Brahmins who nevertheless perform 'Yagams' involving animal sacrifice is a heritage from early Jaina culture in South India.

The early kingdoms of South India were the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pandyas. It is a well-known historical fact pertaining to South India that the Pandiyas were Jains and were patrons of Jainism. They changed their faith only during the Sivaite revival effected by *Appar* and *Sundarar* about the 8th century. That the Cheras were also Jains can be inferred from 'Silappadikana' another great Tamil classic written by a Jaina scholar the younger brother of the Chera king (who was a contemporary of Gajabahu of Ceylon). The Cholas were also off and on the Patrons of Jains though in later days they were associated with Sivaism. These three kingdoms were known about the time of Asoka. The court language in all the three was probably Tamil. Can we suppose that Sri Kunda Kunda belonged to any one of these kingdoms. Our above discussion would lead us to such a supposition and yet there is an important stumbling block in our way.

The work that is translated here is in Prakrit. Further all the commentators of 'Prabhanitratraya'—

Panchastikaya, Pravachanasara and Samayasara—mention the fact that these works were written by Kunda Kundacharya for the benefit of his royal disciple Shvakumara Maharaja. Who this Shiva Kumara Maharaja was and over what kingdom he ruled the commentators are silent about. We are once again compelled to have recourse to hypothesis. This Siva Kumara Maharaja must have been a follower of Jaina faith and must have had prakrit as his court language. Further he must have been somewhere in the south in order to have Sri Kunda Kunda as his religious teacher. This name does not occur in the dynastic geneology of the three Tamil Kingdoms—the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pandiyas. Further there is no evidence that any prince of these dynasties had prakrit as his court language.

Before we proceed to state our theory we have to dispose of the theory proposed by K B Pathak as to the identification of Sivakumara Maharaja.

The Indian Antiquary, Vol. XIV, 1885, page 15. Kunda Kunda was one of the most celebrated Jaina authors. The works attributed to him are the Prabhritasara, the Pravachanasara, the Samayasara, the Rayanasara and the Dvadasanupreksha.

These are all written in Jaina Prakrit. Balachandra the commentator who lived before Abhinava Pampa says in his introductory remarks on the Prabhritasara that Kunda Kundacharya was also called Padmanandi and was the preceptor of Siva Kumara Maharaja. I would identify the king with the early Kadamba King Sri Vijaya Siva Mrigesa Maharaja. For in his time, the Jainas had already been divided into the Nirgranthas and the Svetapatas, and Kunda Kunda attacks the Svetapata sect when he says, in the Pravachanasara that women are allowed to wear clothes because they are incapable of attaining Nirvana.

“ Chitte Chinta mayathamba tasim na nirvanam
चित्ते चिन्तामाया तम्हा तासिं खणिव्वाणं ।

Another interesting fact that we learn from his works is that, in the time of this author Jainism had not spread far and wide in these parts and that the body of this people worshipped Vishnu for he tells us in the Samayasara.

लोयसमणाय मेयं सिन्धतं पडि य दिस्सदि विसेसो ।
लोगन्न कुणदि विण्ह समणायं अण्णो कुणदि ॥

“ So no difference appears between the people and the Sramanas in respect of the Siddhanta (in the opinion) of the people, Vishnu makes (every thing) (in the opinion) of the Sramanas the Soul makes (every thing). On these circumstances, as well as on the place assigned to him in *Jaina Pattavalis* and on the fact that his writings are considered by *Jaina* scholars, both in *Dharwar* and *Maisur*, to be the most ancient *Jaina* works now extant I base my opinion that *Kunda Kundacharya* was a contemporary of the early *Kadamba King Siva Mrigese Maharaja*

The reasons cited by *K. P. Pathak* are all right. *Kunda Kunda* is later than the *Svetambara Schism* which is believed to have taken place about the time of *Bhadrabahu, I*. And perhaps at the time of *Kunda Kunda* the ordinary masses followed the vedantic form of *Vishnava cult*. But still these facts do not form a cogent reason for identifying *Siva Kumara Maharaja* with the *Kadamba King Siva Mrigese Varma*. *Mysore and Coorg* by *Lewis Rice*, page 21 “The *Kadambas* were rulers of the west of *Mysore* from the 3rd to the 6th century.” And *Siva Mrigesa Varma* ruled about the 5th century A. D. But the pontificate of *Sri Kunda Kunda* began in B. C. 8. The early dynasties by *J. F. Fleet*, page 288 of the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol I. “and this is altogether too ancient, a period for the early *Kadambas*” further we do not know whether the *Kadambas* were acquainted with *Prakrit language*. Under these circumstances we have to seek elsewhere as to the whereabouts of *Siva Kumara Maharaja*, the disciple of *Sri Kunda Kunda*

Conchipuram was the capital of the *Pallava kingdom*. The *Pallavas* ruled over *Thonda Mandalam* and also over a part of the *Telugu country* up to the river *Krishna*. *Thonda Mandalam* or *Thondainadu* was the name given to the land along the east coast between the two *Pennars*, *South Pennar* in *South Arcot* and *North Pennar* in *Nellor* and to east of the ghats. This land was divided into several *nadus* and each *nadu* into several *kottams*. It was the land of the learned. Several great *Dravidian* scholars such as the author of the *Kurral*, the great *tamil poetess Avvai*, the *Sweet Puhazanthi* the author of *Nalavenba*, all belong to *Thondimandalam*. Throughout the *Tamil literature* there are references to the literary merits and the culture of the inhabitants of *Thondinadu*. *Concheepuram* the capital of *Thondinadu* must have been a great centre of learning in the south. Students from different parts of the country went to

Conjeevaram for purposes of study Scholars thronged there for the purpose of being recognised at the Pallava Court Mayura-Sarma one of the early founders of the Kadamba dynasty went to the Pallava capital for the purpose of completing his education in the Sacred lore It was there that he quarrelled with the master of the horses who was a Kshatriya Mayura Sarma, a brahmin by birth vowed that even a brahmin could handle the weapons of warfare with skill and could found a kingdom Thus arose the Kadamba dynasty Thus the glory of Conjeevaram—the Pallava capital must have wide spread about the 2nd century A D. The kings of Conjeevaram as patrons of learning must have encouraged philosophical discussion among the representatives of the different religious sects,—the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains Taking part in such religio-philosophical discussions must necessarily, have a reaction on the personal faith of the kings. In the early centuries of the Christian era, proselytising was a common factor among the rival religionists. Great religious leader of different denominations went about from country to country converting kings and people Thus we hear from Jaina History that Samantabhadraswami visited Conjeevaram and converted Siva Koti Maharaja who became Siva Koti Muni the disciple and successor of Samantabhadra. Still later towards the 8th century Akalanka visited the capital defeated the Buddhists in open philosophical contests and converted *Himaseethala* the then Buddhist king It is not improbable therefore that the Pallava kings at Conjeevaram during the 1st century of this era were patrons of Jaina Religion or were themselves Jainas by faith.

We also know from several epigraphical records that they had Prakrit as their court language What is known as the Mayidavolu grant is an important document for South Indian History. It is in Prakrit with the exception of the last verse, which is the closing *mangala* in Sanskrit. The body of the grant is in a prakritic dialect which comes close to the literary Pali, but shows also a number of peculiarities and divergent forms Dr Buhler, Epi. Indica Vol. I, p 2 Come nearer to the usage of the Jaina and Maharashtri dialectics than to that of the Pali and older inscriptions. It is issued by the Pallava King Siva Skandavarma of Conjeevaram. Further it may be pointed out that the grant resembles in many particulars the Jaina inscriptions from Mathura. The use of the word 'Siddham' in the beginning of the grant as well as in the

Mathura inscriptions is very suggestive of Jaina origine. The most important point for us is the name of the King Sivaskanda which is merely another form of Siva Kumara. No doubt the same name occurs in the Andhra line M. J. G. Dubreuil tries to connect the two dynasties by matrimonial alliance. He suggests that the Sivaskandavarma (Yuvamaharaja) of the Pallava dynasty is the grandson of Sivaskanda Sata Karni by the daughter and received the name of the Andhra king who was his grandfather. Whether the name was so inherited or was independently adopted by the Pallava kings it is not quite material to decide here. It is enough to notice the fact that there was a Pallava king by name Sivaskanda or Siva Kumara Maharaja. He also figures as Yuva-maharaja in another grant. This name is also curiously identical with Kumara Maharaja. It is quite possible therefore that this Sivaskanda of Conjeepuram or one of the predecessor of the same name was the contemporary and disciple of Sri Kunda Kunda. This would well fit in with several facts known about Kunda Kunda. Kunda Kunda or Elacharya must have been in Thondimandalam. So also was Pataliputra the seat of Dravida Sangha a town in Thondimandalam

In this connection we have to reject two theories about Pallavas as unfounded and improbable. The Pallavas are generally supposed to be foreigners from Persia. They are identified with Pahlavas, Mysore and Coorg by L. Rice, page 53, which is the prakrit form of the Pârthava meaning Parthians, here especially the "Arsacidian Parthians" Rice further builds upon this theory another fantastic one that Chaulkyans who were sometimes the enemies of the Pallavas were by origin Salenkaians V. Venkiyya adopts the same theory though it is based upon purely etymological grounds. The Hypothesis that is based upon mere similarity of names has no great historical importance unless it is corroborated by independent evidence. This theory unfortunately lacks such a corroboration. Hence it leaves unchallenged the other hypothesis which is perhaps more probable that the Pallavas were a section of the Hindu race in the south.

Another hypothesis deserves notice before dismissal. It is the identification of the Pallavas with some aboriginal tribes as the Kurumbas. This again is based upon the use of the word "Kadavar" to designate the later Pallavas. No doubt the term "Kadavar" means the men of the forest. But there is no other ground to show that this "Kadvars" were of the "forest tribe". In tamil literature

it refers to a highly civilised and cultured race. There must be some other reason therefore for the application of the name to the Pallavas. It may be merely a contraction of "Palakkadavar" a people of the Palakkada another seat of Pallava government

Waiving these two hypothesis as improbable may we not suppose a much closer alliance between the people of the Thondimandalam and Andhras or the Andrabhrityas who succeeded the Mauryas. The term "Thondu" in tamil means 'Service' 'Thondar' may simply mean those who serve' and may be taken as the Tamil Translation of *Andrabhrityas*. The Pallavas or the Thonders therefore may merely a section of the Andhras. Settled in the south who inherited that portion of the Andhra kingdom either by matrimony or by right. This theory that the Pallavas were an indigenous race with a very high culture and civilization men related to Andrabhrityas is highly probable and is corroborated by other circumstantial evidence.

This digression into the history of the Pallavas we have had because such a political environment is required for our author Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya according to the available data about his life. We may therefore conclude that Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya wrote his *Prabhrita Triya* for one Siva Kumara Maharaja who was most probably the same as Siva Skanda Varma of the Pallava dynasty

Several works are attributed to Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya

1. Prabhrita triya (The three Prabhritas).
2. Shatpahudam
3. Niyamasara, etc.

Of these the first three, Panchastikaya, Pravachanasara and Samayasara are the best known and most important. The work that is offered in translation here is the first of these three Panchastikaya Prabhrita which treats about the five cosmic constituents

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

TO

PANCHASTIKAYASARA.

JAINISM—ADYNAMIC REALISM

When the European scholars first began to study Indian Philosophy and Indian Literature they were peculiarly sympathetic towards the idealistic systems of India. These scholars were brought up in the tradition of *Kant* and *Hegel*. *Kant* in constructing his critical philosophy emphasised the phenomenality of our experience in general. The external world including "the starry heavens above" was merely a fictitious creation of the human mind according to its own forms and categories.

Roused from his dogmatic slumber by *Hume*, *Kant* began to inquire as to the possibility of a true metaphysics. *Hume's* analysis of experience ended in throwing overboard the fundamental conceptions of experience. The reality of the Self, the objective world and even the certain law of causation were all said to be fictitious concepts based upon psychological habits but having no rational foundation. From such a sceptical shipwreck *Kant* attempted to save metaphysics. Waiving the earlier methods as dogmatic he introduced his own critical philosophy. The main characteristic of this system is the activity of the mind as opposed to the passive *tabula rasa* of the *Lockean* system. Nature is due to the co-operation of sense materials and the activity of mind. Forms of space and time and the categories of the understanding from the *a priori* constitutive elements of experience. Knowledge is confined to such an experience which is phenomenal. This phenomenal world or the world of appearance is but an island surrounded by the unknown ocean of *noumenal* reality. This may be taken to be the foundation of modern idealism.

No doubt *Kant* strongly repudiated the suggestion that his system was idealistic. It is true that he posited the existence of the thing-in-itself. But this realm of *noumenal* reality remained unknown and unknowable. It was preserved only because of *Kant's* personal predilection, hence it was the very first thing to be rejected by his successors.

Through the influence of *Hegel* the German idealism secured an inordinate potency. Peculiarly gifted with genius for system-building *Hegel* wrought out his system of idealism based on *Kantian* traditions. The thing-in-itself was got rid of as an empty abstraction. Reality was identified with concrete experience. Thus the metaphysical dualism of *Kant* was converted into an idealistic monism. According to this *Hegelian* conception reality is equal to the Absolute consciousness. All finite things and persons are reduced to merely adjectives or qualities of this Absolute which is of the nature of the spirit. It is this spirit that is the reality of which all other things of our ordinary experience are mere appearances.

Besides this idealistic monism of Germany there was another important aspect of thought that determined the trend of modern idealism. *Herbert Spencer* worked out a scheme of cosmic evolution in his synthetic system. This *Spencerian* philosophy also in its own way contributed to metaphysical monism and phenomenality of experience, hence the philosophy of the 19th century, especially towards the last quarter, had a predominant note of monism. This general proneness towards a monistic interpretation in western thought must have determined the attitude of the West towards Indian thought. Naturally were European scholars like *Max Muller* and *Deussen* sympathetically attracted by the metaphysical flights of *Sankara* and *Ramanuja*. The uncompromising monism of Vedanta was admired as the fruit of oriental culture.

The philosophical attitude is never constant. It has always been undulating between idealism and realism. In the West there is observed a distinct set back to idealism. The English philosophers like *Bradley* and *Bosanquet* who inherited the traditions of *Hegel* and who practically ruled the philosophical world are now openly challenged. This revolt against idealistic influence has manifested through different channels. Pragmatism championed by *James* and *Dewey* has exposed the hollowness of a barren Intellectualism.

The *Hegelian* doctrine of the identity between Thought and Reality and the consequent criterion of Truth in the form of self-coherence and self-consistency are openly condemned as pernicious metaphysics. "The will to believe" is recognised as an important factor in Knowledge. Experimental verification of thought

which is the method followed in Science is hailed as the true model for philosophy. Thought is studied in its true concrete setting. In as much as it is merely an instrument to secure greater efficiency of life, its value is entirely determined by its utility. Even Scientists like *Mach* and *Poincaré* acknowledge this instrumentality of thought. Concepts are only convenient fictions to comprehend Nature.

From within Oxford University itself there has sprung up a philosophical schism which boldly questions the pretensions of the Absolute. *Schiller* and *Rashdall*, *Strutt* and others attack the *Hegelian* stronghold. The Absolute is condemned because it neither satisfies the philosophical curiosity nor appeals to religious consciousness.

From France and Italy we hear a similar protest from *Bergson* and *Croce*. The former repudiating the *Hegelian* Absolute builds up a theory of the Universe based upon evolutionism. He too condemns intellect as inadequate to apprehend the inner nature of reality. His antagonism to Intellectualism is carried to an uncompromising revolt against even scientific and philosophical constructions in general. He appeals to intuition as the only means of getting at Reality. Similarly *Croce* tries to separate what is living from what is dead, in *Hegel*. Thus on all sides this German Idealism is being assaulted. But the most dangerous opponent of Idealism is come in the form of New Realism.

From an unexpected source there has come opposition. The Science of Mathematics whose alleged weakness was the strength of *Kantian* Idealism has asserted its own right to challenge metaphysics. The mathematical discoveries of *Cantor*, *Peano*, and *Frege* have once for all reclaimed certain fundamental Mathematical notions such as the concepts of infinity and continuity from the unwarranted criticisms of metaphysicians. As Mr. *B. Russell* clearly points out, modern Idealism must once for all relinquish its *Kantian* basis. It can no more depend upon the so called demonstration offered by *Kant* as to the impossibility of real space and time.

This wave of realism is further intensified by the fact that it is intimately associated with modern Science. The traditional *Hegelian* idealism of the West has been peculiarly adverse to the interest of Science. It may be safely asserted that a system of

metaphysics with does not take into consideration the method and achievement of modern Science is so far self-condemned. Nobody can be blind to the claim of Science to be a safe means for revealing truth. Its claim is so wonderfully substantiated by its achievements, that we may say that modern life and modern thought are mainly the result of modern Science. So much so any system of Metaphysics which aspires to secure the open-sesame to unlock the secrets of reality must not openly conflict with modern Science. The new realism therefore is in noble company.

When we are aware of this changed attitude in modern thought we are naturally stimulated to examine similar philosophical attitudes in the past.

What is placed before the students of philosophy herein is due to such a sympathetic scrutiny of the past. The Jaina system of thought is so peculiarly consistent with modern realism and modern science, that one may be tempted to question its antiquity. Still it is a fact, that such a system flourished in India several centuries before the Christian era.

The author of the work who is translated in the following pages lived in the 1st century B. C. Hence it is one of the earliest treatises on Jaina Thought. But the author was not the originator of this system. The *anekatarada* of the Jains must be certainly older than *Mahavira* who is believed to have revived Jainism.

The realistic tendency in oriental philosophy is not peculiar to Jainism. From the very early days, we find this principle of interpreting life and the Universe running side by side with the idealistic one. During the Vedic period we find nothing but gross form of Realism. The Vedic Gods were but magnified human beings sharing all the weaknesses and foibles peculiar to mankind. When sacrifices were offered to *Indra* or *Agni* or *Vayu* or *Varuna* with chanting of hymns, there could be no trace of any suspicion as to the reality of the world around. Not only the world of Nature was taken to be real but many of its element were imaged after man. No doubt we find a unifying tendency as an undercurrent of the Vedic thought. No doubt the Vedic Devas were subordinated to the one creative principle of the Universe—*Prajapati*.

But this wonderful period of primitive culture is followed by a barren age of sheer ceremonialism. The period of the Brah-

manas is marked by sacrificial technique. Elaborate formulæ were invented for the conduct of sacrifices. Ceremonialism took the place of Poetic effusions. This led to the ascendancy of the priestly class. The sacrificial master or *Yajaman* has to engage his priests, paying heavy fees or *dakshanas*. Religious devotion during this period degenerated into petty commercialism. But this state of things did not last long. While the priests were further elaborating the ceremonial formulæ the work of investigating the true nature reality was taken up by another band of thinkers. By this time the homogenous Aryan tribe split up into different castes. Of these sects the *Kshatriyas* or the warrior class have learned the secrets of Reality. They have introduced a new philosophical cult known as *Bṛhmadvidya*. The *Bṛhmadvidya* must have originally referred to certain spiritual intuitions obtained through introspection. Man discovered himself for the first time. The inner spiritual principle, the *Atman* is taken to be the Reality. It is neither the body nor the senses. It is something behind and beyond the corporeal frame. It is that which hears but is not heard. It is that which sees but is not seen. It is that which makes the operation of the senses possible while itself is beyond sense-apprehension. This spiritual principle was indifferently called *Atman* or *Bṛhman*. Like the Pythagorians of Greece, the Indian thinkers kept their metaphysical cult as a secret. The *Kshatriyas* who were the discoverers and custodians of the New Thought imparted it only to the deserving few. This *upanishadic* cult, for so was it named, soon replaced the earlier ceremonialism. The *Jñāna-kānda* superseded the *Karma-kānda* as the path to Self-realisation. Even the priests, discounting their ceremonial technique, flocked to the Royal courts to be initiated into the new mysteries. Thus the age was one of intense discussion, research and self-introspection. During this period again, we have the seeds of the different philosophical systems constructed in the succeeding period. No doubt *Yagnavalkya* is a towering personality of the Upanishadic age. No doubt he attempted reconciliation between the old and the new. In his hands the new wisdom appeared as distinctly monistic. But that current which is evidently the source of the later Vedantic stream was only one of the many currents of the Upanishadic wisdom. This is very well substantiated by the different systems constructed subsequent to the age. The philosophical systems in India are mainly of two classes, the orthodox and the heretic. The six

Darshanās Pūrva mīmamsa, Uttara mīmamsa or Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Viśeṣhika—constitute the orthodox systems. The heretical systems are Buddhism, Jainism, the philosophy of the Chārvakas and Brhaspatyās. Of course this classification does not mean anything but that it was made by Brahminical scholars 'orthodox' and 'heretical' are terms mainly based upon the attitude towards the Vedas. Kapila's Sāṅkhya is *Nirvāṇa* and is allied to Jainism and Buddhism in its opposition to Vedic Sacrifices. Pūrva mīmamsa or Vedānta rejects the creator and creation as *Vyavaharic* and hence the result of *Māyā*. There is a good deal of truth in the statement that it is merely Buddhism in disguise. Hence the traditional classification is justified neither by philosophical nor religious criterion.

Of these different systems which represent the post-upaniṣadic thought the Vedānta alone has become prominent. But students who study impartially the other systems will realise the importance of their contributions to Indian thought and culture.

The supremacy of Vedānta over the systems, which are to a very great extent realistic, is not a thing to congratulate ourselves. For, Realism is generally allied to science and many of the scientific theories pertaining to the constitution of the physical world are associated with these realistic schools, e.g., the atomic theory of the *Nyāya* and *Viśeṣhika* schools. Idealism even in the West either openly or covertly has been antagonistic to the interests of Science. Hence any attempt to escape from the hypnotic illusion of a powerful Idealism is to be welcomed by impartial students of Science and Philosophy.

It is not possible for us to examine in detail the several realistic schools of Indian Thought. Hence we shall confine ourselves to Jaina Philosophy which is generally neglected by many and misunderstood by the few who attempt to speak on it.

JAINA PHYSICS.

We have referred to the contribution to Indian Wisdom by the Warriors. By their plain living and high thinking they led to the emancipation of human intellect from the thralldom of barren ritualism. While the priest-craft was engaged in devising sacrifice after sacrifice their minds were dominated by a passionate desire for solving the

riddle of the Universe and for understanding the nature of the Eternal One behind the world of appearance. This dominant phase of monism centres round the court of *Janaka*. But there must have been other schools of new *Kshatriya* thought. This group of thinkers could not compromise with the traditional thought of the Vedic period. They show a strong bias towards Dualism and Pluralism. They represent the liberal tendency in the new thought itself. Whenever they encountered a conflict between their ideals and the Vedas they did not hesitate to repudiate the authority of the latter. To this left wing of the pioneers of thought we owe the Systems of philosophy such as the *Sankhya*, the *Jaina* and the Buddhistic schools. It is worthy of notice here, by the way, "that the greatest intellectual performances or rather almost all the performances of significance for mankind in India have been achieved by men of the warrior caste."*

The *Sankhya* system presupposes two kinds of existences, Physical and Spiritual, *Prakriti* and *Purusha*—rather an infinite number of *Purushas*. Salvation according to *Sankhya* consists in the differentiation between the two, matter and spirit. The individual *Purusha* secures emancipation by recognising its own intrinsic qualities as being distinct from the *Prakritic* transformations which go to constitute the cosmic evolution. Not only the genuine physical changes but also the psychological facts such as will, desire and intellect are credited to *Prakriti* while the *Purushas* remain passive spectators of the whole drama, having nothing to do with moral responsibility.

Evidently following the same dualistic tendencies but differing in the last point of moral responsibility the Jainas and the Buddhists worked out their respective systems with a deep religious colour. The Buddhists seem to have overshot their mark. Equipped with the logic of *Kshanikavâda* they reduced the whole world of reality, physical and spiritual, to mere concatenation of sense-qualities having only a momentary existence—a result independently reached after several centuries by *Hume*. Neither this sensational nihilism of Sâkya Muni nor the monistic interpretation is favoured by the Jainas. They steer clear of the two extremes. They accept the *Purushas* of the *Sankhyas*, but in their hands these *Purushas* cease to be passive spectators. They are active architects of their own destiny and

* "Philosophy of Ancient India" by Richard Garbe.

through their own effort obtain final freedom bearing all the while full moral responsibility for conduct. The *Prakṛiti* is also similarly elaborately reconstructed. It is made more definite. It is denied many of its psychological implications. It is identified with Matter in modern scientific sense and it is also given an atomic constitution. It appears under a new name—*Pudgala*. The term *pudgala* means matter. The Physical object which has the several sense qualities and which occupies space is also called *Mūṛta* and *Rūpa*, object. In speaking about *Pudgala* or matter the Jaina thinkers clearly analyse the qualities apprehended by sense perception. The qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound are generally associated with *Pudgala*.

But the Physical bodies that are apprehended by sense perception are constituted by atoms or *Paramāṇus*. It is this atomic structure of the Universe that is the interesting part of Jain Physics*. The *Paramāṇu* or atom is defined quite in terms of modern physics. Though modern physics revolutionised the concept of Atom still it has not completely annihilated it. No doubt an atom is a cluster of electrons as complex perhaps as the solar system itself. But the discovery of *radio-activity* has not interfered with the laws of Physics and Chemistry based upon atomic conception. The only change that modern Physics has introduced is that Atom is no more simple and basic but complex and perhaps secondary. In spite of this complex nature it does maintain its individuality. No modern physicist will deny that it is the fundamental foundation of the structure of the Physical Universe. It is such an atom or *Paramāṇu* that is the basis of Physical structure.

The *Paramāṇu* is neither created nor can be destroyed. It is the permanent basis of the Physical Universe. The several kinds of Physical objects are all constituted by the same class of primordial atom. The *Paramāṇu* cannot be an object of sense perception. It is in itself transcending the sense experience and as such it is practically *Amūrta* though it is the basic constituent of all *Mūṛta*, objects.

This primary atom or the material point has an intrinsic attraction to similar atoms. Thus molecular aggregates are formed by the combination of atoms. These molecular aggregates

* This doctrine of atomic structure is also prominent in the *Nyāya* and *Viśeṣhika* Schools.

are called *Skandhas** These *skandhas* are again of infinite variety; you may have a molecule constituted by two atoms or three and so on up to infinite number of atoms. Thus every perceivable object is a *skandha* and even the whole physical universe is sometimes spoken of as *Mahaskandha* or the Great aggregate. The physical objects being aggregates of atoms or *skandhas* their changes are entirely due to atomic disintegration or aggregation.

THE CONCEPTION OF MOTION.

Having accepted the reality of physical object the Jainas naturally accepted the possibility of real motion.

Motion has always been an unintelligible perplexity to the Idealist. Both in the East and the West Idealistic thinkers have fought shy of this by taking refuge in the conception of *Māyā* or appearance. It is in the western System of thought that the conception figures prominently. *Zeno* trying to defend the unchangeable adamant Absolute of *Parmenides* introduced four invincible arguments against the reality of motion. These arguments were accepted as invincible for several centuries. They figure in some form or other in Kantian antinomies and Hegelian dialectic. Even *Bradley* draws upon *Zeno's* wisdom in his attempt to condemn the realities of concrete world to the limbo of appearances. As *Mr. B Russell* points out the arguments are no more irrefutable in the light of modern Mathematics. Hence Realism need not approach the problem with any misgivings. Reality of motion has thus obtained a standing ground in the field of modern philosophy.

✓ What is more important than this is the part played by this concept in Science. For Science the world of reality is a system of energies. This dynamic conception of science has given a new dignity to the concept of motion. In spite of the unwarranted caution exhibited by Physicists like *E. Mach* and *Karl Pearson* modern Physics has once again emphasised the importance and the reality of motion in understanding the mystery of Nature. Always looked upon with suspicion by idealistic metaphysics the doctrine of Reality of motion has been welcomed by Realistic and scientific systems of thought.

But in order to accept the reality of motion of Physical objects¹ the reality of space must be postulated. Thus motion in Jaina doctrine is intimately associated with space and two other Categories

* This term also occurs in Buddhist philosophy but with a different meaning.

with peculiar nomenclature, of *Dharma* and *Adharma*. We shall examine the Jaina account of these three Categories.

Reality of space is also a crucial doctrine to determine whether metaphysics is idealistic or realistic. Curiously the non-Jaina Indian systems of thought do not pay any prominent attention to the problem of space. In fact the more influential Indian system of Philosophy, the Vedanta uses the term *Ākāśa* indifferently to denote space and ether. It is the latter meaning that is more prominent. It is to the credit of the ancient Jaina thinkers that they took a bold attempt to attack the problem and that with very great success. This fact is perhaps due to their special interest in Mathematics. An adequate solution of the problem of space and time is intimately connected with Mathematical Philosophy. It is modern Mathematics that has successfully reclaimed once again space and time from the destructive dialectic of the idealistic metaphysics. Space is indispensable to Science and Realistic metaphysics. The wonders of modern science are all associated with the reality of Space and what is contained therein. Hence to "the Indian Realism" space cannot but be real. *Ākāśa* is infinite extension. It accommodates all other real existences. On account of this accommodating function it has a portion which is filled with the other real objects. This portion is called *Lokākāśa* the world-space because it is co-extensive with the world or *Lokā*. Beyond that there is the infinite empty space which is *Suddha Ananta Ākāśa*.

The interesting fact about this conception of space is the doctrine that space also is constituted by simple elements known as *Ākāsānu* or spacial point. This *Ākāsānu* is to space what *Pudgala Paramānu* is to matter. And each *Ākāsānu* is related to each *Pudgalānu*. To borrow a convenient modern expression the class of space points and the class of material points are "similar having one to one relation."

The Jaina thinkers elaborately describe the nature of space carefully distinguishing it from matter. It is devoid of the several Physical qualities and as such it is mere extension. It should not be confounded with extended objects.

Matter and space do not exhaust the Physical conception. The Jaina thinker pertinently asks the question why the atoms should be kept together constituting the world of *Maha Shandha*? Why should they not get dissipated throughout *Anantākāśa* or infinite space? Then

there would be no world. The very fact that the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies the existence of another principle which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world form. This principle has the function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its function then is distinctly inhibitive to arrest the flying atom. This Physical principle is called *Adharma* or rest. But if *Adharma* alone were to function in the Universe, there would be absolute rest and universal cosmic paralysis; hence the necessity of a counteracting force called *Dharma*. The function of this is to guarantee free movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise. This principle of *Dharma* or motion then is merely to relieve the universal inhibition that would otherwise result.

These two principles, *Dharma* and *Adharma*, of motion and rest are described in terms that are applicable to the modern conception of *ether*. Both *Dharma* and *Adharma* pervade through space up to the world limit. They are absolutely non-Physical in nature and non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. The qualities of *Pudgala* are not found therein. Nor have they the structure of space which is constituted by space points. These two Physical principles are perfectly simple. Therefore they may be spoken of as one or as many. There are spacial, and yet are non-spacial. They are *Amūta* and *Arupa*. They are neither light nor heavy. They are not objects of sense perception. Their existence is inferred only through their function. Such are the characteristics of these two principles which are distinctly peculiar to Jaina Physics.

The movement of Physical objects and of organic beings is due entirely to other causal agency. Organic beings are capable of spontaneous movement and Physical objects move because of impact received from other Physical moving objects. Movement of these things should not be causally traced to the agency of *Dharma*. Similarly when the moving objects come to rest, rest should not be interpreted as the result of the agency of *Adharma*. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are devoid of any kind of direct causal potency. Their function is purely external and indirect. Their neutrality is so much emphasised by the Jaina thinkers that there could be no mistake about their meaning. These are in short the necessary Physical postulates without posting which the structure and form of Physical Universe will be quite unintelligible.

JAINA METAPHYSICS.

There are two important concepts in Jaina Metaphysics which are preplexing to students of Jainism, the *Astikāyas* and the *Dravyas*. The term *Astikāya* is a compound name made up of *Asti* and *Kāya* which respectively mean existing and extensive magnitude. *Astikāya* therefore means a real that has extensive magnitude. The other term *Dravya* means the real that is fluent or changing. We shall try to explain these two concept in detail.

The *Astikāya* are five in number, *Jiva* (soul) *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest) and *ākāśa* (space). These five build up the Cosmos. Space and matter are distinctly extended reals. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are indirectly related to space. Their operation is in space and is limited by *Lokakāśa*. Thus they may also be considered as related to space. Lastly Life is generally associated with body, the organic body constituted by *Pudgala* or matter. *Jiva* is operative in and conditioned by such a physical medium. In a way therefore *Jiva* also is related to space. These five existences which have spatiality either directly or indirectly are the five *Astikāyas*. These are the constituent elements of the universe or the world.

KĀLA.

Kala or time though not an element of the physical universe may be mentioned here. Since change and motion are admitted to be real, time also must be considered real. The real are absolute time as contrasted with the relative time is constituted by simple elements known as *Kalānīs* or instants. Instants, points and atoms are the characteristic conceptions of Jaina thought and in this respect it has a wonderful corroboration from the field of modern mathematics.

The Jaina thinkers in distinguishing time from the five *Astikāyas* made use of an important idea. *Astikāya* is spatiality or extensive magnitude. This extensive magnitude is denoted by a technical name—*Tiryak Prachaya* or horizontal extension.

When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series we must have the two dimensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a *Tiryak Prachaya* we have *Astikāya*. But time or *Kāla* has only *Urdha Prachaya*. The

elements are in a forward direction. The series is *mono-dimensional* or linear order. Therefore *Kāla* has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an *Astikāya*. Though it is not an *Astikāya* it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things.

Such are the characteristics of real time. This should not be confounded with *Vyavāhara Kāla* or relative time which is measured by some conventional units of either long or short duration. These conventional distinctions would have no meaning if they are not co-ordinated in a single real time series.

THE SIX DRAVYAS.

The term *Dravya* denotes any existence which has the important characteristic of persistence through change. Jaina conception of reality excludes both a permanent and unchanging real of the *Permenidion* type and also the mere eternal flux of *Heraclites*. An unchanging permanent and mere change without substratum are unreal and impossible abstractions. Jaina system admits only the dynamic reality or *Dravya*. *Dravya* then is that which has a permanent substantiality which manifests through change of appearing and disappearing. *Utpāda*—Origin, *Vyaya*—decay and *Dhrouvya*—permanency form the triple nature of the Real. To emphasise the underlying identity alone would end vedantic conception of this Real as *Brahman*. To emphasise the change alone would result in the *Kshanka Vāda* of the Buddhist. The reality as a stream of discrete and momentary elements. The Concept of *Dravya* reconciles both these aspects and combines them into an organic unity. It is an identity expressing through difference, a permanency continuing through change. It corresponds to the modern conception of organic development rather in its Hegelian aspect. It has duration, it is movement, it is the *Elan Vital*. The five *Astikāyas* and *Kāla* or time are the six *Dravyas* or the real existences.

DRAVYA GUNA AND PARYAYA

or

SUBSTANCE, QUALITIES AND MODES.

Having introduced the Jaina conception of the real let us examine the distinctions in the realm of the reals. The dynamic

substance or *Dravya* is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called *Gunas*. Thus the yellow colour, malleability, etc., will be the qualities or *Guna* of the *Dravya* gold. The *Dravyas* with its inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. This is its mode of existence or *Paryaya*. This mode or *Paryaya* is subject to change. It may be destroyed and a new mode may appear. But this creation and destruction are relevant only to *Paryayās* or modes and not to *Dravyas* the constitutive substance. That can neither be destroyed nor created. That is eternal.

The approximate parallel conceptions in the western thought will be *Spinoza's* substance, qualities and modes. Of course for *Spinoza* there was only one substance whereas here we have six distinct substances or *Dravyas*. The term 'attribute' is used in a technical sense by *Spinoza* whereas it means merely the qualities in Jaina Metaphysics. Each *Dravya* or the real has its own appropriate attributes. Matter has the sense qualities of touch, taste, etc., soul has *Chetana* consciousness, and so with the other *Dravyas*. What is the relation between *Dravya* and *Guna*? The reals and their qualities? This is an important problem even in modern metaphysics. There have been two distinct answers proposed by philosophers. One answer always emphasise the permanent basis as the real and the other the changing qualities. The former condemns change as mere appearance or *Māya*, whereas the latter condemns the permanent substance as a mere figment of imagination. The former school generally ends in agnosticism and maintains that the real is unknown and unknowable. The latter generally ends in scepticism and sweeps away in a flood of doubt the fundamental concepts of life and world, of morality and religion. In India we have *Advaita Vāda* as an example of the former and Buddhism of the latter. In the West the philosophers, like *Locke* and *Kant* may be mentioned as representatives of the former school and *Hume* may be taken as a type of the latter.

The problem is once again taken by *Bradley* who after an acute analysis condemns it to be insoluble. Hence according to his own dialectic the thing with its qualities is self-contradictory and therefore an appearance. This is a conclusion which goes clean against science and common sense. Thing-hood is not after all a self-

contradictory notion. For the Jains it is a fundamental concept. The thing or *Dravya* as it is a dynamic entity is always flowing. It has no existence apart from its qualities which in their turn are not really distinct from the *Dravya*. The thing-in-itself apart from all the qualities is merely an empty abstraction. The qualities themselves are not merely momentary fleeting sensations. The thing exists in and through its qualities and the qualities related and organised constitute the thing. The difference between the two is only a difference of reference and not difference of existence, in the technical language of Jaina metaphysics, the anyatva between *dravya* and *guna* is only *vyapadesamâtîa*. They do not have *piadesapiaduktva*. Hence they are one in reality though having distinct nomenclature and reference

Paryâya is another technical term demanding careful understanding. *Paryâya* means mode of existence. This again is viewed from two different aspects, *arthaparyâya* and *vyanjana-prayâya*. We have already mentioned that *dravya* is but an entity that is continually changing. This triple nature of reality that is permanency through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to *dravya* a characteristic mode of existence every moment. This continuous flow of the real is parallel to the continuous flow of the duration of time. This intrinsic change of *dravya* is known as *arthaparyâya*. All the six *dravyas* have this *arthaparyaya*. What is *vyâñjanaparyâya*? It is not merely the cross section in the continuous flow of *dravya*. *Vyâñjanaparyâya* has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence as a pot, for example for a certain duration of time. This *paryâya* of pot is *vyâñjanaparyâya* of *pudgala*. Similarly for jiva. The continuous change that takes place in consciousness is Jiva's *arthaparyâya*. Its existence as a particular organism as a man or a *deva* with determinate age is the *vyâñjanaparyâya* of Jiva's. Thus *Jiva* and *pudgala* have both the kinds of *paryâyâs* whereas the other four *dravyas*, have got only *arthaparyâya* alone. The reals are thus exhausted by the six *dravyas* with their respective *gunas* and *paryâyâs*.

Since these *Dravyas* are reals they have *satta* or *astitva* or existence as their common characteristic. From this point of view

of *satta* all the *Dravyas* may be brought under one class. Though from the class point of view all the *dravyas* are one, still the *satta*, their common characteristic should not be abstracted and postulated as the unitary substance of which the other *Dravyas* may be taken as *pariyayas*. This *ekanta* view is condemned as unwarranted and erroneous. The six *Dravyas*, in spite of their common characteristic of *satta* are fundamental and irreducible one to another.

One more point and we may leave this topic. A thing in concrete world is therefore a *pariyûya* of any one of the *Dravyas*. It is also otherwise called *artha*. An *artha* or a thing is a corporate unity of an infinite number of qualities, just as the Cosmos is a system of infinite number of *arthâs*. The one is extensive and the other is intensive; but both are infinite wholes. According to Jaina Philosophy therefore, we require an infinite thought to apprehend them completely. He who cannot know a thing completely cannot know the world completely and conversely he who cannot know the world completely cannot know even a single thing really and completely. This particular attitude of the Jaina thinkers reminds us of Tennyson's lines in, "*A flower in the crannied wall*" "If I could know thee root and all I could know what God and man is."

Having spoken of the *Dravyas* in general, let us try to explain *Jiva-dravya* a little more in detail.

JAINA BIOLOGY.

Perhaps it is inaccurate to speak of biology in the system before us. The science of biology as such is peculiar to modern age; hence we are not quite justified in expecting such a scientific conception in a work of pre-Christian era and which is perhaps of the same age as of Plato and Aristotle. Naturally therefore, the ideas about the organic world are curiously intermixed with various mythic and fantastic conception relating to being of Hell and *Scarga*. Eliminating all these as irrelevant we still have considerable material to enable us to have an insight into the ancient ideas about life and living beings.

One important conception that would strike the reader in the very beginning is the organic unity of the plant and the animal world. Vegetable kingdom is distinctly organic. Its nature was accurately observed and carefully described. The whole plant world is included in the class of organisms having one sense, i. e. the senses of contact. Then the world of animals and insects is classified according to the

same principle of sense organs. The animal world beginning with such insects as earthworm and ending with man is brought under four main groups, organisms, with two, three, four, and five senses.

PRANAS.

Associated with organisms there is the Conception of *Prāṇas* or the essential characteristics of living beings. These are mainly four. *Balaprāṇa*, *Indriyaprāṇa*, *Ayuh Prāṇa*, and *Uchhvasa—nichhvasa Prāṇa*. Every organism implies certain capacity of spontaneous activity. This capacity for action is *Balaprāṇa* or life potency. Every organisms must possess some kind of sense awareness. This implies the possession of a sense organ and the capacity to apprehend the environment through that sense. The number of sense organs is different according to stages of organic development. Next is *Ayuh Prāṇa* or duration of life. Every living organism has a limited duration of life. This organic capacity to persist through a certain duration is *Ayuh Prāṇa*. And lastly respiration. There is no organism without this *Prāṇa* of *Uchhvasa—nichhvasa*. These four main *Prāṇas* are the essential attributes of organic beings.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF BIRTHS.

One other interesting point is the enumeration of the different means of birth of organisms. Young ones may be produced from *Garbha*. These are *Garbhajāy* young ones produced from the womb. Then the *Andajās*, the young one produced from eggs. Thirdly *Sammurchana* or spontaneous generation. This refers to minute organisms. And lastly they speak of *Upapadikās* in the case of *Devas and Narakas*. The last one of course we may treat as beyond scientific pale. The recognition of spontaneous generation is a point deserving special emphasis.

MICROSCOPIC BEINGS.

Another fact deserving notice is the early recognition of the existence of microscopic organisms. These are called *Sukshma Bhendriya Jivas* or microscopic organisms having only one sense. These are said to fill the earth, air, water and fire. The possibility of microscopic organisms in fire seems a little too fantastic*. But in the case of the other three we need have no hesitation as they are fully established by modern Science.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that *H. Jacobi's* conjecture that Jainisms is very ancient though historically true rests on an

*For the verification of this, one must look to the result of further scientific investigation.

unwarranted assumption as to this *Jivanikāyas*. He interprets (vide his translation of *Tattvarthadhigama*) this *Jivas* in earth, air, water and fire in such a way as to suggest that Jainism is or was once at least, a kind of Indian fetishism which believed in the souls of earth, air, etc. Then what is the purpose of calling these *Lokshma Ekendriya Jivas*? What is the meaning of this distinction between *Jiva* and *ajiva*, *chetna* and *achetna*?

The different organisms mentioned above are *jivas* or souls in association with matter or *pudgala*. If you look at the system of metaphysics as a whole, you have the picture of an infinite number of *jivas* caught in the vortex of matter. Souls surrounded by a soulless environment. This picture is extremely analogous to the cosmic picture of the *Sankhyas*. An infinite number of *purushās* submerged in an ocean of *prakṛiti* and drifting along the current of prakṛitic evolution. But here instead of one homogeneous *prakṛiti* constituting the environment of the *purushās* we have the five *ajiva-dravyas* forming the appropriate stage for the enactment of the spiritual drama of the souls. The primary characters are *Jiva* and *Pudgala*. The others make the things go. The whole cosmic evolution is due to the interaction between soul and matter. According to Jain thought this entanglement of *Jiva* in the vortex of matter is *Samsāra*. 'How could *achetna pudgala* bring about such a calamitous result? *Pudgala* or matter in a very subtle and fine form fills the cosmic space.' This form of *pudgala* is spoken of as *Karma prayogya pudgala*—matter fit to manifest as *Karma*. In this cosmic space are also the *Jivas*. *Jivas* by their impurity of heart led to formation of subtle material cocoon or Karmic bodies which retard and obstruct the intrinsic spiritual radiance of the soul. When once this subtle deposit of matter is begun, the grosser encrustation of matter and the formation of organic bodies is inevitable according to psycho-physical laws. Here we have to notice one important point. Even such a great oriental scholar like *Hermann G. Jacobi* makes the ambiguous and misleading statement that *Karma* according to Jains is purely material and he further suggests that since they speak of a combination between *Jiva* and *Karma*, Jains assume that soul is of some subtle matter thus making the combination between the two possible. This is extremely misleading and far from the truth. There is neither combination nor direct causal relation between soul and matter. Jains speak of *bhāva-karmas*

as distinct from dravya-karmas. The former psychological *karma* is immediate to *jiva*. The latter material is mainly concerned with the building up of the bodies. No doubt the two are associated together, yet the two are distinct and separate. *Jiva* is *chetana* and *sarva* is *Achetna*.

This conjoint existence or *samsara* is *Anadi*, without beginning. Through its congenital impurity of the heart soul is thrown into impure environments from time immemorial, though there can be an end to the state of existence. This end consists in securing spiritual freedom and perfection through obtaining the purity of the heart which in its turn leads to the destruction of the material encasement. Thus the life of the soul in *samsara* is an infinite series without beginning but with an end which is *Moksha*.

JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

Jiva is the central conception of Jaina system. Its nature is *Chetana* or consciousness. *Jiva* and *Chetana*, life and consciousness are co-extensive. Wherever there is life there is consciousness. Even in the lowest class of organisms we have to posit existence of consciousness. But this does not imply that in every living organism there is explicit consciousness. In very many cases consciousness may be latent and implicit. In the lower organisms it is mainly implicit and latent, in man generally explicit and in certain exceptional cases of men having higher spiritual development consciousness may be supernormal.

Jiva with its characteristic of *Chetana* is entirely distinct from *Pudgala* or matter. It cannot be apprehended by sense perception; hence it is *Amūrta*. The qualities which are generally associated with matter such as colour, taste, etc., have no relevancy in the case of *Chetana*.

Jaina Psychology is thus based upon the metaphysical assumption of *Jiva* which is of the nature of *Chetana*. It is not a "Psychology without a soul." This general nature of *Chetana* or consciousness manifests in two ways, *Darsana* and *Jñāna*, Perception and Understanding. These two modes of consciousness are mainly cognitive or thought elements, Consciousness includes also emotion and will. The effective and conative elements are also recognised by Jaina system. Affective states or emotions are the general characteristics

of *Samsari Jiva* or living beings in our ordinary sense. Conduct or behaviour is also assumed to be the natural manifestation of life. *Cháritra* or conduct is also associated with all *Samsari Jivas*. Thus from the point of view of modern Psychology consciousness has a threefold function and this is also assumed in Jain system

This tripartite division of consciousness is expressed in another way also. In describing the characteristics of *Jiva* its *Chetana* character is said to manifest not only in *Jñāna*, *Darsana*-understanding and perception but also in *Karma Chetana* and *Karmaphala Chetana* awareness of action awareness of pleasure pain. The recognition of the threefold aspect of consciousness may be illustrated even from the conception of a perfect being. The characteristics of a perfect being are *Anantajñāna*, *Anantadarsana*, *Anantarīya*, and *Anata sūkha*—infinite Knowledge, Infinite perception Infinite power and Infinite Bliss. The other characteristics are irrelevant to our purpose. The first two of the enumerated qualities Infinite knowledge and infinite perception are distinctly cognitive. Infinite power implies activity or conation and infinite bliss the hedonic experience. Thus throughout the Jain account of life the three aspects of consciousness are assumed.

SOUL AND BODY.

Every organism or a *Samsari Jiva* is an organic unity of two distinct entities, *Jiva* and *Pudgala*, soul and body. Naturally therefore there crops up the problem of the relation between the two. Soul is *Chetana* (consciousness) *Amūrta* (non corporeal) *Ārūpa* (non-sentient) whereas body has the opposite qualities in each case. One may be said to be the contradiction of other. The Dualism is so emphatically expressed here as in *Cartesianism*.

The term body implies two different things. The gross body that we actually perceive through our senses. This is constituted and nourished by matter taken in the form of food, etc. This body is every moment changing and will be given up by the soul after a certain period. Besides this gross body there is for every *Jiva* a subtle body known as *Karmāna Sarīra*. This body is constituted by subtle material molecules known as *Karma Pudgala*. This subtle body may also be changing. But still it is a necessary and inalienable appendage of *Samsari Jiva*. This is transcended only in the perfect state. In discussing the relation between the states of this *Karma Sarīra*

and the states of *Jiva*, Jainism makes an important distinction between Upādāna Karta and Nimitta Karta, substantial cause and external cause. Mental states are the modifications of the mind and Physical states are the modifications of matter. Mind is the Upādāna Karta of psychical states and matter is the Upādāna Karta of physical changes and yet physical states and psychical states may be mutually external conditions. The causal activity contemplated here is a bit obscure. One Psychical State is due to the immediately antecedent psychical state and similarly one physical state is the result of its own antecedent. Thus mental series in a way is independent of physical series. But still a mental change may be externally determined by a physical change and the physical conversely by the mental change. The relation between the physical and the mental is purely external. In the technical language of the system one is the Nimitta Karta of the other. So far as we are able to make out, the meaning seems to be this, a mental change is due to two conditions one an Upādāna Karta a mental antecedent and another Nimitta Karta a physical antecedent. The mental change is the result of both these antecedent conditions physical and mental. Similarly a change in the body is to be traced to two conditions an Upādāna condition a physical antecedent in this case and a Nimitta condition a mental antecedent. The system emphasises the causal interrelation between mind and matter even though the interrelation is one of external condition. The reason given for accepting this interrelation is the reality of moral responsibility. If there is no causal interrelation between mind and matter why should a person be taken responsible for his conduct. If moral responsibility is real, if moral evaluation of conduct is genuine then conduct must be the intimate expression of the personality.

Though the discussion is between *Jiva* and its *Karmanā Sarīra* the discussion and its conclusion may very well be taken as relevant to our problem of the relation between soul and body. The whole discussion may be taken as expressing the views in regard to the wider problem. Soul and body are capable of causal interrelation and a change in one always involves two antecedents, one physical and the other psychical. If causal interrelation is not admitted certainly ethical value will remain unexplained and unintelligible.

SENSATIONS AND SENSE ORGANS.

The sense organs recognised in the system are the usual five. But sometimes *Manās* or mind is also spoken of as an *Indriya*.

Indriyas in general are of two kinds. *Dravya Indriya* or the physical sense organ and *Bhāva Indriya* the psychical counterpart. Sense-awareness is the result of the contact between *Dravya Indriya* and the physical object sensed. It is assumed of course that only physical objects or *Pudgala* that can be apprehended by sensation. This contact may be direct or indirect. In the case of sight the contact is indirect. The object perceived by vision is not brought in contact with the eyes. The objects in space are revealed to us by light or *Jyoti*. It is through being illuminated they are apprehended by vision. The exact operation of light on the eyes is not further explained. In the case of the other senses we have direct contact. But the direct contact may be *Sthūla* or *Sūkṣma* gross or subtle. In the case of contact and taste we have the direct contact with the gross object. But in the case of smell we have contact with minute particles of the object smelt. In the case of sound also we have *Sūkṣma* contact. But in this case what the ears come in contact with is merely a kind of motion. Unlike the other Indian system of thought which associate sound with *Ākāśa* Jaina system explains the sound as due to the violent contact of one physical object with the other. It is said to be generated by one *Skandha* knocking against another *Skandha*. Sound is the agitation set up by this knock. It is on account of this theory of sound the system speaks of an atom or *Paramanu* as unsounding by itself. Thus in all these cases the environmental stimulus is either directly or indirectly a physical object. Sense perception is the result of the contact between two physical things *Dravyendriya* on the one hand and the stimulus from the object on the other hand.

ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS.

The next interesting point is the analysis of the different sensations obtained through different sense organs. Through the eyes we have the apprehension of five colours. Visual sensations consist of the five elements or *Pancha Varna*. But we have to note here that sensation of white is also included as one of the colours. In this respect the term *Varna* or colour is used in its popular sense and not in the scientific sense. Similarly taste is of five kinds, pungent, bitter, sweet, sour and saline. These five tastes are obtained through the tongue which is *Rasanendriya*. Skin is *Sparsanendriya* and through it the following eight kinds of cutaneous sensations are obtained light and heavy, soft and hard, rough and smooth, and

cold and hot sensations, four pairs of opposite senses. These cutaneous sensations include sensations of temperature, contact, pressure and muscular or kinæsthetic sensations. Sensation of smell is only of two kinds, *Sugandha* and *Durgandha*. Sound sensations are of infinite variety. The different kinds of sounds natural and artificial, purposive and non-purposive, articulate and inarticulate, musical and non-musical are spoken of

SENSE PERCEPTION

What we directly apprehend through a sense organ is not merely particular sensation but the object. Sense perception is known as *Darsana*. *Darsana* is the perception of a physical object. *Darsana* may be *Chakshu Darsana* and *Achakshu Darsana*. *Chakshu Darsana* means perception of an object through visual sensation. *Achakshu Darsana* means perception through the other senses. *Darsana* or sense perception not only implies the passive receptivity of the mind but also the active interpretation of the received stimulus, i.e. *Darsana* means the complication between the datum and mental construction. This is implied in the description given of "knowledge by acquaintance" or *mati Avagraha*, *Eha*, *Avaya* are different stages of sense perception. *Avagraha* refers to roughly the datum. But the datum does not mean anything. It is merely the understood patch of colour, e.g. in the case of visual sensation. At the presentation of this visual patch there is the questioning attitude of mind which is represented by the term *Eha*. As a result of this examination we may interpret the object. This interpretation is *Avaya*. In the case of visual perception these three different stages may not be clearly distinguishable. But in the case of auditory perception we may clearly recognise the different stages. *Darsana* then includes all these three stages, then only is the thing known to us.

[These three stages together with *Darsana* or recollection constitute the different forms of *Mati Jñāna*. But recollection is connected with memory and need not be brought under sense perception.]

In this connection we have to notice one important point. The term *Darsana* is not confined to sense perception. It is a general term including the sense perception as well as the supernormal perception of other kinds. Two kinds of supernormal perception are generally mentioned by Jaina thinkers, (1) *Avadhi Darsana* (2)

Kevala Darsana. *Avadhi Darsana* refers to the peculiar kind of clairvoyant capacity which is able to perceive things and events in distant places and also in distant times either past or future. Objects and events not evident to the normal sense perception are obvious to *Avadhi Darsana*. But the objects of *Avadhi* perception appear as if they are perceived normally close at hand. It is said that *Avadhi Darsana* is concerned with only *Rupa Dravyas* or perceptual objects. The other *Darsana* known as *Kevala Darsana* is perception *par excellence*. It is associated with perfect consciousness. This faculty is acquired only after complete emancipation from *kārmic* bondage. To this perfect perception the whole reality is obvious. In short it refers to the all-perceiving faculty of *Paramātma*. What we are justified in speaking of in connection with Jain psychology are the normal sense perception (*Chakshu Darsana* and *Achakshu Darsana*) and the supernormal clairvoyant perception (or *Avadhi Darsana*).

JÑĀNA OR KNOWLEDGE

Jaina account of cognition is also interesting. *Jñāna* or understanding is said to be of different kinds according to means employed in cognition. (1) *Matī Jñāna*, is knowledge obtained through the normal means of sense perception and memory based upon the same. This is the common inheritance of all persons. (2) *Śruta Jñāna* is knowledge obtained through testimony of books. This corresponds to knowledge by description. It is acquired by study. Therefore it is possessed by only the learned men. Besides these two means of knowledge there are three other supernormal means of understanding. These are *Avadhi^{śruti} Jñāna*, *Manā Paryaya Jñāna*, and *Kevala Jñāna*. *Avadhi Jñāna* is the understanding of the nature of the objects obvious to *Avadhi Darsana*. *Manā Paryaya Jñāna* refers to a peculiar kind of telepathic knowledge acquired by persons of certain stage of spiritual development. It is a means by which knowledge of alien minds is obtained. The last one of course refers to the perfect understanding or the omniscience of the Perfect Being or *Purushottama*. Treating this as the metaphysical ideal we have to recognise the other four kinds of cognition as relevant to our psychological interest.

AFFECTION

Affective consciousness plays a very important part in Jaina metaphysics. The whole religious discipline is directly secured by

a stoic freedom from the affective influence of environmental objects. Experience of pleasure, pain, is assumed to be the specific characteristic of organised beings or *Samsâri Jivas*. In one of the descriptions given of Jîva it is mentioned that Jîva has the tendency to continue beneficial activity from which pleasure results and to discontinue the harmful activity from which pain results. This is so very analogous to biological description of the instinct of self-preservation Jîva equipped with this quality naturally desires pleasant things and avoids unpleasant things.

Since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical system several facts of psychological interest are thrown into the background of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless there is no mistake about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by Jaina thinkers. Experience of pleasure and pain, is generally referred to as *Kâma-phala Chethana* or consciousness of the fruits of action. Pleasure and pain are always viewed in relation to action.

Bhâva or affective consciousness is of three kinds, *Sâbha Bhâva*, *Asubha Bhâva*, and *Suddha Bhâva*. Feeling of pleasant nature, feeling of an unpleasant nature, and feeling of pure nature. The last one refers to the enjoyment of Self by Self. As such it may be taken to mean the spiritual experience of the pure Self. The other two kinds of the feeling are relevant to the point. These are corresponding to the normal feelings generally recognised by students of psychology. These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environment to which there may be attraction or aversion in the Jîva. Thus on the one hand feelings manifest as the result of *Karma* or action and on the other hands they are determined by objects in the environment.

A very interesting classification of emotions is given in connection with the conditions of *Kâmic* bondage. These emotions are generally divided into two main classes *Sakashâya*, and *Akashâya* those that have the tendency to colour or stain the purity of the soul and these that have not that tendency. The *Sakashâya* ones are *Krodha*, or anger, *Mâna* or pride, *Mâya* or deceitfulness or dissembling and *Lobha* or greed. The *Akashaya* emotions are

Hâsyâ—laughter.

Ratî—feeling of attraction

Aratî—feeling of repulsion

Soka—sorrow.

Bhaya—fear.

Jugupsā—feeling of disgust which may manifest in hiding one's own weaknesses

Striveda—peculiar sex feeling of women

Pumsaveda—peculiar sex feeling of men

Napumsaka Veda—The corrupt sex feeling of eunuchs

Again certain instinctive tendencies are also referred to as *Sam-māns*. These are *Ahāra*, *Bhaya*, *Maithuna*, and *Parigraha*—hunger, fear, sexual appetite and acquisitive instincts. There are corresponding feelings to these instinctive appetites which may colour the consciousness of a *Jīva*.

The feeling aspect of sensations is implied in the very classification of the sense elements. The feeling aspect is predominant in the case of smell and taste whereas it is indirectly associated with auditory and visual sensations. The rest of the references to feeling of pleasure pain are purely metaphysical and therefore they are more of religious interest than of scientific interest.

CONATION OR THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ACTION.

Ātma is not only *Jñāni* and *Bhoktā*, the knower and the enjoyer but is also a *Kartā* or the agent. This may be considered as the central idea of Jain system. Soul by its own activity is able to make or mar its own destiny. The Theory of Karma is intimately associated with the causal agency of *Ātma*. As the result of this metaphysical assumption we have several facts of psychological importance mentioned in the System. Even in the lowest organism there is the tendency to continue pleasurable activity and to discontinue painful activity. This primitive tendency of life or *Jīva* is just the conative activity which develops into conscious choice of an end or purpose which is the characteristic of volitional activity. In human beings this conative tendency is naturally associated with *rāga* and *dvesha*, desire and aversion.

Conative activity in general is denoted by the term *Karmachetana*. This *Karma chetana* or consciousness of activity is to be associated with the Zoological Kingdom—*Trasa Jivās*. The plant world or the world of *Epandriya Sthavara Jivās* is devoid of this *Karma Chetana*. They have *Karma Phala Chetana* alone whereas the other *Jivās* have

both and also *Jñāna Chetana* to boot. The importance of volitional activity is clearly testified by the part it plays in the Jaina System of ethics. The psychology of will is also connected with another doctrine of psychological importance. *Mohaniya Karma* which is considered to be the root of all evil has two aspects cognitive and conative. What is known as *Diṣasana Mohaniya* interferes with the faculty of perception and belief *Charitra Mohaniya* is a sort of corruption of the will ; it misleads the will and thus leads the *Jīva* towards evil . We shall consider the relation between *Karma* and *Ātma* when we go to consider the ethical aspect of Jaina system . In the meanwhile let us see what Jaina logic is.

JAINA LOGIC

UNDER this head we have to consider the following three points:—

1. *Pramāṇa*
2. *Naya*
3. *Saptabāṅgi*

Pramāṇa and *Naya* refer to understanding. (*Pramāṇanayai-radhiḡamaḡa*) Knowledge is through *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* *Pramāṇa* refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge *Naya* refers to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two means of enriching knowledge. *Saptabāṅgi* refers to the theory of predication which is peculiar to Jaina System

Pramāṇa is of two kinds, *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa* and *Parokṣa Pramāṇa*,—Immediate Apprehension of reality and Mediate Apprehension of reality . Ordinarily the term *Pratyakṣa* refers to sense perception. This ordinary meaning of the word is considered secondary and subordinate by Jaina thinkers. They call it *Vyavaharika Pratyakṣa* . The real *Pratyakṣa* is known as *paramārthika pratyakṣa* or that which is apprehended by *Ātma* immediately and directly . According to this view sense perception is indirect and mediate, for the sensory object is apprehended by *Ātma* only through the medium of sense organs.

Pramāṇās in general are five, — *Mati*, *Śruti*, *Avadhi*, *Manahpariyayā*, and *Kevalā*. These five are already explained in connection with cognition. Of these *Mati* and *Śruti* are considered *Parokṣa Pramāṇās*. The other three are considered to be *Pratyakṣa Pramāṇās*.

There is one interesting fact about these *Pramānās*. The standard of reality is distinctly experienced in its normal and super-normal aspects. The normal experience would be *Matī Jñāna*; the super-normal experience would include *Avadhī*, *Manahpariyaya* and *Kevala*. These four would constitute direct knowledge by the Self, but our experience is also enriched by the testimony of others. Therefore the testimony of others transmitted through literature is also considered as one of the *Pramānās*. This is *Śruta Jñāna*. This is not given the supereminent place which it has in the other Hindu systems of thought. The *Vedās* form the ultimate *Pramāna* for the *Brahmanical* systems. Every other principle of knowledge is subordinated to the *Vedic* revelation which itself must be implicitly accepted. But the Jainas recognise *Śruta Jñāna* as only one of the *Pramānās* and even then it is only subordinate. Direct and Immediate Apprehension is the ultimate standard of truth. The *Pramānās* are all distinctly human and they are not considered to be eternal. It is this humanistic element in the system that is specially interesting. Three of these five *Pramānās* have the possibility of being corrupted by adverse psychological conditions. Thus they will become misleading or corrupt *Pramānās* or *Pramanabhasas*. Thus *Matī Jñāna* may become *Kūmatī*. This evidently refers to illusory and hallucinatory perceptions and erroneous inferences. *Śrutī* may become *Kūśrutī*. This would be feeding ones intellect with fictitious philosophy and unreliable literature. False and misleading clairvoyance is the corrupt form of *Avadhī* which is technically called *Vibhanga Jñāna*, hence right *pramānās* would exclude these three corrupt forms of *Kūmatī*, *Kūśrutī*, and *Vibhanga*. But in the case of the other two *Pramānas* there is no such possibility of falsification. *Manahpariyaya* is the supernormal faculty acquired after great spiritual development and *Kevala* is the Ideal reached after complete emancipation. Hence in these two cases there is no chance of extraneous interference. The right forms of the former together with the latter two constitute the *Pramānas*.

From the short enumeration of the *Pramānas* given above it is clear that the Jaina doctrine of *Pramānas* is slightly different from that of the Hindu Systems in general. The *Pramānas* such as *Pratyaksha*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna*, *Sabha*, etc. which are variously stated by the various systems of Hindu Philosophy are all

comprehended by *Matī Jñāna* and *Śrūta Jñāna*. Even in these two cases objective corroboration seems to be the most important criterion of the true *Pramanas*. In addition to these two normal sources of Knowledge they recognise the other three supernormal sources. Thus they recognised not merely the intellect but also the higher intuition which *Bergson* emphasises. *Bergson* is no doubt right in placing intuition over intellect. Intellect is the analytic process of understanding things. Hence it shares the artificial nature of the process of analysis. It is no doubt incapable of accounting for the vision of artist or the poet. The *Daemon* of *Socrates* and the *Christ* of *St. Paul* are quite beyond the pale of intellectual analysis. The Reality like the *Proteus* of ancient myth slips out from the grip of intellect but is quite evident to the supernormal intuition. The existence of such a supernormal faculty in man we have an inkling of, through the lifting of the veil by recent psychic research. The normal personality is but a fraction of the total personality which is more of the subconscious nature. It is the sub conscious self that seems to be the storehouse of spiritual power and wisdom. One who has learnt to tap the resources of this hidden self, becomes a genius in the field of art or morality. To him is given the open *seasame* to unlock the secrets of the universe. A philosophy of knowledge, therefore, must necessarily take cognisance of such a supernormal intuition.

But to recognise this is not to deprecate the intellect altogether. According to *Bergson* what is revealed by the intellect is quite untrustworthy. Such a summary condemnation of the intellect would be an unwarranted impeachment of modern Science. Intuition apotheosised at such a cost would be no more than a philosophical fetish. A more reasonable attitude would be to recognise both the intellect and intuition as adequate means of apprehending the nature of reality so long as they have corroboration by objective evidence. Rationalism which could not accomodate any supernormal faculty and mysticism which could not stand the glare of Reason, both are inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable. The Jaina doctrine of *Pramānas* is able to accommodate both from the lowest to the highest in the order of gradation.

Jñāna and Jñeya

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE.

The recognition of the distinction between the *Pramanas* and, *Pramānābhasās* implies an important philosophical principle—The existence of an objective reality which is beyond and beside knowledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the case Jain philosophy would not be different from *Advaita*. Its whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is apprehended by perception or *darśana* and understood by intellect or *Jñāna* which two are but the manifestations of *chetana* the intrinsic nature of the soul. No where in the Jain system is it even casually implied that the object of Knowledge is in any way modified or interfered with by the process of Knowing. In order that *Darsāna* may reveal the form and *Jñāna* may discover the nature there must be an object postulated, an object which is logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an independent object of Knowledge should not be interpreted to imply the passivity of the intellect. The continuous activity of the *Jiva* or soul is the central doctrine of Jain thought. Hence the intellect is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has the power of revealing its own nature as well as *non chetana* objects beyond. Thus the term *Jñeya* or the object of Knowledge includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to illustrate the nature of Knowledge. Just as light reveals itself as well as other objects which are illuminated so also *Jñāna* reveals the *tattvas* both *Jiva* and *Ajiva*. Hence it would be quite inconsistent to interpret the relation between *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* Knowledge and its object in any other way that would make both inseparable elements of any higher unity. No doubt as far as *Jiva* or soul is concerned the relation between *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* is very intimate. The soul is *Jñāni* the possessor of *Jñāna* or knowledge. There can be no *Jiva* without *Jñāna* for without it he would be *achetana* and indistinguishable from other *ajiva dravyas*, and there could be no knowledge without *Jiva* for being foundationless and off its moorings from life it will cease to have connection even with consciousness.

Thus *Jñāna* and *Jñāni*, knowledge and self are absolutely inseparable though distinguishable by name. But this very name *Jñāni* may also become *Jñeya-padārtha* the object of knowledge to his own *Jñāna*. The, *Jñāni*, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya*, the self, knowledge, and the self as object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete unity.

But Knowledge or *Jñāna* is also related to *ajiva padārthas* that is, physical objects can also be *Jñeya padārthas*.—When physical objects are the objects of Knowledge the relation of Knowledge to its object is not the same as in the previous case that between Knowledge and self as object of Knowledge *Jñāna* is distinctly alien to *ajiva padārthas* though these become as *Jñeya* related to *Jñāna* or Knowledge. The function of *Jñāna* or knowledge here is to reveal the *ajiva padārthas* in their true nature as *achetna* or physical. How could *chetana* reveal the nature of *achetana* things? This question is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswerable for the question means why *Jñāna* should have its *Jñāna* nature. That *Jñāna* though alien to the nature of physical object—these latter being *achetana* can still be related to them and reveal their nature to *Jñāni* or the knowing self—is taken as the fundamental postulate of *Jaina Epistemology*.

Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of *Jaina Epistemology* reveals the following two facts

(1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* as far as *ajiva padārthas* are concerned is purely one of external relation.

(2) As a corollary of the first we have the independent existence of *Jñeya padārthas* or objects of knowledge, of course with the exception of self, which has an internal relation to *Jñāna* or Knowledge

The distinction between internal relation and external relation requires explanation. The *Russell Bradley* controversy as to the nature of relations is an interesting though an intricate topic of modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail. It is enough to indicate what the terms mean. *Bradley-Bosanquet* school of modern idealism following the traditions of *Hegel* assume that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related. That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart from ✓

the terms will not be the same A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the *Hegelian* Idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family Society itself is an organic unity like plant or an animal body having as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the society Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality, to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real Every thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the invaluable contributions from *B Russell* He the upholder of the opposite doctrine of external relations sufficiently exposed the inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine According to him two terms A and B may have a relation R and yet the nature of the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations. To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following illustration which is very useful to the reader though crude. You may have for example a chair by the side of a table The two are in a certain spatial relation say the chair is to the south of the table If the relation is changed, (i.e.) if the chair is placed to the north of the table then according to the doctrine of internal relations both the terms the chair and the table must undergo change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This seems absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully well that there is no change in the things themselves except the change of position. To persist in the belief that the things do change in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's

own reason to the false gods of philosophy. *Russell* holding the doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change their nature inspite of the change of position. This has an important and refreshing consequence. You may have a society of human beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevant to us in this connection is that the relation of Knowledge to its object need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these two are aspects. If that were the case this alleged higher unity must have as its members both persons and things *chetana* and *achetana dravyās*. The fundamental doctrine of Jainism like that of the *Sankhya* is the distinction and the alienability between *Jiva* and *ajiva*.

This short digression into modern European thought we had for the following reason. The authors of an "Epitome of Jainism" in trying to expound the doctrine of *Syadvāda* attempt to make out that Jainism is a bold Idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off against the Realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according to one's own tastes so long as the terms are clearly defined. But what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of *Syadvāda*. Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of *ajivas*, the authors say,

"They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things in spite of the changes? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualities. They are substances according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling and perception etc., But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence; because in trying to give unity to a member of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination,

equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations, what will be left of your substance? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the existence of any one involves the existence of all the rest and how all are so connected with this particular quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as Locke had meant we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

"In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely external relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which can be known only when it is seen in a sense to be the rest. We cannot, for example, take the combination of two external independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. *The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity*" ("An Epitome of Jainism" pages 106-109)

The subject and the object merging into a higher unity sounds more like idealistic rhetoric than philosophical logic. Here we have an echo of Bradley and Bosanquet. The authors have drunk deep

of *Hegel* but they have not discerned what is living and which is dead in *Hegel*. No doubt the Jaina Conception of *Dravya* is closely allied to the *Hegelian* dialectic but the Jaina metaphysics does not contemplate the *Hegelian* absolute. The Authors who do not spare the Indian Absolutist, *Sankara*, for his misunderstanding of *Syadvāda* do not hesitate to make obeisance to his western counterpart. This inconsistency is quite glaring and the misrepresentation of Jaina doctrine is all the more surprising as it apparently proceeds from Jaina writer, a more careful study of their own system and a little less of that hypnotic illusion by and the blind adoration to the German Idealism would have enabled our authors to see that the System they expound is a bold and masterly refutation of the philosophical Absolutism of ancient India.

JAINA LOGIC.

NAYAS.

The next topic relating to Jaina Logic is about "*Nayas*." This is the second means of understanding things, the first being "*Pramāṇas*". All concrete things are extremely complex, they have innumerable qualities and relations. The Reals being such complex entities, they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension of a thing from a particular point of view is known as *naya*—an opinion or an assertion from some one aspect. Every aspect of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence *Naya* is a means of insight into the nature of Reality. Theoretically the possible *Nayas* are infinite in number since the Reals have infinite qualities and relations. But writers on Jaina Logic generally speak of seven (7) different *Nayas*. These are *Naigama*, *Samgraha*, *Vyavahāra*, *Rijusūtra*, *Sabda*, *Samabhīrudha* and *Evambhūta*. Let us try to explain these in order.

NAIGAMA NAYA.

This *Naya* seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the Scholars. *Puṣyapāda* in his commentary on Sūtra 33 of Bk 1 *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, explains the *Naya* thus. *Naigama* is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of activity. The illustrations given are:—

(1) You see a person carrying water, firewood and other necessities for cooking meals and ask him "what are you doing?" "I am cooking meals" he replies. This answer refers to the purpose or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act of cooking at the time of the answer.

(2) The Second illustration refers to a person who goes with an axe. When he is asked what he is about, he replies "I am to bring a wooden measure (*Prastha*)". He is to cut a piece of bamboo perhaps and make a *prastha* out of it. Here again this measure is only the purpose or end to be realised.

(3) In each of the two examples "*Odana*" and "*Prastha*" "food" and "measure" there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course of conduct of some duration. The course of conduct is represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In

spite of this difference, the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general purpose or aim may be said to be present in all the different stages of the course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives meaning to the different items of the series and connects them into a whole. This emphasis on the teleological element which is immanent in a course of purposive activity seems to be *Naigama naya* point of view.

The same interpretation, with the same two illustrations of 'cooking' and making a 'measure' is adopted by *SrutaSāgara*, the authors of a *Vritti* on "*Tattvārtha*" called after him *Srutasaṅgraham*. The same illustrations are again found in *Prameya Kamala Mātāṇḍa* a treatise on Logic.

This *Naigama Naya* is further sub-divided into three according to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The two illustrations refer to some present course, hence they come under—

(1) *Vartamāna Naigama*. But there may be looking back to a past event. On the morning of *Deepavali* day, you may say "To-day is the *Parinivāna Kāla* of Lord Mahavira." But Lord Mahavira does not attain *Nirvāna* on that day which you are actually speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it was on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this correspondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years. Thus we speak of the King's birth-day, the *Darbar* day every year. The assertion has meaning only because of a past event. This characteristic attribute of the present—the genuinely belonging to the past, yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation between the two is pertaining to

(2) *Bhūta Naigama*. (Past *Naigama*) Instead of looking back to the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting in the concrete present some element which *was* once associated with it, you may discover in it something which is *yet to be*. At the sight of a prince you may hail "Here comes His Royal Highness," The Prince is but Lion of the Royal family. He is not yet King, but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every *Bhavyā Jīva* a good soul as *Siddha Jīva*, a perfect soul. For somehow in

the far off future Perfection will be the goal of all; for every one is God in the germ:

Such an assertion is true according to *Bhāva Naigama*—future *Naigama*

The other way of interpreting this *Naigama Naya* is, associated with *Siddhasena* who is quoted by Hermann Jacobi under his translation of the *Sutra* 33 (referred to above) of *Umasvāti's Tattvārtha*. *Sri Deva Suri* who is quoted by *Mallishena* in his *Syādvāda Manjari* also adopts this second view. But curiously, this is not so very prominent in *Umasvāti's* own *Bhāṣya*, any how this method of interpreting the *Naya* starts with the examination of the relation between the universal and the particular, *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*. For this *Naya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems are referred to as adopting this *Naigama Naya* in an *ekānta* manner (i.e.). These two system adopt this *Naya* so far as they go, but push it to an unwarranted length *Saukhya* and *Vedānta* deny altogether *Viśeṣas*—particulars. *Buddhism* denies—*Sāmānya* universal outright Against these two extremes the above systems recognise the importance of both. The universal by itself or the particular by self will not be able to account for a concrete thing These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of both *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*, universal and particular. There can be no (*Samanya*) universal apart from the particular and no particular (*Viśeṣa*) apart from the universal and there can be no real thing apart from either This seems to be the fundamental Jain view of the Real

The very same view is said to be adopted by the *Naiyayikās* and the *Vaiśeṣikās* Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the *Naigama* point of view. But wherein the Jainas differ from the others? It is here No doubt *Naiyayikās* and *Vaiśeṣikās* adopt the *Naigama* view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the universal and the particular (*Sāmānyas* and *Viśeṣas*). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative So far they agree with the Jainas But while the Jainas believe that the distinction between *Sāmānya*—universal and *Viśeṣa*—particular, is true only in a relative way the *Naiyayikās* and the *Vaiśeṣikās* maintain that it is absolutely true,

Sāmānya is quite different and distinct from *Viśeṣa*. It is because of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands this *Naya* becomes *Naigamabhāsa*. They are *kathanchit bhinnah* and not *atyanta bhinnah*.

After explaining thus the *Naigama Naya*, *Śrī Deva Suri* enumerates three species of this *Naigama* distinction.

1.—Differentiating two qualities one from the other e. g. existence and thought are in soul *Sat chaitanyam atmani*." Here Thought is differentiated from existence.

2.—Differentiating two substances, e. g. *Dravya* is that which manifests through things and their modes,

"*Vastu paryayaḥ Dravyam*."

3.—Differentiating a thing from its attribute, e. g. a sensual person has only a momentary pleasure. "*Kṣhavarṇekam Sukhaḥ Viśhayasaktajiva*."

Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from Thought, (2) a thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure. Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way. As we saw above the very same illustrations are reproduced by H. Jacobi in his translation.

But when we attend to *Mallīshena*, we find evidently both the interpretations given in his *Syādvāda Manjari*. He begins by explaining *Naigama Naya* in the same way as *Deva Suri* or *Siddhasena* does. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book. When there is a discussion of the relation between *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*. Hence he does not want to add anything further under this *Naya* and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in *Pravachana* the Divine word. What are the two examples? He just mentions two names, and they appear to be cryptic. But this need not be altogether helpless. His words are *Pravachana Prasiddha Nilayana Prastha dristanta-dvya*, etc., *Nilayana* and *Prastha*—are the words here. In *Puṇyapāda* we have *Odana* and *Prastha*. Instead of food and a measure we have a house and a measure. The rest is quite clear. The illustrations leave us in no doubt as to the meaning of the *Naya*. House-building or making a measure refers to the purpose or the ideal. It relates to "*Samkalpa mātra*" as *Puṇyapāda* says.

The next question we have to face is 'How does *Mallishena* manage to give one explanation and to bring in the illustrations pertaining to the other interpretation? Here we must confess we are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is quoting the examples. It may refer to an another from whom both *Puṣyapāda* and *Mallishena* draw their inspiration. What justification is there for *Mallishena's* attempt to bring the two views together? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to be the common basis for both the views. In the case of house-building or measure-constructing the thing which is to be the Goal is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisation of the same. Similarly the distinction between the universal and particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one point of view may be universal from another. In fact the particular is drawn out of the universal. It is through the medium of the particular that the universal expresses its nature. If you remember this point then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent have this common foundation. Perhaps *Mallishena* had this in his mind when he interpreted the *Nāgama* one way and illustrated it in the other way. This compromise is offered as a provisional suggestion.

(ii.) *Samgraha Naya* The next *Naya* is the class-point of view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina System is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of individuals.

These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we consider them as individuals belonging to a class, our attention is directed to the underlying similarity to the exclusion of their individual and proper characteristics. From this underlying principle of classification we may consider the individuals as a whole and a Unity. Here again the unity is only relatively true. The unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number of individuals brought under the same class. But there is a great danger in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view. The individuals forming the class though spoken of as a whole and unitary class are really distinct from one another and may be really

differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals of Space and Time. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the plurality and difference would be a distinct metaphysical error. It is this erroneous application of *Samgraha Naya* that accounts for the system of *Advaita Vedānta*. Too much emphasis on the unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of *Hegelian Idealism*. Both agree in condemning the differences as appearances and *Naya* and in accepting the ultimate absolute as the one reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as the danger of this *Samgraha Naya*. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the reality and the only reality is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered the *Naya* has its own uses. But in the hands of the *Samkhya*s and *mīmāṃsika*s it becomes absolute and thus a *Nayabhāsa*.

This *Samgraha Naya* is of two kinds. *Paśā Samgraha* or the ultimate class view and *Apaśā Samgraha* or the inferior class-view. Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may speak of all things as one in the Ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things living and non-living, included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is *Apaśā Samgraha* or the inferior class view.

(iii) *VYAVAHĀRA* *Vyavahāra Naya* means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the *Chārvākās* and *Brahmaspatyās*. The whole Criterion of Reality is the Concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only *pramāṇa* of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and keeping into the future through ideal forecast are

philosophical uncertainties The same applies to the categories obtained by Intellectual analysis such as *Samānya* and *Vīśeṣa* Universal and particular

Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the *Pramāṇas* and sanctioned by *Vyavahāra* or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either *Sāmānya* or *Vīśeṣa* ? Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical abstractions The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoretically true

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path way, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearance, or illusions of *Naya* Their reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true But to go beyond to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present to deny the past and the future and to reject the philosophical categories *in toto* is to surrender reason to sense-perception is the apotheosis of convention Hence Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this *Vyavahāra Naya* though it recognises in it the soul of goodness, and an element of partial truth.

(iv) *RIJU SŪTRA* This *Riju Sūtra* is the extreme opposite of the *Samgraha Naya*. The latter denies all difference whereas *Riju Sūtra* denies all continuity and identity Reality is concentrated to mathematical present. It is purely momentary In this respect it is still narrower than the *vyavahāric* present At least for *vyavahāra* view there is a tolerable duration, for, the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this *Riju Sūtra Naya* a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet Hence a thing as being in the no more or in the not yet is sheer contradiction If it is real at all it must be in the present moment We at once recognise the identity between this *Riju Sūtra* view and *Buddhist* metaphysics Its aim is as that of Buddhism to expose the pretensions of an unchanging

metaphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to such a conception of changeless substratum Buddhist metaphysics adopts *Riju Sūtra* view and brings the centre of gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration. It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To over emphasise the neglected element of change as a set off against *Vedānta* and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to identify reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only real and to make it live in a metaphysical void is to overshoot one's mark. It is this erroneous and uncalled for accent on change to the detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality without which, change will have no meaning. It is this *Riju Sūtrabhāṣa* that the Jaina system asks us to beware of. If this principle is the sole criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing suicide to employ a suggestive phrase of *Bradley's*.

(v) *Sabda-Naya* or the implication of Terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind, the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and action may be referred to by appropriate words in the language. Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech. Thus the difference in meaning corresponds to the difference among the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term and its meaning. Variation in the term may introduce a corresponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the difference of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of speech may be said to have corresponding variations, however, slight they be. This principle of correspondence between the terms and their meanings is the foundation of the science of grammar. We have already mentioned that there is a relation to logic implicitly present in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discussion of verbal implications very often pass beyond their legitimate sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such

an exaggerated notion about the verbal implication would be not only illogical but also conflicting with common sense and convention. Jaina logicians therefore raise a note of warning against such an unwarranted application of this principle and point out the logical danger in that one-sided emphasis of the relation between *Sabda* and *Artha*

Their contention is this. No doubt generally speaking the grammatical principle or *Sabda Naya* adopted by the *Vayakianis* is sanctioned by usage. But to assume it to be an universal principle without an exception would be neglecting the difference between the relative and the absolute and identifying the partial truth with the whole and the complete one. Ordinarily each name has its own meaning. The term 'cow' is different from 'king' not merely in word but also in meaning. But this is also true. Words which are different in nature and origin may nevertheless refer to the same identical object. Exaggerated and universal application of the *Sabda Naya* of the grammarians cannot conveniently accommodate synonyms in the vocabulary. That there are synonyms and that they are distinct from one another literally no grammarian can afford to deny. Yet unswerving loyalty to his principle of *sabda naya* would constrain him to accept such an absurdity. The only way out of the difficulty is to accept the Jaina interpretation of *sabda naya*, according to which the relation between terms and meanings is a relative principle. The illustrations generally offered are the synonyms, *India*, *Sakra*, and *purandhara*, names referring to the one and the same individual, the Lord of the *Devās*. Similarly terms differing not merely in origin as the above but also in number, gender, person, case, etc., may still refer to the same individual fact. Thus *pushyaha* (masculine) *Tara* (feminine) *Nakshatram* (Neuter), in spite of difference of gender do refer to the same object,—Star. Again in a sentence, terms referring to the same individual object may appear in different cases, and if a verb, in different sense and person may refer to the same activity. This subordination of grammatical differences of inflexion to the logical implication of terms seems to be the essential principle of *sabda naya* as understood by the Jainas. It is not necessary to repeat that the *naya* in the hands of the grammarians because of *ekānta* application degenerates into a false *naya*—(*Sabdabhāsa*)

vi *Samabhirudha naya*—The derivative difference of names. This *samabhirudha naya* is the differentiation of terms according to their roots. Thus it is only a special application of *Sabda naya*. In

becoming specialised it becomes narrower and more exaggerated than the above *naya*. As a general rule the terms in a language have their own special radical signification. This radical signification is the reason for the particular nomenclature. The first appearance of the word was evidently suggested by such an implication of the root. Of course this does not mean the connotation of the name. Connotation is the ground of the application of the name whereas the significance of the root accounts for the origin of the name. The former is logical and universal whereas the latter may be purely subjective and even accidental. The science of history of language may discover various principles subserving the origin of names in a vocabulary. To the historian of language this is certainly an important principle. To detect radical difference in the vocabulary and to trace the history of different terms from this original seed-difference is certainly a commendable pursuit. But this nuclear difference interesting to the historian of language is not so very important as to swallow up all the other grammatical and logical principles of implication. Here again the *naya* is discovered to be a relative one by Jaina Logic which enjoins a necessary circumscription to the above claims put forward by the historian of language. For example, it is true that the terms 'gau' (cow) is different from 'India'. This difference can be traced to their respective roots. Hence the difference in the roots must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings. Accurately speaking says this *naya*, the terms 'India,' 'Sakra' and 'Purandhara' respectively imply the 'all prosperous,' 'the all powerful' and the destroyer of enemies'. These are the direct and legitimate signification sanctioned by their origin. To emphasise the original and the radical implication of a term is one thing and to suggest that the term in its ordinary application must necessarily and always mean the same original radical sense is quite a different thing. The passage from the radical and immediate difference to the current application and the general accepted sense is an unwarranted jump taken by this *naya*.

(vii) *Evambhuta naya*.—The last of the *nayas* is a further specialisation of the previous one. This is merely the historical principle run mad. According to this principle the radical sense in general is not the appropriate implication of a term. Even the root signification must have different gradations and aspects. Of these various aspects and gradations in the manifestation of the thing, only one particular

aspect is contemplated by the root of a term and it is this contemplated aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the term in its current usage. The very same thing in a different attitude must be designated by a different term altogether. Thus for example, the term 'gau' implies an animal in motion. That which moves is a 'gau' or 'cow'. The same term therefore should not be applied when the animal is at rest or lying down. Movement is fundamentally different from lying down and therefore the same term 'cow' should not be applied to an animal at two such fundamentally different attitudes. Fundamental difference in the logical implication must necessarily be indicated by literal difference on the terms. This is the contention of *evambluta naya*. The term must just designate the particular aspect or attitude in the object referred to. If the term goes beyond that it will be a source of confusion and ambiguity. Language instead of revealing things as they are would only conceal them.

This grammatico-logical contention may be conceded partially. In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle but the language that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous logical principle. Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify, what actually exists, with what ought to be, logically. Therefore this *evambluta naya* interpreted without reference to concrete usage and conventional meaning would only end in meaningless verbiage.

These are the *Seven nayas* referred to in Jaina logic. The first four are called *artha nayas* inasmuch as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other three are called *Sabda nayas* inasmuch as they pertain to terms and their meanings. The same seven are sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under *Dravya naya* whereas the other four come under *parjaya naya*. The former means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of change or manifestation.

These *nayas* have an important place in the *Anekānta Vāda* of the Jaina system. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every day speech but also in the language of the metaphysical statements have their own context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the background would result in practical inconvenience and philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme

complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the *anekānta* aspect. Multifaced reality may lead to "multitude of descriptions." Every one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit in with his own petty framework then there is the ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System building in philosophy has always been the process of providing reality with a procrustean bed. But one who knows, smiles at the simplicity of human philosophising. The critical caution that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy was sounded several centuries before the Christian era by the *Anekāntavādins*.

Our account of the *nayas* will be incomplete without a mention of the six *nayas* which are generally employed in the examination of the nature of souls. According to Jaina Metaphysics *Jīva* or soul has the nature of consciousness or *chetanā*. When it is viewed in its pure state unlimited by extraneous conditions, it has its thought characteristics fully and perfectly developed. This state of its existence represents the Ideal of Perfection or *Siddhahood*. But even in this ideal state the nature of the self does not lose its complexity. Even in its infinite radiance, the self does not lose its *Dravya* nature or dynamic constitution. It is not distinct and separable from its own infinite qualities. It is the richness of content that marks the Jaina conception of Perfection as against the nihilistic attitude of *Vedānta* which speaks of quality-less existence as the ultimate Reality. Existence apart from qualities would be an empty abstraction and is therefore all the more unfit to stand for the ultimate reality. It is this unalienable unity that exists between the Real and its qualities that may be said to be the central doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics.

This pure and perfect state of the self is a thing to be achieved. Ordinarily the existence of the self is somewhat different. Its infinitude is limited, its glory abated and radiance dimmed by alien conditions and limitations. By its own general weakness and disposition it weaves round itself material sheaths some subtle and some gross. These material sheaths form the encumbrances and limitations which make the cycle of births and deaths possible for the *Jīvās*.

In this state Jīva is generally an embodied consciousness or an organism. In its normal state it may be evident to the senses through its gross organic body. In its subtle state of interval for death to another birth even though it casts off its grosser sheath it is still endowed with a subtle *karmic* body which serves as the nucleus for building up its appropriate body of the next generation. Jīva in these states is said to be the conditional one *Sopādhi Jīva* as differentiated from the unconditioned perfect self *Nirupādhi Jīva*.

Jīva in its *samsaric* state is not only associated with a body of its own but with several other things living and non-living. The environment in which it lives, moves and has its being is generally wider than its own corporeal frame. Even in the case of animals and birds there is such a wider interest than the mere instinct of self-preservation. The parental instinct of helping and preserving the young ones and filial instinct of falling back upon the support of the parents from the prehuman biological foundation of the institution of family among human beings. When we come to human society this widening of the environmental horizon of the self becomes all the more marked. Several economical and social institutions such as owning property or belonging to a particular social order or a nation all these contribute to extending the personality so as to coincide with its environments. There is a personal pride and pleasure in extending one's own property. There is a sympathetic feeling of joy or sorrow with the prosperity or adversity of the family or the nation to which the individual belongs. The nature of the personality therefore is determined by the extent and diversity of interest. We feel offended when any injury is done to our possessions. We feel it a personal insult if any one who is near and dear to us is unfairly treated. The self which is by its own intrinsic nature a complex entity becomes all the more complex by identifying itself through its interest with its environment of things and persons. Under such circumstances it is an extremely difficult problem to define the exact nature of the soul and to point out its own appropriate boundary. Hence the necessity of the application of *Nayas* or points of view. These *Nayas* as already mentioned are specially designed for the purpose of explaining the nature and defining the limits of the self.

To start with there are two main aspects or *Nayas-Nischaya* and *Vyavahāra*. The former represents the true and complete point of

view. There is no distinction between *Dravya* and its *guṇas*. The self is looked at as a whole with all the wealth of its attributes. The latter represents the partial point of view. The complex nature of the self is analysed into its diverse qualities and our attention may be directed to any particular attribute with which the self may be identified at the moment. Further the former *Nischaya Naya* is divided into *Sūddha Nischaya* and *Asūddha Nischaya Naya*. *Sūddha Nischaya Naya* holds the self in its pure and unconditioned *Nirupādhi* state. Disentangled from all its material environment and limitation the self radiates in its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities. This aspect where the self is in its qualities and its qualities are pure and unalloyed expression of the nature of this self is the topic of *Sūddha Nischaya Naya*. The second *Asūddha Nischaya Naya* contemplates the self as caught in the meshes of the material environment the *Sopādhi* state. The presence of *Upādhi* makes it impure or *Asūddha*. Its intrinsic glory is dimmed but still it is viewed as a whole with its complete nature as expressed in its attributes though somewhat warped by alien influences. This is the self according to *Asūddha Nischaya Naya*.

Similarly the *vyavahāra* point of view is divided into two main heads—*Satbhūta Vyavahāra* and *Asatbhūta Vyavahāra*. The term *Satbhūta* implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Here the question is not about the purity or the impurity of the thing. The term *Vyavahāra* as already explained implies the analysis and differentiation of attributes from the underlying *Dravya Jñāna* or thought is certainly an attribute of the self. To speak of *Jñāna* as identical with self is to adopt *Satbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. The term *Asatbhūta* implies the importation of alien qualities into the self. Some of the organic instincts and emotions are distinctly due to the physical constitution. Nevertheless such instincts and emotions are associated with the self from the point of view of *Asatbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. Similarly the *kārmic* constituents which are intrinsically physical may be said to belong to the self and modify its manifestations.

Each of these two again is divided into two other minor kinds—*Upachārta* and *Anupachārta*. *Upachārta* is usage sanctified by convention but having no other intrinsic justification. It is a sort of metaphorical application; whereas *Anupachārta* is just the opposite of the above. It stands on its own intrinsic merit and

has no metaphorical and transferred import. Thus finally we have 4 kinds of *Vyavahāra Naya* 1 *Anupachārta Satbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* 2. *Upachārta Satbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* 3. *Anupachārta Asatbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* 4. *Upachārta Asatbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*.

Now the first is mainly *Vyavahāra* inasmuch as it analyses the attributes from the thing is *Satbhūta* inasmuch as it emphasises the genuine and intrinsic attributes and is *Anupachārta* inasmuch as it is free from figurative and transferred implication. The illustration of this is the self is of the nature of *Jñāna* or knowledge. The second *Naya* is *Vyavahāra* for the reason stated above and *Satbhūta* for the same and *Upachārta* because the epithet is figurative and transferred. When we speak of *Jñāna* or knowledge as *Pramāna* or the criterion of truth we are thinking of the objects of knowledge or *Artha*. *Artha* itself may be spoken of as a manifestation of knowledge or *Jñāna Vikalpa*. To speak of *artha* or the object as a modification of knowledge is only figuratively true in the case of external objects. These being physical in nature are *achetanā* and yet as object of knowledge may be spoken of as modification of *Jñāna*. What intrinsically belongs to the self is transferred to its object because of the relation brought about by the process of knowledge. The third *Naya* is *Anupachārta Asatbhūta Vyavahāra*. The only term that demands explanation is *Asatbhūta* here. It refers to the identification of the Self with some alien properties. For example to consider one's own body as oneself which is generally done in ordinary life is *Asatbhūta Vyavahāra*. This is not merely figurative as the statement is sanctioned by the intimate interrelation that exists between the soul and the body. Hence 'this body is mine,' or 'I am this,' pointing to the body is a statement which is justified according to *Anupachārta Asatbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. The last *Naya* is the *Upachārta* form of the same. Here the alien quality or the thing with which the self is identified lack that intimate relation that exists between the soul and its own body. To call the ornaments as one's own, to claim certain individuals as one's relating to possess certain things as one's own property in short to identify one's personality with alien things and persons is possible only in a figurative sense. Each personality is distinct from and alien to

the others though all by co-existing together may partake of common environment and enter into definite relations. Still from the metaphysical point of view one's destiny is in one's own hands. Therefore the popular identification of the self with the other things said to be owned by it is a figurative and transferred predication or *Upachârta Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*. These four kinds of *Vyavahâra Naya* together with the two *Nischaya Nayas* constitute the six *Nayas* which are specially employed to fathom the depth of human personality.

The object of these *Nayas* generally of the former seven and specially of the latter six is to reveal the intrinsic nature of personality in its comic environment. It is not merely a matter of theoretical interest that underlies these *Nayas*. Apprehension and understanding of the nature of reality must be a useful means in the hands of the self to reach the safe haven of Beatitude from which there is no return. But besides this practical aspect there is another aspect to the question. The truth that is apprehended by the *Pramânas* and the *Nayas* must be available for the general public. Ever growing under the weight of sorrow and yearning to have that Bliss which they know only by faith and hope. Hence is the necessity for expressing the truth through Scripture. This Revelation of the truth through language is the WORD or *Syadvâda*. This pertains to the principle of conditional predication which is sevenfold. This seven-fold predication is known as *Saptabhangi*.

SAPTABHANGI.

SAPTABHANGI OR THE SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATIONS.

The Dialectic of *Syadvāda* is no less puzzling to Indian students of philosophy both old and new, than the *Hegelian* dialectic is to the European philosophers. *Syadvāda* and its counterpart appear at first sight self-conflicting and unwarranted. But they have an important principle,—namely the fundamental principle of reality as their substratum and justification. Closer examination reveals in them a clear grasp of truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modification. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer which enables him to look back through eons of the past cosmic history or to have a glimpse of the far off future we see the universe as a motion picture on the screen of existence. What is a twinkling star at present was once upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the evolution of an enormous quantity of heat. This leads to the formation of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a number of incandescent masses. These held together by the laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our Sun itself is but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with this evolution of a sun with its planetary system we have the converse drama enacted. Either due to a mysterious explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human view not only the nursery of distant solar systems, but also the decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The starry heavens are but the cosmic alphabet which spell the three sublime words birth, growth and decay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space when compared to the Sun and the Stars. Here also the same process.

The formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic convulsions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the surface, then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms are all indelibly written on the different strata of the earth. This also repeats the same story. Then life itself is a mysterious though subtle process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you will you see the same thing. Reality is a complex process of change and everything in it is partaking of the same process.

Nothing is merely permanent; nothing is merely changing. The acorn grows to the oak; the seed is in the plant and the tree and yet it is not there as the seed. Everything lives by the process of death. The very loss leads to gain. This message of the organic reality is an important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on Logic—nay identified both. But his Logic is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor *Kant* built his system. *Hegel's* logic came as a disturber of peace to the then philosophic thought; but it ultimately led to the emancipation of thought from scholastic thralldom. He proclaimed boldly to the world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity 'is' and 'is not' are really identical and same, for they are but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher synthesis, the following presentation of *saptabhangi* will lose its paradoxical nature and discover the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any particular object which as the topic of assertion can very well take in two assertions—affirmative and negative. How can there be two apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact? The nature of the fact is such is the answer. Every concrete assertion presupposes a question as to the exact nature of the object. This interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a particular point of view. Since the thing has several aspects and relations there may be several determinations. Hence is the possibility of apparently conflicting attributes inhering in the same and exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of plaster of Paris? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same gold bangle which you * wear? No, it is newly made though the

same gold is used Was Socrates a Greek or Roman? He was Greek and not Roman What is the *Kaiser* now? He is and yet is not the *Kaiser* These are familiar questions and answers All these exhibit the possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing. *Is* and *is not*, can significantly refer to the same subject The only thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each case There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same subject can have two such predicates no one predicate can monopolise the subject to itself There will always be some aspect of the subject left out by this predicate, and this left out aspect can very well be expressed by the rival predicate. This implies that under no circumstances can we have a predication which is the only true predication about the subject There can be no judgment absolutely true and excluding every other judgment about the same topic. Hence we have recourse to qualified assertions as the only available ones under the circumstances These qualified or conditional assertions are primarily two affirmation and negation

(1) Perhaps X is.

(2) Perhaps X is not.

These two aspects are inherent in the same thing, hence we can say

(3) Perhaps X *is* and *is not*; here we are contemplating the whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended to severally. But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of one single identity. Hence they may be considered together jointly as expressing the single identity In that case there is no chance of asserting two conjointly by a single predicate, for the simple reason that there can be no such predicate Therefore we have to confess our inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having such an assertion. This fact becomes the fourth mode of predication.

(4) Perhaps X is indescribable

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still qualify this by each of the first three predicates Thus we have the last three modes of predications

Which are (5) Perhaps X is though indescribable

(6) Perhaps X and *is not* though indescribable.

(7) Perhaps X *is* and *is not* though indescribable.

In their traditional form these are :—

- (1) *Syādaṣṭi*
- (2) *Syānnāṣṭi*
- (3) *Syādaṣṭinnāṣṭīcha*
- (4) *Syādavaktavyah*
- (5) *Syādaṣṭi avaktavyah*
- (6) *Syādnāṣṭi avaktavyah.*
- (7) *Syādaṣṭi nāṣṭi avaktavyah.*

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated with reference to some object such as a *Jar* or *Ghata*. Whether it is to have an affirmative predicate or negative one depends respectively on four aspects : its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar. A jar is real, or is affirmed with reference to *Svarūpa*, *Svadravya*, *Svakshetra*, *Svakāla* and is unreal or is denied from the point of view of *pararūpa*, *paradravya*, *parakshetra* and *parakāla*. When we have affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are derived from these two

1. Then what is the *Svarūpa* or intrinsic form of a Jar? And what is its *pararūpa*? When we hear the word *jar* uttered, the term invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which a particular object is designated by the term. These essential attributes connoted by the term *Jar* will be its *Svarūpa*. The attributes of any other object implied by any other term will be its *pararūpa*—will be alien to the *Jar*. Existence rests on *Svarūpa* and non-existence on *pararūpa*. If existence is predicated of the *Jar* both from its own form as well as that of an alien thing like cloth (*paṭa*) then the *jar* will lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien nature then there will be no jar at all. Neither of these results stand to reason

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that a *jar* is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a *jar* or kettle? The *jar-form* is its *svarūpa* and the kettle form is its *pararūpa*. From the former the *jar* is, from the latter, it is not

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual *jar* has its individuality as *Svarūpa*, and every other *jar* will be *pararūpa*

Jar A exists on account of *svarûpa* and does not on account of *pararûpa*. If non-existence is associated with *svarûpa* then there will be no *jar* at all, if existence follows from *pararûpa* then all *jars* will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones.

Then *Ghata-jar* is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the potter's wheel is not yet a *jar*. It is only the finished product that is a *jar*. This finished form is its *svarûpa*, any other stage in its formation is its *pararûpa*. The former leads to affirmation the latter leads to negation

2. What is its own matter? Clay is *Svadravya*, and gold is *paradravya*. The *Jara* is of clay and is not of gold. *Svadravyena asti, paradravyena nâsti*.

3. What is its own place or *Svakshetra*? The ground where the *Jar* is, is its *Svakshetra* and every other place is its *Parakshetra*. The *Taj* is in *Agra* (*Svakshetra*) and is not in *Delhi* (*Parakshetra*). If the *Jar* exists in *Parakshetra* also then there will be no place without a *Jar*. In the case of the *Taj* every place will have a *Taj Mahal*. If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no *Jar* anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.

4. What is its own time or *Svakâla*? The *Jar's* *Svakâla* is the duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past when it was a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it will be a heap of broken shells will be its *Parakâla*. Its existence in its own time and non-existence in other times will be quite evident. So also with every other object. *Socrates* existed at a particular age of *Athenian* History and is not existing now. If a thing exists in *Parakâla* also as in *Svakâla* then it will be eternal, if it does not exist in *Svakâla*, as in *parakâla* then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration.

Thus a thing is affirmed in its four fold self-relation, form, matter, place and time; and is denied in its four-fold alien relation.

Now the *Svarûpa*, etc., are determined with reference to the four-fold other-relation of *Pararûpa*, etc. The self-relation apart from the other relation has no meaning. But how are we to determine the four kinds of relation:—*Pararûpa*, *Paradravya*, etc. These must depend on their environmental relations and these latter again on others. Thus we pass on from our environment to others still wider without having

any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation does not rest on an indefinite regress. The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *Svarūpa* but differentiates itself from *Pararūpa*. In experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A *Jar* is seen not merely as a *Jar* but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the *Jar* at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non self. Hence the charge of indefinite regress is quite unwarranted.

Now, according to this theory *astī* and *nāstī* (is and is not) may be predicated of *Prameya* the objective aspect of knowledge or the process of apprehending an object. This dual predication must rest on *Svarūpa* and *Pararūpa* of *Prameya*. What is its *Svarūpa* and what is its *Pararūpa*? *Pararūpa* of *Prameya* means non-*Prameya* anything other than *Prameya* we have no means of knowing. Hence the theory must fail in this case.

No, says the Logician. The state of being apprehended by knowledge-*Prameyatva* is the *Svarūpa* of *Prameya*. This implies in general the relation of object to the knower anything besides this relation, even the object will be distinct from *Prameyatva* and hence will be the *Pararūpa* in this context. Now this theory must be applicable to the ultimate existence or *Mahāsatta*. If *is* and *is not* are to be predicated of this *Summum Genus* what are its *Svarūpa* and *Pararūpa*? For the latter cannot be, as there can be no other form or matter or place or time not included in this. The *pararūpa* of *Mahāsatta* need not imply the existence of other things besides itself; that would be self-contradictory. But still we can speak of its *Pararūpa* when we contemplate something which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of its parts will be so far the negation of whole—its *Pararūpa*.

Now *astī*, affirmation depends on self, *nāstī*, negation, on other things. *Astī* which is conditioned by self can very well belong to a thing. But if *nāstī* which is conditioned by other than the *Jar*—

e g. is also predicated of the *Jar*. Then it would imply that the *Jar* participates in the nature of its other—say cloth. This will lead to mere confusion

This objection also is based on a misapprehension. Affirmation no doubt rests on the nature of the self the *Jar*. The negation resting on another thing—*Paṭa* (cloth) does not mean that the *Jar* also has the nature of a cloth. That would be absurd. The clear cut boundary between things will vanish and with it all knowledge. *Asī*—implies self assertion, *nāstī* implies alien-exclusion. A thing not only asserts its own individuality, but also repulses anything alien to it. It is this element of repulsion that everything must have in order to be real that entitles it to have the negative predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion this element of differentiation is the only basis for self-assertion of a thing. *Asī* and *nāstī*-assertion and exclusion are inalienably present in the same thing. Wherever there is *asī*, there is *nāstī* and wherever there is *nāstī*, there is *asī* also.

Now this association of this two *asī* and *nāstī*—in the same thing appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive a *Jar* we see mere *asī* without *nāstī* and on the other hand in the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as asses horns sky-flower there is mere *nāstī* without *asī*.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object *nāstī* does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. *Nāstī* means nothing more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which isolates a thing from its background and gives it a determinate and positive nature. In this sense *nāstī* is inseparable from *asī* and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of impossible and unreal concepts where is the positive foundation. If sky-flower is quite real, nay if it has a slight positive basis it will cease to mean an unreal and an impossible thing. Its nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that. This cannot be, answers our Logician. How can there be any negation without any significance. A significant negation must have some positive basis, otherwise it will be mere nonsense. The elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and are justified by the canons of experience. We have seen horns in a cow ;

we have seen an ass or a horse These are existing and real. But the fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is unreal But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower in the sky Without this positive basis of experience there will no elements to make up even a fanciful complex Thus even the fanciful ideas of *unicorn* and *centaur* must have some foundation in our experience Again in the proposition "*Syādaṣṭi Jiva*" the terms *aṣṭi* and *Jiva* (life) must mean identically the same thing or different things If the meanings are of the same nature then one cannot be predicated of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a Jar both being co-ordinate Further *aṣṭi* or existence is predicable of everything real If *aṣṭi* is identical with *Jiva* then *Jiva* also must be predicated of everything But if *Jiva* is different from *aṣṭi* then there is no chance of predicating *aṣṭi* of *Jiva* for they are entirely different from each other Further *Jiva* being different from *aṣṭi* and *aṣṭi* being the predicate of everything, *Jiva* cannot be related to anything real ; (i e) *Jiva* would become unreal. You cannot maintain that *Jiva* though different from *aṣṭi* can be said to have the predicate by a process of combination with it, for combination is impossible in the case of repelling elements

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by *syadvāda*. These results need not frighten the Logician to whom *aṣṭi* and *Jiva* are identical from the *dravyārtha* view and different from *pariyārtha* view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all *

The primary modes of predication are three—*Syādaṣṭi*, *syannāṣṭi* *syadavaktariyah* The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to *sankhya* philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to *Buddhism* everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes. The former is true according to the principle of *Dravyārthika* point of view, the latter is true according to *pariyāyārthika* point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely Again reality is indescribable according to the *Vedāntins* who emphasise the *nirvachaniya* aspect of reality Even this is only partially true,

* [This discussion from *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgī* reminds us of Bradley's discussion of the theory of Predication—in appearance and Reality]

for otherwise even this predication "that Reality is indescribable" will be impossible

The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of following pairs of attributes, eternal and changing, one and many, universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes of predication. Thus practically every attribute by being affirmed and denied according to different aspects may bring about seven fundamental propositions true of real subject

It may be said that after all this principle of *Saptabhāṅgī* is a wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection has been sufficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted or understood in an unwarranted sense then it may be charged with wanton quibbling, for example in the statement that this person has a new woollen shawl (*nava kambala*) the term *nava* may be taken to mean also *nine*. Though the word is capable of such an interpretation still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context if a person retorts that assertion by saying 'this person cannot have nine shawls as he is very poor,' it would be wanton quibbling. There is no such wanton quibbling underlying *Saptabhāṅgī*.

If it is not wanton quibbling it must merely be an expression of doubt. To say a thing may be as well as may not be is to exhibit one's own doubt and ignorance. At the best therefore the doctrine is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge. If the *prima facie* appearance of a thing leads you to two different interpretations of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is unknown scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the contradictory propositions forming the basis of *Saptabhāṅgī* we have two different aspects each serving as the basis of one of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case. Each assertion is definite and clear.

SANKARA AND SYADVADA

THIBAUT'S TRANSLATION OF THE *Bhāṣya*.

"This doctrine we meet as follows — Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to

say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such, the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such are not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is' 'somehow it is not' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion, partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the *Tirthankara* (*Jina*) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. Again, if we apply the *Jaina* reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five, from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described, but, as a matter of fact they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite, you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are

eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is employed in such statement will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and *vice versa* non-being excluding being—the doctrine of the *Ātmat* must be rejected.

“RAMANUJA AND SAPTABHANGI”

Thibaut's Translation—With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya*), and *pariyaya*—to be existing one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite is so far as they are *pariyayas*. By *pariyaya* they understand the particular states of substances and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. With regard to this the *sūtra* remarks that no such proof is possible ‘Not so, on account of the impossibility in one, i.e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jains) called *pariyaya*—are different things (*pa lārthi*) one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i.e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction; how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*), again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes, non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference, not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the *Jaina* may here be supposed to ask the *vedāntin*) how can you maintain that Brahman,

although one only, yet at the same time is the self of all ? Because we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent and so on. And that the body and the Person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that *Brahmana* is not touched by the defects of this body), we have explained like-wise. Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on are not one substance and one *pariyaya*, their being one substance and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one and so on. And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on) each owing to its own *pariyaya* and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical. Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable."

These two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu Commentators of *Vedanta Sûtras*, *Sankara* and *Ramanuja*. The Sûtra that is commented on is "नैकस्मीनसंभवात्" (CH I. PADA 2 SU 33.)

The author of the *Vedanta Sûtras* as well as the commentators reject the *Saptabhangî* *naya* on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing.

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would vindicate the claim of *Saptabhangî* against the charges brought against it by these scholars. Our account would be incomplete if these charges are not examined in this connection.

Now the author of the Sûtras does not give any detailed reasons besides the one contained in the Sûtra itself—that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes. *asti* and *nasti* being and non-being. or affirmation and negation being contradictory epithets cannot be referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication is futile. This reasoning though short is interesting and suggestive. We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having *dravya* and *pariyaya* must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the doctrine of reality for the reason given they seem to claim that the real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and reconcile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of *Bradley's*

polemic against 'the nature of things'. Though he admits the *Hegelian* doctrine of identity in difference he cannot forget the scholastic traditions about identity and difference. Every concrete thing or person is according to *Bradley* a Unity in diversity, and identity in difference a constant which is varying also. Now *Bradley* argues that such a nature implies self-contradiction and internal conflict. This is so because it is not possible for us to know how the difference could be derived from and related to an identity. Hence he condemns such things to the limbo of appearances.

We have been suggesting the similarity between the *Hegelian* doctrine of identity and the *Jaina* doctrine of *Asti-nasti*. But we must raise a note of warning that the *Jaina* doctrine does not accept wholesale *Hegelian* metaphysics. Unlike *Bradley* the greatest living representative of *Hegelian* absolutism the *Jainas* emphasizes this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by *Bradley* to condemn a thing to be appearance is the very reason which serves the *Jain* thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same.

The commentators deserve special attention. Hence we shall examine their criticism in detail. *Senkarô's* criticism is of three main stages. *First* he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of this doctrine. *Second* its practical futility. *Third* its conflict with many other *Jaina* doctrines. Being and non-being cannot be predicated of the same thing just as it is impossible to predicate hot and cold of the same. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together of the same thing at the same time. This objection appears to be unanswerable but if we remember the two different aspect of self-relation and other relation we can very easily see that the objection does not hold good. Very often even in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes which are in the abstract self-contradictory. The branches of a tree may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an inch. Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving. The same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual be both father and son. The two conflicting attributes of fatherhood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual. Similarly a class which is a genus with reference to its own species

may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus. We need not multiply instances. It would be quite idle to maintain the impossibility of incompatible attributes in one and the same thing. It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an acute thinker like *Sankara* should go without observing the particular aspect from which the rival presents his case.

After appealing to experience to substantiate his point *Sankara* brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of *Saptabhāṅgi*. On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of indefiniteness. It is enough here to show that if by definiteness *Sankara* means unconditional and absolute assertion indefiniteness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of *śaśvadā*. In the course of the discussion the critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call "unparliamentary." We may pass it without notice partly because of its irrelevancy to the main argument and partly because of the fact that in his days such an intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate.

As to his second point the practical futility of the doctrine we have to say a word. His argument comes to this. Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing. This is all the more so in the case of Indian thinkers. All Indian philosophers in spite of their doctrinal differences accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy that metaphysical research is the handmaid of ethico-religious ideal of securing the *summum bonum* of life. Hence any doctrine that is indefinite and ambiguous in its message is condemned by this pragmatic test. Since we have not accepted the theoretical charge of ambiguity we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

Next let us go to the application of *Saptabhāṅgi* to the other Jaina doctrines. Such as the five categories and the final release with the consequent heavenly bliss. *Sankara* points out that according to this logic the five *astikāyas* may be five and may not be five. This result will not certainly non-pluss the Jaina logician. If they are severally referred to they are five. If they are referred to as an aggregate and a class they are one. If they are classified according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-living. Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these categories. Variation in the number that may be used to designate

these categories instead of implying self-contradiction indicates only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined. As the climax of his criticism *Sanhara* asks his rival to say what would become of the heavenly world if it both exists and does not, both eternal and non eternal. His rival will only answer as the author of *Saptabhangi Tarangini* does—in the following manner. If as you say it must be one of those and not both you have the following difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal and existing where is the chance for *Samsāra* and the attempt to obtain *moksha*. If the other alternative is the only truth what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impossible. "Man partly is and wholly hopes to be" is not mere poetry. It is genuine philosophy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal towards which the whole creation moves it is true and real and inasmuch as it is the goal and is not yet an actualised fact it is not real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemently attacked passes our understanding.

When we go to *Ramanuja* we have got a different method of argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine all the while protesting. He clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *pariyaya*. Substance and mode. He also perceives that *pariyaya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points out that the doctrine of *syadvāda* is based upon these two different aspects *Dravya* and *Parayaya*. The proper course for the critic having gone so far would be to accept the doctrine. Or if he wants to reject he must show that things do not have both these aspects *dravya* and *pariyaya*. Instead of doing either *Ramanuja* attempts to defend the *Sūtra* on a principle which is quite indefensible and unwarranted. What he proves is that *asti* and *nasti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly, it cannot have Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects—and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates.

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference *Ramanuja* has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of *Vedānta* is affected. In one sense the *vedāntic* metaphysics is the doctrine

of the one and the many. If reality could be one and the many at the same time *Vedāntism* would be sufficient argument in favour of *Sayadvāda*. But unlike *Sankara* who dismisses the Many as *Wāyu* [Ramanuja] as constrained by his metaphysical attitude accepts the reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the many. He proposes the *purva paksha* for the Jāini, "But how can you maintain that *Brahma* although one only yet at the same time is the self of all." He answers the *purva paksha* thus—"The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or *parināma* of the *Brahma* and this what Ramanuja believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe. For, his rival would be justified in asking whether the *parināma* or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commentary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of *Sankara's* and if the former he is bound to admit the *Sayadvāda* point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the Person and many from the point of view of *parināma* or his body.

For a fuller discussion of the same we refer the reader to the excellent work *Saptabhāṅgūtārāṅgī* from which we have freely drawn in this essay.

One other point and we may take leave of this topic *Bertrand Russell* in his American lectures "On Logical Atomism" develops *Menrong's* Theory of objective fact in a very suggestive way. According to *Menrong* every proposition either true or false has an objective fact as the basis. For in order that there may be an intelligent assertion apart from its truth value there must be some objective basis. This doctrine implies two sets of objective facts one for true propositions and other for false ones. Both being objective, what is the distinctive mark of each so that one stands for truth and the other for error? Thus the question of truth is pushed further without being answered and we have to admit objective facts which are false and erroneous. In order to avoid this result, *Russell* proposes a modification in the doctrine.

He distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact implied by a proposition. Any individual object may be designated

by a name. The name is a symbol refering to some particular object. This is a bare fact. There is no meaning in calling this true or false. It simply is. Truth or falsity refers to a proposition, a proposition becomes true or false because of an *objective fact*. The term *objective fact* is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposition. (i.e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact. The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far falsified by the fact. But take the following pair. *Socrates* is living and *Socrates* is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is true and affirmative one is false. According to Russel's theory the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact; otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition — 'socrates is not living.' There seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore *Russell* brings in the theory of "negative fact". This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience. But *Russel* himself leaves it undeveloped. He emphasises the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.

Now what have we in the above doctrine of *Saptabhangi*? Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two affirmative and negative. The affirmative proposition is determined by self form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four form, matter, place and time. In this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating *Socrates* to his own time is true, the one relating him to any other time is false. To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like this. A thing in its *Svarūpa* (self form), *svadraya*, (matter), *svakshetra* (place) *svakāla* (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its *pararūpa* (non-self-form), *par-dravya*, *parakshetra*,

parakāla will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the negative proposition. This is offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what *Russell* calls "negative fact." Neither do we propose to develop *Russell's* theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.

This *Saptabhangī* is a powerful organon in the hands of *Syadvādins* who avoided the Nihilism of the *Buddhists* as well as the absolute Monism of the *Vedantists*, who steered clear of the shallow realism of the *Charvakas* and the ludicrous idealism of the *Nayavādins*.

The following works are due to Sri Kundakunda Ācharya.

Prābhūta-traya or Nāṭaka-traya i.e., the trilogy of

Pañchāstikāyasāra,

Pravachanasāra, and

Sammayasāra or Sammayasāra Prābhūta

Also Niyamasāra,

Satā Prābhūta, or Satapāhūda, consisting of Darśana Pāhūda, Sutta, Charitta, Bodha, Bhāva, and Moksha Pāhūdas Rayana Sāra, Bāraha Anubekkhā ;

(All these books have been printed)

He is said to have written 84 Pāhūdas. Some names are given below.—They are not as yet found in any library

Jonisāra, Kriyasāra, Ārahanasāra, Ksapanasāra, Vamdhāsāra, Tattvasāra ; Amgasāra, Dabbasāra, Karma Pāhūda, Paya Pāhūda, Vidyā Pāhūda, Ughāta Pāhūda, Drisṭi Pāhūda, Siddhānta Pāhūda, Samavāya Pāhūda, Naya Pāhūda, Prākṛiti Pāhūda, Chūṛṇi Pāhūda, Pamchabagga Pāhūda, Karma Vipāka Pāhūda, Vastū Pāhūda, Payadhara Pāhūda, Utpāda Pāhūda, Dibba Pāhūda, Sikkhā Pāhūda, Jīva Pāhūda, Achāra Pāhūda, Sthāva Pāhūda, Alāpa Pāhūda, Chūṭi Pāhūda, Sata Darśana Pāhūda, Nakamma Pāhūda, Samthana Pāhūda, Nitaya Pāhūda, Eyaṃta Pāhūda, Vihāya Pāhūda, Sālamī Pāhūda.

All the works of *Sri Kundakunda* are in Prakrit verse. But it is easy and beautiful. His *nāṭaka traya* or Trilogy has been commented upon in Sanskrit by *Sri Amṛta Chandra Achārya* and also by *Sri Jayasena Achārya*. There is also a commentary on *Niyamasāra* by *Sri PadmaṃPrabha Maha Dhari Deva*. There is an excellent printed Hindi edition of this work by *Jaina Dharma Bhūsana Brahmchārī Sital Prasadji*

श्रीपञ्चास्तिकायसमयसारः ।

Pañchâstikâya Samayasâra.

इंदसदर्वंदियाणं तिहुअणहिदमधुरविसदवक्काणं ।

अंतातीदंगुणाणं णमो जिणाणं जिदमवाणं ॥ १ ॥*

1 Obeisance to Jinas, possessed of attributes infinite, the conquerors who are beyond the influences of transmigration, worshipped by the hundreded Indras, revealers of the clear, sweet, and three-world-beneficial Word

COMMENTARY.

The three Lokas are Ūrdhva (upper), Madhyama (middle), and Adhah (lower). The Word is called beneficial, because it enables the people of the three worlds to realise their pure and perfect self. It is sweet because it draws towards itself the hearts of the faithful and the wise. It is called clear because it is free from defects such as, doubt, or self-contradiction etc.

The hundred Indras are —

40 of the Bhavana Devas

32 of the Vyantara Devas.

24 of the Kalpa Vâsis.

2 of the Jyotiska Devas, Sun and Moon

1 of the Human beings

1 of the Animals.

One who is worshipped by such Indras in *Samosarana* is certainly deserving of worship by the ordinary mortals. The reference shows the glory of Jina.

2

Next, salutation to the Jinâgama.

*Sanskrit rendering

इन्द्रशतवन्दितेभ्यस्त्रिभुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्यः ।

अन्तातीतगुणेभ्यो नमो जिनेभ्यो जितमवेभ्यः ॥ १ ॥

समणमुहुग्गदमट्ठं चदुग्गदिणिवारणं सणिव्वाणं ।

एसो पणमिय सिरसा समयनियं सुणह वोच्छामि ॥२॥*

2 I bow to the Śāstra that is revealed by Jinas, is the means of liberation from the four "Gatis" and leads to Nirvāna. Listen ! I describe that same truth in this work.

COMMENTARY.

Samaya means system It is of three kinds.—

- (1) Śabda Samaya, the system of philosophy or scripture
- (2) Arthasamaya, the system of reality
- (3) Jñānasamaya, the system of knowledge

Saluting the Śabdasamaya or the scripture the author goes to describe Arthasamaya the facts of reality in order to attain true knowledge of the Jñānasamaya

The four Gatis are .—

- 1 Naraka the Hell
- 2 Tiryak - the plant and the animal world
- 3 Manusya Man
- 4 Deva : the Gods

These four Gatis constitute Samsara

The Āgama is saluted because of two great reasons. Its origin and its fruit. It is the word of God It is revealed by Sarvañja Its fruit is that it saves the soul from the four Gatis of Samsāra and leads it to Nirvāna, the unconditioned state of perfection where the self is completely realised

3

Then he mentions the three Samayas. Śabda, Artha, Jñāna in the first half of the Gāthā ; and the distinction between the Loka (the world) and the Aloka (the beyond) in the second half of the Gāthā .

*Sanskrit rendering

श्रमणमुज्जोग्गतार्थं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सन्निर्वाणं ।

एष प्रणम्य शिरसा समयमिमं शृणुन वक्ष्यामि ॥ २ ॥

समवाओ पंचण्हं समउत्ति जिणुत्तमेहिं पण्णत्तं ।

सो चेव हवदि लोओ तत्तो अमिओ अलोओ खं ॥३॥*

3 It is said by Jina that the group of five categories constitutes the system of reality, the same is the world. And beyond that, is the immeasurable and infinite space (called Aloka)

Arthasamaya or the system of reality is two-fold. Loka and Aloka. Loka is constituted by the five Astikāyas, or existences. Beyond that is the great and the infinite Aloka which is co-extensive with pure Space or Anantākāśa.

4

Here the author enumerates the five existences. He describes the number of each and the general and special characteristics of the different Astikāyas.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा तहेव आयासं ।

अत्थितह्मि य णियदा अणण्णमइया अणुमहंता ॥४॥†

4 Jivas or souls, Pudgalas or non-souls, Dharma and Adharma, the principles of rest and motion, and finally Space—these are the Astikāyas. They are eternal, uncreated and of huge magnitude.

COMMENTARY

Since the atom or the material point is the unit of space, the spatial point is also called *Anu* or Atom. Since the five entities, such as Jivas, etc., mentioned above are capable of occupying space, they are called Kāyas (corporeals), the term Kāya implies relation to many spatial points. Existences that can be so related to space are called by the Jainas, Astikāyas. It is evident that material objects consti-

*Sanskrit rendering

समवायो सञ्चानां समुद्यु इति जिनोत्तमै प्रवृत्तं ।

स एव च भवति लोकस्ततोऽमितलोकः खं ॥ ३ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

जीवाः पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मौ तथैव आकाशम् ।

अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥ ४ ॥

tuted by physical molecules have such space quality Jīva or soul is also considered to be an Astikāya because of its organic nature. Jīva exists as an organism and as such it is related to body and hence the spatial quality Dharma and Adharma are the peculiar principles recognised by Jainas as corporeal These are also Astikāyas. One is the principle of motion, the other is the principle of rest. They are pervading space and as such are Astikāyas It is not necessary to point out that space is a multidimensional existence. Jains have recognised the reality of space They do not think that it is possible to reduce space to a "form of the mind" as the Idealists of Europe and India have done

Since Time has neither potentially nor really the possibility of such space relations it is denied the name Astikāya. It is purely an entity of monodimensional series Though it is not an Astikāya it does not cease to be a real entity. Here also the Jains differ from the Idealistic thinkers of the world in their attitude towards Time Time is a reality and not a form of experience. Their views are more or less akin to the ideas of the Realism which is associated in England with thinkers like B. Russell.

5

Then the Astikāyas are described

जैसिं अत्थिसहाओ गुणेहिं सह पज्जएहिं विविहेहिं ।
जे हँति अत्थिकाया णिप्पणं जेहिं तेल्लो क्कं ॥५॥*

5 Whatever things have the essential nature of manifesting themselves severally through their numerous qualities and modes are the Astikāyas These fill the three worlds—they being the constituent parts of the world

COMMENTARY

Since these are real, they are called Asti. Since they constitute the world or Loka they have the space quality, hence they are Kāyas Astikāya then implies existential nature as well as space quality

6

Next the description of the six Dravyas The above five Astikāyas together with the Time (Kāla) form the six Dravyas

*Sanskrit rendering

येषामस्तिस्वभावः शुभैः सह पर्यायैर्विविधैः ।

ते भवन्त्यस्तिकायाः निष्पन्नं यैस्त्रैलोक्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

ते चेव अत्थिकाया तैक्कालियभावपरिणदा णिच्चा ।
गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परिवर्तणलिंगसंयुक्ता ॥ ६ ॥*

6 These five Astikāyas which though manifesting themselves diversely, maintain their permanency, constitute together with Kāla or time which has the quality of permanence in change, the Dravyas

COMMENTARY

✓ These five entities are being and becoming. They undergo change and yet maintain their identity.

Thus they have the three characteristics of coming into existence, ceasing to exist, and also remaining permanent in spite of both Creation, destruction, and yet continuity,—these are the main qualities of Dravya. Kāla or time also has these three qualities, hence the Dravyas are six in number

Dravya is fundamentally an organic unity This view takes reality not merely in its aspect of change nor of permanency It is permanency in change. Hegel is responsible for introducing such a conception of reality in modern thought Jainas in their conception of Dravya have anticipated such a modern idea, several centuries in advance Of course the concept was not fully worked out because of other limitations peculiar to their age.

7

These six Dravyas can move in the same place. They can also occupy the same space because of their mutual accommodating nature Though they get thus interpenetrated still each preserves its own proper nature.

अण्णोण्णं पविसंता दिंता ओगासमण्णमण्णस्स ।

मेलंता वि य णिच्चं सगं सभावं ण विजहंति ॥ ७ ॥†

7. These six Dravyas though mutually interpenetrating, and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up

Sanskrit rendering

तैच्चेवास्तिकायाः त्रैकालिकभावपरिणता नित्याः ।

गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परिवर्तनलिङ्गसंयुक्ताः ॥ ६ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering .

अन्येऽन्यं प्रविशन्ति द्रव्यवकाशमन्योऽन्यस्य ।

मिलन्त्यपि च नित्यं स्वकं स्वभावं न विजहन्ति ॥ ७ ॥

in view of occupying the same space, yet they always maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, general as well as special

COMMENTARY

The six Dravyas are classified into three kinds — (1) Sakriya (2) Sakriyaniskriya, (3) Niskriya. Sakriya Dravyas are those that can be efficient causes. They can move about from place to place. They have the capacity of Āgamana or motion. Such are Pudgala, or matter and Jīva or soul. Sakriyaniskriya Dravyas are those that condition movements, without themselves undergoing change or motion. These have merely Avagahana. The physical principles of Dharma and Adharma correspond to this description. Lastly Niskriya Dravya is one which is capable of being neither the direct nor the indirect condition of change. Such is Space which has pure Avasthāna.

8

After describing the general nature of Astikāyas in Gāthā No. 5, "Jesim Atthisahāo etc," the author proceeds to describe their distinctive characteristics and examines them from different points or Nayas.

सत्ता सव्वपयत्था सविस्सरूपा अणंतपज्जाया ।

भंगुप्पादधुवत्ता सम्पडिवक्खा हवदि एक्का ॥ ८ ॥*

8 Substance is one (as a class) It is the inherent essence of all things. It manifests itself through diverse forms. It undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple characteristics of creation, destruction and permanence. It also has the antithetical qualities that is, it may be described by the opposites.

COMMENTARY

✓ The antithesis referred to is due to the fact that the substance may be described in each case by the opposite attribute. It is described as one from the class point. It may be described as many from the individual point. So with every adjective, Sarvapadastha

*Sanskrit rendering

सत्ता सर्वपदस्या सविश्वरूपा अनन्तपर्याया ।

भङ्गोत्पादध्रौव्यात्मिका सप्रतिपदा भवत्येका ॥ ८ ॥

may have the antithesis Ekapadastha, Viśvarūpa against Ekarūpa, Anantaparyāya, against Ekaparyāya, etc. Such a description of the same thing by opposite attributes may be incompatible with the false position taken up by Ekanta philosophy, that is, the philosophical attitude which insists on a single point of view with reference to the extremely complex facts of reality. But such complex facts can be described by opposites without involving violent self-contradiction according to the Anekānta philosophy—philosophy of manifold aspects. Complex reality naturally claims complex attitude of the understanding. Any attempt to provide life and its problems with a simple ready-made framework must certainly end in failure, for conceptual analysis always implies selection and abstraction. The reality which is described by a concept will certainly be richer in content than the content of the idea. Hence is the possibility of describing the same fact of Life by distinct and sometimes diverse conceptual symbols. This means that life is always greater than Logic. It is this aspect that is expressed in the Jaina attitude of Anekānta. The *prima facie* contradiction suggested by the term Anekānta is in no way different from the Hegelian dialectic which could embrace contradictions. When the Jaina philosopher speaks of describing the same thing by opposite attributes his view need not be assumed to be more violently shocking to the common sense attitude than Hegel's assertion that affirmation and negation are identical. Both the views in short are *apparently* inconsistent, but both emphasize an important aspect of reality

9

While describing the nature of Dravya the author goes to mention the qualified identity between Sattā and Dravya. These are the same from one aspect

✓ दवियदि गच्छदि ताइं ताइं सबभाव पज्जयाइं जं ।
दवियं तं भण्णंति अण्णणभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥ ९ ॥*

9 What flows, or maintains its identity through its several qualities and modifications, and what is not different from Sattā or Substance, that is called Dravya by the All knowing.

* Sanskrit rendering

द्रवति गच्छति तांस्तान् सद्भावपर्यायान् यत् ।

द्रव्यं तत् भणन्ति अनन्यभूतं तु सत्तातः ॥ ९ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Here Sattā or substance is distinguished from Dravya. Dravya means that which flows or changes. While changing through its different qualities and modifications its essential nature persists. This kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya. But such development is also the characteristic of substance. Hence according to Jaina attitude Dravya is not entirely different from Sattā or substance. Therefore the opposite qualities mentioned above with reference to Sattā or substance are also applicable to Dravya which is not different in meaning.

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Sattā in Jaina system. Such adamant existence cannot be identified with Dravya which is extremely volatile. Here also the similarity between Hegelian concept of "thing" and the Jaina concept of Dravya is worth noticing. Sattā is not "a thing in itself" behind Dravya. Sattā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned. Thing in itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravya refers to facts of experience. Sattā refers to existence or reality. One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact.

10

Then he speaks of the other characteristics of Dravya

द्रव्यं सल्लक्षणियं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्तसंजुतं ।

गुणपञ्जयासयं वा जं तं भणन्ति सर्वणहू ॥ १० ॥*

10 Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of birth, death, and permanence, and is the substratum of qualities and modes, is Dravya. So say the All-knowing

COMMENTARY

Here the three characteristics of Dravya are described. First Dravya has the quality of 'Sat' or existence. Secondly it has the quality of permanence through birth and death. Thirdly it is the

*Sanskrit rendering

द्रव्यं सल्लक्षणकं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्तसंजुतं ।

गुणपर्यायाश्रयं वा यत्तद्भणन्ति सर्वज्ञाः ॥ १० ॥

substratum of attributes and conditions. The quality of 'Sat' emphasises the substantial reality of Dravya. It is not merely the form of the intellect. It has an existence in *Rerum Natura*. The triple quality of dialectical change is the second attribute. Utpāda is appearance, i.e., assuming new modification. This does not mean creation out of nothing. Creation by the fiat of a Will is not recognised by the Jainas. Utpāda therefore means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. Vyaya is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance. It only means that phase in the process of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. Dhruva refers to the persistence of the essential nature of Dravya which undergoes development and which makes both Utpāda and Vyaya simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases. This fact is not only recognised by the scientists like Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher, Bergson, who raised it to an important philosophical principle. Lastly Dravya is the substratum of qualities and modes. Attributes and modifications will have no basis if they do not rest on something real. This does not mean that Dravya is merely a prop, supporting an alien fact, the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the attribute, but still the Jainas do not admit that the attributes alone are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them *esse* is not *perceptum*. Attributes in order to be objective and not merely psychical do require an objective basis. Such a basis Dravya is. Finally it is to be noted that these three characteristics are inseparable from one another. Sattā pre-supposes Utpāda, Vyaya, Dhruvattva, and also is the substratum. Similarly process of development implies Sattā, which again cannot be existing apart from qualities and modes. Neither of the three can exist apart from the other two. In short the three characteristics express the same essential nature of Dravya in three different ways.

11.

Then Dravya is examined from two points of view :—

- (1) Dravyārthika Naya, the aspect of substance, and (2) Paryáyārthika Naya, the aspect of change or development.

उत्पत्तीव विनाशो द्रव्यस्य य नत्थि अत्थि सबभावो ।
वय* उत्पादध्रुवत्तं करन्ति तस्सेव पज्जायाः ॥ ११ ॥†

11. Dravya in its reality can neither be created nor destroyed, it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, appearance and disappearance.

COMMENTARY

According to Dravyârthika Naya, Dravya, e g , gold can neither be created nor destroyed It exists and that is all But the ornaments and other things made of gold are the Paryâyas or modes. These may change, one ornament may be melted and a new one be made The disappearance of the previous ornament is Vyaya and the appearance of the new ornament is Utpada, and yet all the while there is the same gold Dhruva. Dravya then has both the qualities, permanence and change, it is permanent as Dravya and changing as Paryaya

12

Then it is pointed out that there is no fundamental difference between Dravya and Paryâya, substance and its mode

पज्जयविजुदं द्रव्यं द्रव्यविजुत्ता य पज्जया नत्थि ।
दोण्हं अणणभूदं भावं समणा परूयिन्ति ॥ १२ ॥‡

12. There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance The one cannot be without the other, so say the Śramanas

COMMENTARY

Though there is a difference between substance and its mode from the points of significance, quality and utility, yet the one cannot exist apart from the other as the difference is not fundamental. For

*There is another reading of it in the printed edition of this work in Raichandra Jain Granthamala as विगमुत्पाद

†Sanskrit rendering

उत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो द्रव्यस्य च नास्त्यस्ति सद्भावः ।

वय उत्पादध्रुवत्वं कुर्वन्ति तस्यैव पर्यायाः ॥ ११ ॥

‡Sanskrit rendering

पर्ययवियुतं द्रव्यं द्रव्यवियुक्ताश्च पर्याया न सन्ति ।

द्वयोरनन्यभूतं भावं श्रमणा प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ १२ ॥

example, an ornament which is the Paryāya of gold is different from gold in Samāna or significance, in Laksana or attribute, and in Prayojana or utility. But still there can be no ornament apart from gold and gold apart from some form or mode of it. The relation between Dravya and Paryāya is the same as the relation between matter and form. No matter without form and no form without matter.

13.

Next he establishes the identity of substance and qualities

द्ववेण विणा ण गुणा गुणेहिं दव्वं विणा ण संभवदि ।
अव्वदिरित्तो भावो दव्वगुणाणं हवदि तस्मा ॥ १३ ॥*

13. There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality, hence these two are not incompatible in their nature

COMMENTARY

Though the quality and the qualified are different in appellation, they are not really different in nature, as both refer to the same real fact.

14

Then he describes the Pramāna Sapta—Bhaṅgaḥ. The seven forms of Predication about Reality.

✓सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अव्वत्तव्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।
दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥ १४ ॥†

14 According as Dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following propositions —(1), Perhaps it is. (2), Perhaps it is not. (3), Perhaps it is both (is and is not) (4), Perhaps it is indefinable (5), Perhaps it is and is indefinable (6), Perhaps it is not and is indefinable and (7) Perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable

*Sanskrit rendering

द्वयेन विना न गुणा गुणैर्द्रव्यं विना न सम्भवति ।
अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणानां भवति तस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering .

स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवक्तव्यं पुनश्च तत्रितयं ।
द्रव्यं खलु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन सम्भवति ॥ १४ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Sapta—Bhaṅgi or the seven-aspected logical predication is an important doctrine of Jaina logic. The same object may be described by seven distinct propositions. These are the seven possible ways of a *priori* description. We cannot have another proposition about an object which cannot be brought under any one of the seven propositions. The complex nature of a real object or Dravya is amenable to description by the above seven and only seven propositions. To have a complete description then, the thing must be taken in all the seven ways. In each case it is the same fact that is the subject of the propositions which are certainly diverse in nature. That only means that different and apparently conflicting ideas may be predicated of the same subject. This is possible only in Anekānta philosophy.

The different propositions are all beginning with the term "Syāt" which means *perhaps*. The proposition aims, at the most only at probable truth. Jaina logicians were evidently extremely cautious. With the consciousness of seven possible predications they would never assert anything categorically about anything. Absolute categorical assertion may be justified in Ekānta philosophy. But the Jaina thinker in his dread of such absolutist attitude never hesitated to emphasize his relativistic philosophy even at the cost of verbal redundancy.

The prefix Syāt therefore saves the proposition from becoming an absolute assertion. The quality predicated is probably or perhaps true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject.

1 The proposition *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* means that existence is affirmed of a thing from the point of view of its own *Dravya* or essence. Essential characteristic may be safely affirmed of a thing. The affirmation has meaning with reference to its own *kṣetra* or place, i.e., you can say that "a thing is" when you refer to its place of existence. Similarly the proposition is significant with reference to its own *Kāla*. You can affirm the existence of a being during its life-time. Again affirmation is significant if reference is to its *Bhāva* or quality. The quality of a thing can be safely predicated of the thing. Hence the proposition *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* is an affirmation about the Dravya with reference to its own *Dravya*, (substance), *Kṣetra* (place), *Kāla* (time) and *Bhāva* (quality).

2. *Syānnāsti Dravya*, (perhaps the thing is not.) This proposition is a negation about a thing from the point of view of Para-Dravya (alien substance), Para-Ksetra (alien place), Para-Kāla (alien time) and Para-Bhāva (alien quality), i.e., you can have a negative proposition of a thing in the following manner —

- 1 X is not Y (Para Dravya)
- 2 X is not in Y (Para Ksetra).
- 3 X is not now (Para Kāla), i.e., it ceased to exist or it is not yet born.
4. X has not the quality Y, i.e., (Para Bhāva)

3. *Syādaśtī Dravya* (perhaps the thing is and is not.) Both the conflicting predicates may be applied to the same subject, provided the following condition is satisfied. The affirmed predicate must refer to Sva Dravya (its own substance), Sva-Ksetra (its own place), Sva Kāla (its own time) and Sva-Bhāva (its own quality.) And the predicate denied must refer to Para Dravya (other substance), Para Ksetra (other place), Para Kāla (other time) and Para Bhāva (other quality.)

4. *Syādavaktavyam Dravya* (perhaps the thing is beyond description) There is no word which would bring out the implication of both the affirmation and negation of a thing at the same time. Avaktavya should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then 'Avaktavya' itself would become meaningless. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time.

5. *Syātastīavaktavya* (perhaps the thing is and is beyond description) When reference is made to Sva Dravya, Sva Ksetra etc, the thing exists and hence the affirmation, and when reference is made at the same time to Sva Para Dravya, Sva Para Ksetra etc, the thing becomes beyond description and when attention is directed to both the abovementioned aspects, affirmation and indefinability will be the fifth *Bhanga*, namely —perhaps a thing is and is beyond description.

6. *Syānnāstīavaktavya* (perhaps a thing is not and is indefinable) Here the first reference is negation from the point of Para Dravya, Para Ksetra, etc. Secondly the reference is to the indescribability and when both these characteristics, denial and indefinability are associated with the thing at the same time then the proposition "perhaps that it is not and is beyond description" becomes significant.

7. *Syad-asti-nasti-avaktavya Dravya*, (perhaps the thing is, is not and is indefinable) Affirmation is with reference to Sva Dravya etc Negation is with reference to Para Dravya Indefinability when these two are taken at the same time. When all the three above characteristics are attended to together then the thing may be said to exist, and yet not to exist, and to be beyond description.

The seven principles are divided in the following manner.

1. *Pratyeka Bhangas*, single principles

(a) *Syâdasti*

(b) *Syânnasti*

(c) *Syâdavaktavya*

2. *Dvîsamya Bhangas*, dual principle.

(a) *Syâdastinâsti*.

(b) *Syâdastiavaktavya*

(c) *Syannâstiavaktavya*

3. *Trîsamya Bhangas* (triple principle).

(a) *Syâdastinâstiavaktavya*.

It is already mentioned that the Jainas accept only seven principles. Hence the following statement of Kumârila Bhatta is condemned to be absurd

सप्तभंगी प्रसादेन शतभंग्यपि जायते ।

"When seven principles are admitted then there may also be hundred" Jainas believe that the true nature of reality will be understood when it is viewed according to Sapta—Bhangî,

15

There can be neither destruction of existing Dravyas nor creation of non-existing ones Concepts of creation and destruction are applicable to substance only because of its qualities and modes In this Gâthâ Dravya is shown to be permanent from Dravyârthika Naya and changing from Paryâyârthika Naya

भावस्स णत्थि णासो णत्थि अभावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुव्वन्ति ॥ १५ ॥*

15 There can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing Coming into existence and ceasing to exist, things do have because of their attributes and modes

* Sanskrit rendering

भावस्य नास्ति नाशो नास्ति अभावस्या चैव उत्पादः ।

गुणपर्यायेषु भावा उत्पादव्ययान् प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥ १५ ॥

COMMENTARY.

For example the atoms of gold that constitute the substance gold are subject to neither creation nor destruction. But there may be appearance and disappearance in the different forms and modifications of gold; the original form may be lost; and a new form may be assumed. One ornament may be destroyed and another created. What is true of inorganic things is also true of other Dravyas such as Jīva. Jīva as such is neither created nor can be destroyed. Its essence is eternal, but it may lose its original state of existence and come into a new state of life. Life then is continuity of existence through births and deaths. Thus Dravya as such is permanent and unchanging. But its forms and modes are perpetually changing. Hence Dravya may be described by both the attributes permanent and changing according to the respective aspects or Naya

16.

Then Dravyas are further distinguished from their qualities and modes.

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चेदणा य उवओगो ।

सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पज्जया बहुगा ॥१६॥*

16. Jīva and other Dravyas are reals. The qualities of Jīva are consciousness and upayoga, (perception and knowledge), which are manifold. The soul manifests in the following forms as Deva, as man, as a member of the Hell or as a plant or an animal.

COMMLNTARY

The term Upayoga is used to denote Darśana and Jñāna. Darśana is perception and Jñāna is knowledge. Besides Upayoga there is the quality of consciousness or thought or Chetanā. Chetanā and Upayoga constitute the main qualities of Jīva. But according to Jaina thought, Jīva may be pure and perfect or impure and imperfect—Suddha Jīva and Karma Jīva. Karma Jīva is not a distinct kind. It is the same Suddha Jīva soiled by the Karma.

Chetanā or thought when associated with Suddha Jīva would mean perfect thought to which there can be nothing opaque.

*Sanskrit rendering

भावा जीवाद्या जीवगुणाश्चेतना चोपयोगः ।

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो जीवस्व च पर्यायाः बहवः ॥ १६ ॥

Upayoga also will be Śuddha Darśana and Śuddha Jñāna—perfect perception and perfect knowledge. The whole of reality forms an object of perception to Śuddha Darśana and at the same time the whole reality is known to Śuddha Jñāna. Śuddha Chetanā and Śuddha Upayoga, consciousness, perfection, and understanding all perfect and pure, constitute the Svabhāva Guna—the intrinsic qualities of Jīva. These Sabhāva Gunas are potentially present in all Jīvas and explicitly manifest in Siddha Jīva or the Realised Self.]

The very same Svabhāva-Gunas get corrupt because of the interference of Karma. Then they become Vibhāva Gunas of Jīva or the extrinsic qualities of Jīva. Chetanā and Upayoga become Aśuddha. The imperfect and the impure consciousness of man and other Samsāra states of Jīva is Aśuddha Chetanā. It is the Vibhāva Guna which must be got rid off before the self attains purity and regains its intrinsic Śuddha Chetanā. Similarly Śuddha Darśana and Śuddha Jñāna become Aśuddha in Samsāra Jīvas. Sense, perception or Indriya Darśana and knowing or Aśuddha Jñāna are the forms of Upayoga which is corrupt. This again in the Vibhāva Jñāna of Jīva. The Vibhāva Gunas accordingly are present in all Samsāra Jīvas, whereas the Svabhāva Gunas are in the germ.

In a similar way Jīva has two main Paryāyas, Sabhāva or Śuddha Paryāya, Vibhāva or Aśuddha Paryāya. The Siddha state the state of purity and perfection is the Svabhāva Paryāya, whereas all Samsāra states are Vibhāva Paryāyas.

The distinction between qualities and modifications or states of existence may also be illustrated with reference to other Dravyas

17

Next it is pointed out again that though things have origin and decay from the point of forms or modes they have no change in essence

मनुसत्तणेण णट्ठो देही देवो हवेदि इदरो वा ।

उभयत्त जीवभावो ण णस्सदि ण जायदे अण्णो ॥ १७ ॥*

17. If a soul departs from the human state it becomes either a Deva or some other living being. In either case (during death or birth), it does not lose its intrinsic nature.

*Sanskrit rendering

मनुष्यत्वेन नष्टो देही देवो भवतीतरो वा ।

उभयत्र जीवभावो न नश्यति न जायतेऽन्यः ॥ १७ ॥

COMMENTARY.

When the original form is lost, the soul does not lose its own nature with the passing form and when it puts on a new form it does not get a new nature with its coming form. In spite of origin and decay of forms the soul maintains its nature and identity

This view of soul rejects the two false views, Ksanika Ekānta and Nitya Ekānta. The former maintains that there is a different self at every moment as the Buddhist believes. The Jaina view rejects this as untenable because it recognises the change with Paryāya or Guna and not with Dravya. Nitya Ekānta view maintains that the self is absolutely permanent and unchanging, and that all changes are illusory. This view also is rejected by the Jainas. For them Jīva maintains its identity through the changes of Guna and Paryāya.

18

The same fact is again explained from the point of Nayas or principles of understanding

सो चेव जादि मरणं जादि ण णट्ठो ण चेव उत्पण्णो ।
उत्पण्णो य विणट्ठो देवो मणुसुत्तिपज्जाओ ॥ १८ ॥*

18. Though the soul experiences both birth and death, yet it is neither really destroyed nor created. Origin and decay refer respectively to the disappearing Deva state or the appearing human state and these are only its Paryāyas or modes

COMMENTARY.

From the Dravyarthika principle there is neither birth nor death for the Jīva has an indestructible essence which cannot be annihilated even by the hand of Time. Origin and decay are applied to Jīva only from the point of Paryāyarthika Naya.

19.

Then the different states of existence and their time limits are described.

*Sanskrit rendering

स एव याति मरणं याति न नष्टो न चैवोत्पन्नः ।

उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टो देवो मनुष्य इति पर्यायः ॥ १८ ॥

एवं सतो विनाशो असतो जीवस्य एतत्ति उत्पादो ।
तावदिओ जीवाणं देवो मणुसोत्ति गदिणामो ॥ १६ ॥*

19 Thus neither an existing thing is liable to death or destruction, nor a non-existing one can come into being. The Jiva has the Deva state or human state as the effect of the Gatinâma Karma and the duration of each state is conditioned by its own Nâma-karma

COMMENTARY

The Âtmâ in itself has neither beginning nor end, and yet it will take infinite forms. Each form of existence will be of a particular Gati. Gati is a general class of beings. Four such classes are recognised by the Jainas, Manusya, Deva, Naraka, and Tiryak Gatis. The birth of Âtmâ into any one of these forms is entirely conditioned by a particular kind of Karma. This Karma which leads the soul to take forms according to the different Gatis is called Gatinâma Karma. The form and the duration of life are dependent upon the quality and the strength of this Nâma-karma.

When the particular Nama-karma exhausts its efficiency, the particular form of life brought about by that Karma ceases to exist, and the soul puts on another form, that is, enters into another Gati, as determined by the new Nâma-karma acquired during the previous life. Thus Âtmâ is like an actor who takes several parts on the stage. Forms are put off and put on while the actor is one and the same. Through all the changing forms the soul maintains its identity and nature for which there is neither birth nor death. And finally when the Âtmâ gets liberated from the Karmas it still maintains its everlasting nature, of course, pure and perfect.

20

It is pointed out that the soul which by liberation from Karma attains Mokṣa is not absolutely distinct from the soul which was in Saṃsâra.

For a gem purified is not fundamentally different from its own state before purification. The gem is the same though free from dirt.

*Sanskrit rendering

एवं सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य नास्त्युत्पाद ।
तावज्जीवानां देवो मनुष्य इति गतिनामः ॥ १६ ॥

णाणावरणादीया भावा जीवेण सुदुअणुबद्धा ।

तेसिमभावं किञ्चा अभूदपुव्वो हवदि सिद्धो ॥ २० ॥*

20 Jīva on account of his Bhāva Karma or an impure emotional state may get utterly bound by the Karmas such as Jñānāvarṇiṇya (the knowledge-clouding Karma). (Then he becomes a Samsāri Jīva). But he may (through the realisation of his own nature) completely liberate himself from that bondage and then attains a state unknown to him before the state of perfection

COMMENTARY

Though gold, may be different from brass, yet it is mixed with it. In the same way Jīva pure in itself gets bound by Karmas. The initial condition is its own impure heart called " Bhāva Karma " On account of this psychological state, the Dravya Karmas, or the different kinds of Karmic matter are attracted and get deposited on the Jīva, thereby shrouding its light and glory

When the Jīva is so bound by Karmas it undergoes a series of manifestations. But finally by realising its true nature it may liberate itself from Karmic shackles and get Nirvāna. When once this stage is reached there is no fear of coming back to Samsāra. Jainas do not assume the doctrine of the fall of man. Every Jīva to begin with is a Karma-Jīva and Nirvāna is a unique state to be acquired anew and for the first time. The state of nature is not a state of freedom. It is a state of bondage. Jīva finds itself in chains, and by its own exertion secures freedom

21

Then it is stated that the Ātmā with the manifestation of Guna and Paryāya (attributes and modes) will lose its existing nature and assume a new state of existence according to the Paryāyārthika Naya.

*Sanskrit rendering

ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेन सुदुः अनुबद्धाः ।

तेषामभावं कृत्वाऽभूतपूर्वो भवति सिद्धः ॥ २० ॥

एवं भावमभावं भावाभावं अभावभावं च ।

गुणपञ्जयेहिं सहिदो संसरमाणी कुण्णदि जीवो ॥ २१ ॥*

21. Thus the Jīva with its attributes and modes, roaming in Samsāra, may lose its particular form and assume a new one. Again this form may be lost and the original regained

COMMENTARY.

Dravya or substance has the quality of identity and difference. It is permanent while changing. Jīva Dravya is capable of taking different forms or Paryāyas. This process of Paryāyic change is Samsāra. In the series of Samsāra with reference to a particular Jīva there is the passing away of old forms and the coming in of new ones. These changes of forms do not pre-suppose the loss of identity of the Jīva. The very same Jīva as an individual survives after each change thus maintaining its self identity. Samsāra for the Jaina is not the manifestation of a single self as the Vedāntin would have it. Infinite number of Jīvas each having its own Paryāyas constitute the total of Samsāra. At any particular moment the simultaneous and co-existing forms of different Jīvas will make up the Samsāra of that moment which means the organic world the mankind and the Devas and the Nārakas and animals and plants of that moment.

22

After describing the Dravyas in general by way of introduction the author is going to speak about Kāla or time which is indispensably related to the five Astikāyas. Before going to the description of time, the author recapitulates the five existences or Astikāyas in relation to which only time has relevancy and meaning.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया आयासं अत्थिकाइया सेसा ।

अमया अत्थित्तमया कारणभूदा हि लोगस्स ॥ २२ ॥†

22. The souls, the material bodies, space, together with the remaining two, Dharma and Adharma, are the uncreated existences that constitute the world. These are the Astikāyas.

* Sanskrit rendering

एवं भावमभावं भावाभावमभावभावं च ।

गुणपर्ययः सहितः संसरन् करोति जीवः ॥ २१ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

जीव पुद्गलकायाः आकाशमस्तिकायौ शेषौ ।

अमया अस्तित्वमयाः कारणभूता हि लोकस्य ॥ २२ ॥

COMMENTARY

The infinite number of souls, the infinite number of physical bodies, space and the two physical principles of (Dharma and Adharma) of motion and rest—these are the constitutive elements of the world. These are uncreated and eternal. Jainas recognise the reality of space. To complete the world they also pre-suppose the two principles of motion and rest called by them Dharma and Adharma.

23

Then Time is described. It is the instrument of change in the above five Astikāyas. This is real Time or absolute Time. From these changes we have the perception of duration and intervals which corresponds to relative or Vyavahārika Time. Real Time is also a matter of inference from the changes in the above Astikāyas.

सद्भाव सभावार्ण जीवार्ण तह य पोग्गलार्ण च ।

परिग्रहणसंभूदो कालो नियमेण पणत्तो ॥ २३ ॥ *

23. That on account of which these existences the Jīvas, material bodies, the Dharma and Adharma undergo changes is called real time or Kāla-Dravya.

COMMENTARY.

Time is of two kinds, real and relative. Birth, growth and decay of things are possible only because of the former absolute time. The relative Time is made up of conventional periods measured by unit based upon those changes. This is merely an aspect of real time which is constituted by Instants. This is unconditional and absolute.

First of all the distinction between absolute and relative time reminds one of Newton's distinction. The idealist for whom the world of concrete experience is illusory may speak of time as a form of experience. But one who accepts the reality of the concrete world and its changes, must also admit the reality of Time. Jainas being realists do recognise the reality of time. If change is real, again, Time must also be real. It is the instrument of creative evolution as Bergson would say. And lastly the absolute or real time is constituted by instants which correspond to the points of space and

*Sanskrit rendering

सद्भावस्वभावार्ण जीवार्ण तथैव पुद्गलार्ण च ।

परिवर्त्तनसंभूतः कालो नियमेन प्रवृत्तः ॥ २३ ॥

particles of matter In fact, these three classes of elements, points, instants,—and particles have important function in the Jaina system of Philosophy It is also worth noticing that modern realist led by the Mathematical Philosophers admits the doctrine that space is real and is made up of points, Time is real and is made up of instants or moments, and the physical world is real and is made of particles. And these doctrines form the fundamental concepts of the Jaina view of the world

24

Next the account of real time of which the conventional time is a form or mode

ववगदपणवणरसो ववगददोगंधअट्टफासो य ।

अगुरुलहुगो अमुत्तो वहणलखो य कालोत्ति ॥ २४ ॥*

(24) What is without the five colours, and the five tastes, without the two smells, and eight contacts, what is neither heavy nor light and has the character of introducing changes in other things is Time

COMMENTARY

Time has meaning for and existence in the world It is made up of Instants or Kālānus The Instants have neither colour, taste, nor touch The qualities associated with physical objects cannot be applied to it These constitute a "continuous compact series" The time series formed by Instants is one dimensional in the language of the Mathematicians, that is why Time is denoted Kayatva by the Jaina Philosopher Time which is so constituted by Instants is called Mukhyakāla or absolute time It is also described by the following terms.—Paramārthakāla, the great unconditioned time Nischayakāla, true time. Dravyakāla, real time It is one of the six Dravyas or the Reals

25

Then the account of relative Time which is measured by changes in the physical object or in the Jīvas This conventional Time is merely a Parjāya of real time and is conditioned by the above changes.

* Sanskrit rendering

व्यपगतपञ्चवर्णरसो व्यपगतद्विगन्धाष्टस्पर्शश्च ।

अगुरुलघुको अमूर्तो वर्त्तनलक्षणश्च काल इति ॥ २४॥

समओ णिमिसो कट्टा कला य णाली तदो दिवारत्ती ।
मासोदुअयणंसंवच्छरोत्ति कालो परायत्तो ॥ २५ ॥*

25 *Samaya*, *Nimisa*, *Kâstha*, *Kalâ*, *Nâli*, then (*Muhurta*), *day*, *month*, *season*, *Ayana*, and, *Samvatsara* and other periods of Time are all *Vyavahâra* or conventional time These are determined by other objects.

Samaya or moment (which is the manifestation of infinite number of ultimate distants).

Nimisa which is made up of innumerable such moments.

Kâstha which is equal to fifteen *Nimisas*

Kalâ which is equal to thirty *Kâsthâs*

Nâli which is a little over twenty *Kâlas*

Muhurta which is equal to two *Nâlis*

Day and Night, equal to thirty *Muhurtas*

Month which is equal to thirty days

Season which is equal to two months

Ayana Half year equal to three seasons.

Samvatsara year which is equal to two *Ayanas*

COMMENTARY.

The different periods enumerated in this *Gâthâ* are the conventional periods measured by different units These are artificial distinctions introduced into the continuous time series of real time The units which determine the conventional distinctions are generally the changes in the objects of the physical world or of the organic world Winking of the eyelid, the diurnal motion of the sun across the heavens (which is only apparent according to modern Astronomy) and the motion of the moon round the earth are some of the important changes of physical objects which have been traditionally associated with conventional period of measurements Because of these conventional distinctions, relative Time is said to be *Parâyatta* "dependent on other things," but still since it is merely a form of real time which is an unconditioned *Dravya*. *Vyavahâra Kâla* is said to be conditioned in a way It is called *Kathanchit Parâyatta*, somewhat conditioned..

26

Then is explained what is meant by somewhat conditioned in the case of relative Time

*Sanskrit rendering

समयो निमिषः काष्ठा कला च नाली ततो दिवारात्रं ।

मासर्त्वयनसंवत्सरमिति कालः परायत्तः ॥ २५ ॥

णत्थि चिरं वा खिप्पं मत्तारहिदं तु सा वि खलु मत्ता ।
पुद्गलद्वयेण विणा तस्मा कालो पदुच्चभवो ॥ २६ ॥*

26 Duration of time either long or short is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions

COMMENTARY.

Vyavahāra Kāla or conventional time consists of periods of duration which may be either short or long. This distinction of length of periods is not intrinsic. It is entirely due to external conditions such as the moments of the physical bodies. Therefore though time as such is unconditioned Vyavaharā kāla is certainly conditioned by alien objects. Thus Time as such is the instrument of change or Parinama in the five existences of the world, while itself has the Vyavahārika Paryayas measured by the changes of the other objects.

Here ends the Introductory Chapter of the Pañchāstikāya Prabhrta

CHAPTER I

27.

After describing the Dravyas in general the author examines them in detail. He takes up Jīva Dravya first, for that is the most important.

जीवोत्ति हवदि चेदा उपओगविसेसिदो पहुकत्ता ।
भोत्ता य देहमत्तो ण हि मुत्तो कम्मसंजुत्तो ॥ २७ ॥

27. The soul has the following attributes. It has Life, Consciousness, Upayoga, (knowledge and perception) and is Potent, performs actions, and is affected by their results, is conditioned by his own body, is incorporeal and is ordinarily found with Karma.

* Sanskrit rendering

नास्ति चिरं वा क्षिप्रं मात्रारहितं तु सापि खलु मात्रा ।
पुद्गलद्वयेन विना तस्मात्कालः प्रतीयभवः ॥ २६ ॥

* Sanskrit rendering

जीव इति भवति चेतयितोपयोगविशेषियः प्रभुः कर्त्ता ।
भोक्ता च देहमात्रो न हि मूर्च्छः कर्मसंयुक्तः ॥ २७ ॥

COMMENTARY

The author enumerates nine attributes. These attributes are true not only of Sopādhi Jīvas, but also of Nirupādhi Jīvas. The enumerated attributes refer to Sopādhi Jīva—the Jīva that has Upādhi or limitations. Of course the author implies also the correlative nine attributes of the Nirupādhi Jīva or the liberated soul.

The attributes relating to Sopādhi Jīva are :—

- (1) *Life*, i.e., living with Daśa-prānas or ten life principles.
- (2) *Chetanā* or consciousness, i.e., the ordinary finite consciousness which is associated with will and emotion, viz., acting and enjoying.
- (3) *Upayoga*. Upayoga is the manifestation of Chetanā in the act of understanding. Jñāna and Darśana are the two Upayogas, Knowledge and perception. These two modes of the understanding are intimately related to Karmic changes. The relation may be said to be in inverse ratio. They decrease in intensity and quality as the Karmic veil becomes thicker and stronger. If the Karmas decay or disappear then the Upayogas have the chance of fuller manifestation.
- (4) *Lordship* or the capacity to assume different states of existence in Samsāra. He is the architect of his own life.
- (5) *Kartā*. He is the doer of his own Karmas—both Dravya and Bhāva (Physical and mental Karmas).
- (6) *Bhoktā*. He is the enjoyer of the fruits of his own Karmas.
- (7) *Dehamātra*. Being embodied he may be said to be of the same dimensions as the body.
- (8) *Amurta* is incorporeal, being spiritual by nature.
- (9) *Karma—Samyuktah* is born with Karmas, being a Samsāri Jīva.

Similarly we have the nine corresponding attributes of the Nirupādhi Jīva or the liberated soul —

- (1) Living the life of pure and perfect existence.
- (2) Having the consciousness which is infinite in contentment.
- (3) *Śuddha Upayoga*. He has the pure modes of Kevala Jñāna and Kevala Darśana, perfect knowledge and perfect perception.
- (4) *Lord*. He is the true Lord because of the freedom acquired by annihilation of Karmas.
- (5) *He is the true Kartā* or Doer, being independent of and undetermined by extraneous conditions, Self determined.

(6) *Is the enjoyer of the eternal and infinite bliss begotten of the complete realisation of self*

(7) *Is the approximate size of the body possessed by him last*

(8) *And yet is without form, being spiritual and being free from all Karmas or physical qualities*

(9) *And is Karma—nirmukta is absolutely free from the bondage of Karma*

Thus the author in a single *gôthâ* describes the two kinds of *Jîvas*, each with the nine qualities

28

कम्ममलविप्पमुक्को उद्धं लोगस्स अंतमधिगंता ।

सो सव्वणाणदरसी लहदि सुहमणिंदियमणंतं ॥ २८ ॥*

28. *Âtmâ* which is free from the defect of Karma gets to the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all, and obtains the transcendental bliss everlasting

COMMENTARY

Of the nine attributes the attribute of lordship is taken first for explanation. It is known by experience and by the study of scriptures that Soul is the lord of his own attributes and states of existence. Impurity of the heart or false faith may lead him to Samsâra. The Lordship should not therefore be interpreted only with the reference to the fall from a high estate. Even when he is in the right path, the path that takes him to the never-before-experienced bliss, everlasting, he is the Lord of his own destiny. He is not to be imagined merely as a drift wood carried up and down by the waves in the Ocean of Samsâra. That would make him helpless in the hands of extrinsic Karmic forces. No. He is the Creator, the Karmas themselves owe their existence to his will. Hence he is his own Lord whether he walks the path of righteousness or chooses the other one. *Âtmâ* is his own maker and Lord.

Jaina philosophy is peculiarly associated with its own cosmogony. Heavens and hells are arranged in an order. The soul that gets liberation quits the place, rises up to the summit of *Loka* where he retains his abode. This *Dogma* is referred to in the *Gâthâ*. As the

*Sanskrit rendering

कर्ममलविग्रमुक्त ऊर्ध्वं लोकस्यान्तमधिगम्य ।

स सर्वज्ञानदर्शी लभते सुखमनिन्द्यमनन्तम् ॥ २८ ॥

natural and inevitable result of self-realisation the true Lordship of the soul consists in inheriting the abode of bliss at the summit of the world.

29.

Then it is mentioned that this everlasting heavenly bliss is secured by Âtmâ by his own efforts without any extraneous help.

जादो सयं स चेदा सवण्हू सव्वलोगदरसी य ।

पप्पोदि सुहमणन्तं अव्वाबाधं सगममुत्तं ॥ २९ ॥*

29. Thus Âtmâ becoming omniscient and all perceiving through its own effort obtains the infinite bliss which transcends sense experience which is free from any imperfection, which is spiritual and self-determined

COMMENTARY

This Gâthâ goes with the previous one and states that infinite bliss is an acquisition of the self through its own exertions. This brings out the quality of Prabhutva or lordship, over one's own destiny.

30

After the description of the attribute Prabhutva we have an account of Jīvâtva or Life characteristic. Here the author adopts the Vyavahârîka point of view and describes the characteristics of organic beings in Samsârâ

पाणेहिं चदुहिं जीवदि जीवस्सदि जो हु जीविदो पुव्वं ।
सो जीवो पाणा पुण बलमिंदियमाउ उस्सासो ॥ ३० ॥†

30 Whatever thing manifesting through four Prânas (or principles of organism) is living at present, will continue to live in the future, and was living in the past, that same is Jîva. Again the Prânas are Bala, or strength, Indriya or the senses, Âyuh, or the age and Vchchhvâsa or respiration

*Sanskrit rendering

जातः स्वयं स चेतयिता सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।

प्राप्नोति सुखमनन्तमव्याबाधं स्वकममूत्तम् ॥ २९ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

प्राणैश्चतुर्भिर्जीवति जीवष्यति यः खलु जीवितः पूर्वं ।

स जीवः प्राणः पुनर्बलमिन्द्रियमायुरुच्छ्वासः ॥ ३० ॥

A living organism must have these four Prānas or life principles. You cannot think of a living being devoid of these characteristics. Hence the author trying to describe the nature of life as we know it, enumerates the four fundamental characteristics of organic life. These are —

- 1 Balaprāna or strength which consists of
 - (a) Manobala or strength of mind
 - (b) Vakbala or strength of speech
 - (c) Kāyabala or strength of body
- 2 Indriya prānas are the senses
 - (a) Sparśa or contact sense through skin
 - (b) Rasa or taste through tongue
 - (c) Ghrāna or smell through nose
 - (d) Śabda or sound through ears
 - (e) Chakṣu or vision through eyes

Thus the Indriyas are five

- (3) Āyuh Prāna which is the duration or age of life and it is one
- (4) Uchhivāsa or respiration is one

Thus the four Prānas become ten Prānas when details are taken into consideration. These Prānas need not all of them with all the details be present together in an organism, i.e., there may be an organism which has not all the five Indriyas. But there must be the four main characteristics. These Prānas are generated by the respective Karmas. The number and quality of the Prānas will be determined by the Karmic differences. These are considered to be the characteristics of soul, only from Vyāvahārika point. The particular Vyāvahārika point adopted here is called by the Jaina Philosopher, अनुपचरित अमत्तमुत् व्यवहारनय i.e., non-conventional and relative aspect of attending to the unessential nature of a thing, i.e., these characteristics do not belong to Ātmā according to the principle of absolute reality or Śuddha Nischayanaya.

31 and 32

Next he enumerates the general and special characteristics of Jīva, the characteristics both manifested and unmanifested

अगुरुलहुगा अणंता तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदा सव्वे ।
देसेहिं असंखादा सियलोगं सव्वमावण्णा ॥३१॥

* Sanskrit rendering

अगुरुलघुका अनन्तास्तेरनन्तैः परिणताः सर्वे ।

देशैरसंख्याताः स्यात्सौकं सर्वमावण्णाः ॥ ३१ ॥

केचित्तु अणावण्णा मिच्छादंसणकसायजोगजुदा ।

विजुदा य तेहिं बहुगा सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥*

31 32 The spiritual qualities of Jiva are infinite, Jivas assume different forms through the manifestation of these infinite attributes. Taking the point of world-space some souls through their complete manifestation may fill the whole world Others are not so fully manifested These are filled with false faith-blinding emotions, erroneous knowledge and perception The former class of souls are free from these defects and are called the perfect ones And the latter are the Samsâri, Jivas or the imperfect ones Each class contains infinite number of individuals

COMMENTARY.

That spiritual principle on account of which the Jîva Dravyas continue to manifest through all their different forms is called *Agurula-ghutva gûya* On account of the explicit manifestations of these attributes Jîvas have the chance of becoming complete and perfect. The number of Jîvas are infinite They have their abode only in the *Lokâkâsa*. A soul developed to perfection is called *Siddha*. That stage represents absolute freedom from Karmas The other class consists of *Samsâri Jîvas* According to Jainas each class contains infinite number of individuals.

If we employ the terminology of modern philosophy we have to characterise the system as pluralistic The souls are not only different and distinct in their *Samsâric* state but also in the perfect state. A soul may become perfect, may acquire by self-manifestation infinite number of qualities and still it preserves its own individuality Individuality and perfection are not incompatible Hence according to the Jaina system realisation of *Paramâtma* does not mean absolute nullification of self-identity. That means several *Paramâtmas* or perfect souls may co-exist.

This attitude of uncompromising pluralism is evidently due to the extraordinary emphasis laid on individual conduct by the Jaina

*Sanskrit rendering

केचित्तु अणापन्ना मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगयुताः ।

वियुताश्च तैर्बहुवः सिद्धाः संसारिणो जीवाः ॥ ३२ ॥

system. Bhakti and Jñāna are inadequate either severally or jointly to lead the soul to Mokṣa. Châritra or conduct is the indispensable third to constitute Mokṣamârga. If individuality is merely phenomenal appearance, moral value will also become purely relative. Ultimate reality may be complete without conserving moral value which becomes merely an unessential characteristic confined to the world of appearance. Any system that attaches great importance to moral value, that believes that reality would be incomplete without the conservation of values, cannot afford to play with individuality and must necessarily be pluralistic explicitly or implicitly.

33

Next he explains the characteristic that soul is of the same dimensions as its own body which is acquired through Karmas. He explains it by analogy

जह पउमरायरयणं खित्तं खीरे पभासयदि खीरं ।
तह देही देहत्थो सदेहमत्तं पभासयदि ॥ ३३ ॥*

33 Just as the lotus-hued ruby when placed in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to the milk, so Âtmâ residing in its own body imparts its lustre or intelligence to the whole body

COMMENTARY

Âtmâ is in itself non-special hence it is not accurate to ask "Where does it reside in its body?" It pervades through the whole body. If it is located in any particular part of the body, the parts away from its residence will have to be somehow related to consciousness. The Jaina system avoids the whole difficulty by considering the soul to be completely pervading in its own body. This pervading is not to be interpreted as a sort of physical expansion. It is merely spiritual manifestation still since the relation of consciousness is intimate with its own body which is physical and special. Âtmâ is considered to be a Kâya. But this Kâyatva would not make it physical. It is distinctly defined to be spiritual.

34

This characteristic of co-extensiveness with the body is true in its present as well as its past and future states or forms. Then

* Sanskrit rendering

यथा पद्मरागरत्नं क्षिप्तं क्षीरे प्रभासयति क्षीरं ।

तथा देही देहस्यः स्वदेहमात्रं प्रभासयति ॥ ३३ ॥

the author mentions the substantiality of the soul, its distinctness from the body and the reason of its different states of existence.

सर्वत्र अस्ति जीवो न चैक एकाय एकद्वौ ।

अज्भवसाणविसिद्धो चिद्वदि मलिणो रजमलेहिं ॥३४॥*

34 Jīva pervades the whole body Still he is not one with the body though when functioning, he is identical with it Impelled by gross emotions, stained by Karmas he puts on different forms in the cycle of Samsāra

COMMENTARY.

The term Sarvatra is again interpreted to mean all the different bodies taken up by a soul during different births. Then the Gāthā will be interpreted slightly differently. The very same soul exists in all its different bodies It is one with its body and yet distinct from them and so on. Again Sarvatra may mean in all parts of the world. Then the interpretation will have to be as follows :—

सर्वत्र In all parts of the world

अस्ति Jīva exists.

There are Jīvas everywhere, i.e., in all parts of the world

The Jīvas एकाः are not identical as they are distinct entities एको and yet they are one and identical, एकद्वौ as they are substantially similar to one another, etc., i.e., they are one, from the generic point of view, but different from the specific point of view Though the Âtmā has continued to exist, and has an embodied existence from time immemorial, it is in its spiritual nature entirely distinct from its corporeal habitation It puts on a body because of Karmas and thus it roams in the world of Samsāra

35

Next, the characteristic of *Amūrta* or incorporeality This quality is real absolutely in the case of a Siddha Jīva who is free from all taint of matter, karmic and non-karmic, whereas the other Jīvas though in themselves *Amūrtas*, are ordinarily associated with Mūrta Dravyas or physical characteristics

*Sanskrit rendering

सर्वत्रास्ति जीवो न चैक एकायै ऐक्यस्थः ।

अज्भवसायविशिष्टश्चेष्टते मलिनो रजोमलैः ॥ ३४ ॥

जेसिं जीवसहावो णत्थि अभावो य सव्वहा तस्स ।
ते होंति भिण्णदेहा सिद्धा वचिगोयरमदीदा ॥३५॥*

35 Those Jivas which have not the life principles (Dravya Prānas or the sense organs) and yet are not altogether devoid of them (as the Bhāva Prānas are intact) are the ones that are free from corporeal limitation and they are the perfect ones beyond description.

COMMENTARY

The body is the limiting condition of Ātma Pradeśa or the dimension of Ātmā. The size of the perfected soul is said to be a little less than that of its last body for it is free from the 'Yoga' the principle which brings about contraction and expansion or shrinking and diffusing. It may be said to be merely an assemblage of pure knowledge and other qualities of perfection.

36

That Siddha state is shown to be neither the cause nor the effect of the Samsāra series. It being absolutely unconditioned cannot be an item of the conditioned series of causation.

ण कुदोचि वि उपण्णो जह्मा कज्जं ण तेण सो सिद्धो ।
उप्पादेदि ण किंचि वि कारणमवि तेण ण स होदि ॥३६॥†

36. The Siddha is not to be born again at any time in Samsāra. Hence he is not to be an effect (he is not to be causally determined by anything else). Nor is he to bring about a change in anything else, therefore he is not a cause either.

COMMENTARY

Siddha has secured the absolute Amūrtā State, the state of perfect spirituality and is incapable of maintaining causal relation with the Samsāra series. The latter is determined by Karmic conditions. The

* Sanskrit rendering

येषां जीवस्वभावो नास्त्यभावश्च सर्वथा तस्य ।

ते भवन्ति भिन्नदेहाः सिद्धा वागोचरमतीताः ॥ ३५ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

न कुतश्चिदप्युत्पन्नो यस्मात् कार्यं न तेन स सिद्धः ।

उत्पादयति न किञ्चिदपि कारणमपि तेन न स भवति ॥ ३६ ॥

former is not so conditioned. The casual category which is true of the conditioned series is not to be applied to the unconditioned reality. The argument is the same as that employed by *Kant* with the reference to the Thing in itself. What is true of the experience need not necessarily be true of the *metaempirical*. The Siddha state then is transcendental Self.

37

Then he states that the soul maintains its intrinsic nature and is real even in its Siddha or perfect state. Thus the Buddhist view of Nirvāna as the annihilation of self is condemned and rejected.

सस्सदमध उच्छेदं भवमभव्वं च सुण्णमिदरं च ।

विण्णामविण्णानं ण विजुज्जदि असदि सब्भावे ॥३७॥*

37. That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet dead from Samsāra; that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature; that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect; these eight attributes will not be associated with him if 'Nirvāna' is interpreted nihilistically.

COMMENTARY.

As we said above, this Gāthā defends the Jaina view of Self against the nihilistic interpretation of the Buddhists. Even in Siddha state the self does not lose its "Satbhāva" substantial reality.

It is only perfection of the already existing true nature which is in the germ in the finite self. Complete evolution is no annihilation. There must be more of its real nature and not less.

With this ends the Amūrta characteristic of Jīva.

38

Next the characteristic of "*Chetanā*" The author notices the three forms of *Chetanā* or consciousness.

*Sanskrit rendering

शास्वतमथोच्छेदो भव्यमभव्यं च शून्यमितरच्च ।

विज्ञानमविज्ञानं नापि युज्यते असति सद्भावे ॥ ३७ ॥

कम्माणं फलमेक्यो एको कज्जं तु णाणमध एको ।
चेदयदि जीवरासी चेदगभावेण तिहिवेण ॥३८॥†

38 One kind of Jīva experiences merely the fruits of Ka.ma, pleasure-pain Another experiences conative activity as well, still another has pure and perfect knowledge. Thus consciousness is manifested in three-fold awareness

COMMENTARY

The first two states of experience are related to Samsāri Jīva, for they have reference to Karma, whereas the third has reference to pure Chetanā Svabhāva and hence is associated with the perfect one. The implicit recognition by the author of the three different aspects of consciousness feeling, activity, and knowledge, is worth noticing from the point of modern Psychology

39

Then he specifies the Jīvas according to the three aspects of consciousness noticed above

सव्वे खलु कम्मफलं थावरकाया तसा हि कज्जजुदं ।
पाणित्तमदिक्कंता णाणं विंदन्ति ते जीवा ॥ ३९ ॥*

39 Indeed all fixed organisms like plants experience merely feeling, but the moving ones, the animals have besides feeling, conative experience Whereas those that transcend the organic conditions or Prānas experience pure knowledge

COMMENTARY

Plants are fixed and incapable of movement, and can therefore only suffer the environmental changes. They can only feel the mechanical and climatic stimuli around The moving organisms because of their movement are capable of experiencing their own activity In their experience then there is besides feeling, the

†Sanskrit rendering

कर्मणां फलमेकः एकः कार्यं तु ज्ञानमथैक ।
चेतयन्ति जीवराशिश्चेतकभावेन त्रिविधेन ॥ ३८ ॥

*Sanskrit rendering

सर्वे खलु कर्मफलं स्थावरकायास्तसा हि कार्ययुतं ।
प्राणित्वमतिक्रान्ता ज्ञानं विन्दन्ति ते जीवाः ॥ ३९ ॥

consciousness of activity, whereas to experience pure thought, there must be complete absence of physical and organic conditions. Such a being is certainly the Mukta Jīva

After the wonderful discoveries of Dr. Bose with reference to plant life it is not necessary to defend the proposition that plants are capable of feeling. Western science, though it recognised the organic nature of plants was very much reluctant to admit the correlative organic characteristic of feeling in plants. This is only another phase of the *Cartesian* prejudice with reference to plants and animals. Descartes was responsible for the view that animals were skilfully created automata or machines. Darwin gave a death blow to this philosophical superstition and Bose did the same service to the plant world and thereby distinctly established the fundamental unity of the organic world and this is the thesis presupposed in the above Gāthā.

Thus ends the discussion of Chetana characteristic of Jīva.

40

Then the quality of Upayoga or the instrument of knowledge Jñāna and Darśana—understanding and perception.

उवओगो खलु दुविहो णाणेण य दंसणेण संजुत्तो ।
जीवस्स सव्वकालं अणणभूदं वियाणीहि ॥४०॥*

40 Upayoga the instrument or means of knowledge is twofold—Jñāna or understanding and Darśana or perception. It is inseparable from and always present in Jīva. So do thou learn its nature.

COMMENTARY

One of the commentators says that this Gāthā is addressed to a disciple who is a Nāgājīka. Perception and understanding are essentially related to Jīva. There can be no Jīva which has not perception and understanding, similarly the faculties cannot exist apart from the self. This is the view of the author. He rejects the view that the faculties are adventitious and acquired.

41.

Then the author describes the different species of Jñāna which is one of the Upayogas referred to in the previous Gāthā.

* Sanskrit rendering.

उपयोगः खलु द्विविधो ज्ञानेन च दर्शनेन संयुक्तः ।

जीवस्य सर्वकालमनन्यभूतं विजानीहि ॥ ४० ॥

आभिणिसुदोधिमणकेवलाणि णाणाणि पंचभेयाणि ।

कुमदिसुदविभंगाणि य तिणिण वि णाणेहिं संजुत्ते ॥४१॥*

Abhinibodha (knowledge obtained by congenital mental capacity), Śruta (knowledge obtained by study), Avadhī (a kind of clairvoyant knowledge of events in different places and in different times), Manah Paryaya (telepathic knowledge of another's mind), and Kevala Jñāna (the perfect knowledge) These are the five kinds of right knowledge. But, when the first three are associated with the error, or Ajñāna they form three kinds of erroneous knowledge, Kumati, Kuśruti, Vibhanga Avadhī, and are included in the forms of knowledge

COMMENTARY

Matī Jñāna refers to sense perception and the inferential knowledge based upon it. Śruta Jñāna is knowledge based upon testimony obtained mainly through books. Avadhī Jñāna is an abnormal faculty of perception, but the perception is not conditioned by sense organs. It is supposed to comprehend things and events of different places and of different times. The faculty is able to project itself either to the past or to the future. This form of awareness is quite analogous to sense perception. This in a way corresponds to the clairvoyant capacity possessed by certain "mediums." Manah Paryaya is the capacity of knowing the ideas in another's mind. This corresponds in a way to telepathy of modern psychology. This gives an insight into mental facts of persons at a limited distance—the distance limit being conditioned by the strength and the quality of the faculty. This should not be confounded with inferential knowledge obtained from facial expression. And lastly Kevala Jñāna is the perfect knowledge which is associated with the S'ddha State. The first two are distinctly conditioned by sense perception, whereas the other three transcend sense limitations. The last is absolutely free from any kind of physical conditions, whereas the other four are still associated with corporeal existence. Avadhī and Manah Paryaya are the super-normal faculties acquired under peculiar psycho-physical

* Sanskrit rendering

आभिनिबोधिकश्रुताविधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।
कुमतिश्रुतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानैः संयुक्तानि ॥ ४१ ॥

conditions The normal and super-normal cognitive faculties which correspond to the revelations of modern psychic research are not facts to be passed over without notice.

42

Then the five Jñānas are described in detail First Matijñāna is taken.

मदिणाणं पुण तिविहं उबलद्धी भावणं च उवओगो ।
तह चेव चदुवियप्पं दंसणपुव्वं हवादि णाणं ॥४२॥*

42 Matijñāna is of three kinds — Upalabdhī or perception, Bhāvanā or memory, Upayoga or understanding It is also said to be of four kinds This Jñāna is always preceded by sense presentation or Darśana

COMMENTARY.

This Matijñāna is certainly consequent upon sense perception It includes as the Śūtra says apprehension of the object, memory, and understanding, *i e*, all that is given to us through sense perception and all that we elaborate out of these sense-elements in memory and imagination. Though it is mainly of three kinds it is also considered to be of four different forms For example the author of Tattvārthasūtra speaks of अवग्रहोपाय धारणा This four-fold division is not fundamentally different from the previous division अवग्रह implies the sense datum, *e g*, Perceiving a thing to be white through the eyes is Avagraha To attempt to determine what that white object is, is ईहा This ईहा refers to the indecisive mental attitude where several alternative determinations are possible Finally when the thing is determined, *i e*, out of several alternatives when one is chosen because of certain special characteristics perceived in the white object then we have Avāya This implies the inferential element in all perception This should not be confounded with mediate inference about other things through sense perception The very same act of perception involves all these three stages And lastly whenever we remember these things after sometime it is called धारणा. This Matijñāna consists of 336 forms when viewed according to different principles of Division

* Sanskrit rendering

मतिज्ञानं पुनस्त्रिविधं उपलब्धिर्भाविता च उपयोगः ।

तथैव चतुर्विधं दर्शनं पूर्वं भवति ज्ञानम् ॥ ४२ ॥

—प० जुगलकिशोर ।

43.

Then Śrutajñāna, knowledge by testimony and not by acquaintance. The objects of this knowledge may be Mūrta and Amūrta, Physical and non-physical.

सुदणाणं पुण जाणी भणंति लब्धी य भावणा चेव ।
उवओगणयवियप्पं जाणेण य वत्थु अत्थस्स ॥४३॥

43 The wise say that Śruta Jñāna is of four kinds—Labdhi, or association, Bhāvanā or attention, Upayoga or understanding of things and Naya or the aspects of their meaning.

COMMENTARY

Of these four forms of Śrutajñāna or knowledge by testimony, the first is Labdhi. This corresponds to association of ideas. Labdhi is defined to be the process of getting the meaning of one idea through its associated idea. Bhāvanā is the direction of attention to one idea with a view to get at the associated idea. Upayoga is the process of understanding the meaning of ideas consequent upon Bhāvanā. Naya is viewing the meaning from different relations. The first three are concerned with the psychic process of acquiring knowledge through the ideas contained in books. The last is the way of understanding things from different aspects. This Naya plays a very important part in Jain system of thought. This and the Sapta Bhaṅgi mentioned above are the two pillars of Jain Logic. The Nayas also are of seven different kinds. In order to distinguish the seven Nayas these are called Naya Sapta Bhaṅgi as contrasted with Pramāṇa Sapta Bhaṅgi. Naya is defined in "Naya Vivaraṇa" thus नीतिं गम्यतेदानं श्रुताधीनं सर्वोपनिषत् that by which the various aspects of the meaning of the scripture are understood is for us the Naya or principle. This Naya or principle of interpretation is mainly of two kinds, 1. Dravyārthikanaya, that pertaining to Dravya or substance, 2. Paryāyārthika Naya that pertaining to modifications. Again Dravyārthikanaya is further sub-divided into three kinds, 1. Naigama, 2. Samgraha, 3. Vyavahara. The Paryāyārthika Naya is sub-divided into four kinds, 1. Rijusutra, 2. Śabda, 3. Samabhirūḍhi, 4. Liambhuta. These seven may be explained in detail,

1 Naigamanaya Nigamahi or Sankalpalahi or purpose That which pertains to निगम. or purpose is नैगमनय It may be said to be the Teleological aspect of a continuous activity. When the purpose of the activity is taken to represent the whole series then it is नैगमनय It is defined in the Sûtra अनभिनिवृत्तार्थं संकल्पमान्नादौ नैगमः. Thus when a person who is drawing water or who is busy carrying firewood is questioned "What are you doing?" He answers "I am cooking." Here he is not actually cooking but it is the purpose which accounts for his action of carrying firewood or drawing water vide *Poojya Padya's* Commentary Sarvarthasiddhi Sutra 33 of Ch I This Naya is misunderstood by M. D. Desai (Nayakarnika,* and by S. C. Vidyabhushana (Nyayavataira).†

These passages give an entirely different interpretation of this naya. It is very clearly explained and illustrated by *Poojyapadya* in his *Sarvarthasiddhi*—Sutra 33 of the first chapter. The same explanation and also the same illustrations are adopted by another commentator of the same sutra—*Srutasagara* the author of *Srutasagaraveyam*—an unpublished commentary on *Tatvarthadhigema*. My own explanation is based upon these authorities and also on the great work on Logic—*Prameya Kamala Martanda*. I consulted *Syadvadamanjari* also of the Benares Edition, page 166 and Bombay Edition of *Ratibandhajaina granthmala* page 198. Here also the same interpretation is found. If in a series of qualities or action any part is taken as the representative of the whole, this representative aspect is Naigama. The derivation given by Mr. Desai may also mean the same Naikam, gahatiti Nigama nigamo bana—Naigama. "The particular that is not restricted to itself, but goes beyond itself, to unify and represent the whole."

This representative character is of course not to be identified with either the mere universal or particular. It is different from both. When a person is making preparations to start on journey, we say "He starts." At the moment of the statement he is not starting, but is going to start. Similar "He dwells here," need not mean that the person must be actually be in the residence at the moment,

* *Naigama Naya* (vide) *Naya arnala* pages 7, 8 of introduction and 43
Also *Nyayavataira* pages 27 and 47.

2 *Samgraha* स्वज्ञान्यविंगोचनैकद्रव्यसुपनीया पर्यायानात्रान्त भेदानभिगेषेण ममन्
प्रदणान्मगद — (तत्त्वार्थसूत्र)

स्वज्ञात्यविंगोचनैकद्रव्यसुपनीयार्थनात्रान्त भेदान्समन् ग्रहणान्मगद ।

Samgraha is the class view. When several things which are similar in essence and which are not incompatible with one another are brought together under one class concept we have *Samgraha Naya*. Thus the name pot refers to the whole class of individual objects which go by that name. Similarly the idea of *Dravya*. From the point of *Dravya* characteristic (Permanency through change) the term *Dravya* refers to several entities, living and non-living which are all taken as one class.

3 *Vyavahara* मप्रक्षुण्यजिज्ञानामयीनां विविधैर्लक्ष्मणैश्चकारः ॥

(Tatvartha)

संप्रक्षुण्यजिज्ञानामयीनां विविधैर्लक्ष्मणैश्चकारः ॥ (Prameya)

Vyavahara is the process of examining the objects which are brought together under one class according to the different rules of Logic. This would specially enquire into the several species which constitute the whole genus. Examination of the specific *Dravyas* like *Dravya* and *Ajiva Dravya* which both belong to *Dravya* Genus would be an illustration for *Vyavahara Naya*.

4. *Riju Sutra* अजुंमगुण सूत्रयति नन्वतदनि ऋजुसूत्र ॥ (Tatvartha)

- अजुप्रतिज्ञा, व्यक्त' वर्तमान जगुमात्रं सूत्रयती (मोक्षरति) इति ऋजु सूत्र ॥ (Prameya)

That which clearly expresses a momentary state is *Riju Sutra Naya*. This would take into consideration only the present state of a thing. "It is very pleasant now."— This proposition predicates something which is true of the subject only at the moment of the predication. Such an aspect of a thing is *Riju Sutra Naya*.

5 *Sabda Naya*

लिङ्ग संन्या साधनानि व्यभिचार निवृत्तिहर शब्दोनयः (Tatvartha)

कालकारक लिङ्ग संन्या साधनोपग्रह भेदादभिन्नं अर्थं यपनीति शब्दोनयः शब्द प्रधानत्वान् (Prameya.)

Words though differing in tense, voice, gender, number and instruments may point to the same thing i.e. refer to the same meaning. This aspect of the identity of meaning in spite of differences noted above is *Sabda Naya*.

6 *Samabhivrudha*

नानार्थ समभिरादयान्, समभिरुद्ध

This refers to merely synonymous which though interpreted account to their derivation may refer same identical thing

7 रावं भूतनयः That which describes a particular action or capacity of a thing. Though the thing has not that particular aspect at the time of judging, the name obtained because of that action is still applicable to the thing, according to this principle

Again the Nayas are divided into six kinds. Thus we have *Shadanayas* *Dravyārthika Naya* is also called *Nischaya Naya* or the real aspect *Paryāyārthika Naya* is called *Vyavahāra Naya* or the relative aspect The former is further sub-divided into *Suddha* and *Asuddha* Thus we have *Suddha Nischaya Naya* and *Asuddha Nischaya Naya* *Vyavahāra Naya* is divided into *Sadbhūta* and *Asadbhūta*. Each again determined as *Upacharita* and *Anupacharita* Thus we have four kinds of *Vyavahāra Naya*.—

(1) *Upacharita Sadbhūta*, (2) *Anupacharita Sadbhūta*, (3) *Upacharita Asadbhūta*, (4) *Anupacharita Asadbhūta* The term *Vyavahāra* is added to each at the end These six Nayas are specially employed in the examination of the characteristics of *Atma*.

(1) *Suddhamischaya Naya* That the soul is identically the same whether in *Samsara* or in *Moksha* because of its intrinsic characteristics of *Jñāna* and *Darsana* is a statement according to this *Naya*

(2) *Asuddha Nischaya Naya* to believe that the soul is characterised by gross emotions in its *Samsaric* state is true according to *Asuddha Nischaya Naya*

(3) *Upacharita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya* The opinion that the soul has the *chetana* modification of *Matijñāna* etc., is true because of the *Upacharita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra*. That the soul has *Matijñāna*, is relative and figurative though pertaining to a quality which is in a way real

(4) *Anupacharita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra* That the soul has the modification of *Kevala Jñāna*.

(5) *Anupacharita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. This corresponds to the inseparable accident of the scholastic logic, for example, this is my body. Body is identified with self according to this particular *Naya*

(6) *Upacharita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. This corresponds to the separable accident of scholastic logic, for example. This is my house. House is identified with the self according to *Upacharita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*.

These Nayas refer to the different relations that the several attributes have to the self. The soul owns these several attributes according to these several Nayas. That special aspect of possessing is different in different cases and the different Nayas define the several relations which may be real or relative; which may be pure or impure, which may be separable or inseparable and so on.

(44) Then Avadhī is described in detail

ओहिं तहेव घेप्पदु देसं परमं च ओहिसव्वं च ।

तिणिणवि गुणेण णियमा भवेण देसं तहा णियदं ॥४४॥

Thus Avadhī also is of three kinds Desavadhī, Paramavadhī and Sarvavadhī. All the three are conditioned by Psychic qualities. But Desavadhī is also conditioned by birth in the case of Deva and Naraka.

COMMENTARY

Desavadhī is the very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond sense perception. It is able to apprehend only a limited number of things within a limited space and within a limited time. Paramavadhī is the higher Avadhī Jñāna which is free from such limitations. But the last, Sarvavadhī is the perfect faculty which perceives all reality. This is associated with the perfect self. These three faculties are respectively acquired by psychic development, i.e. as long as certain Psychic qualities are present these metemperical faculties spontaneously manifest themselves. But in the case of the last when once it is acquired it becomes permanent and everlasting. Whereas the first is also present as a matter of birth right in Devas and Narakas i.e. they need not acquire it by special Psychical effort and development. But in the case of man and some higher animals it is to be acquired by developing the psychical nature.

Thus Desavadhī, is said to be of two kinds Gunapratyaya and Bhavapratyaya, conditioned by Gunas or Psychic qualities and by Bhava or Birth. Gunapratyaya Desavadhī is associated with man and animals and Bhavapratyaya with Deva and Naraka.

Gunapratyaya is again divided into six kinds —

1. Anugamī (the following)
2. Ananugamī (not following)
3. Vardhamana (the growing)
4. Hiyamana (decaying or decreasing)

5. Avasthita (limited or bounded).

6. Anavasthita (unlimited or indefinite)

The first is that which enlightens the things while marching as the sun does

The second is that which sticks to one and the same thing as the fixed idea of an insane person. In the first attention is continually flowing from things to things whereas in the second it is rivetted to the very same thing

The third is that which begins like a spark of light and grows into a huge flame gradually lighting up a number of objects

The fourth implies the opposite tendency in the faculty. Here the faculty gradually decreases like fire going out

The fifth is the faculty that neither increases nor decreases but is limited and definite because of the Samyak qualities of the soul.

The sixth is the opposite of the fifth. It is unlimited and indefinite. It is wavering hither and thither like a column of fire or water that is subject to heavy gust of wind.

(45) Then the description of Manah Paryaya

विउलमदी पुण णाणं अज्जवणाणं च दुविह मणणाणं ।
एदे सजमलद्धी उवओगे अप्पमत्तस्स ॥४५॥

Manah Paryaya is of two Kinds. Rijumati and Vipulamati; telepathy which manifests straight and direct and telepathy that manifests crooked or in undulations. These appear only in a person of *appamatta Gunasthâna* who acquired *Samyama labdhi*, (i. e.) a person who acquired complete harmony or steadiness of the spirit by thorough renunciation

COMMENTARY.

Rijvi means straight that which manifests straight or direct is Rijumati. This apprehends straight and direct the ideas in another's mind. Vipula means crooked or zigzag. When the process of knowing the ideas in other's mind manifests in a zigzag way it is Vipulamati. These are the two kinds of Manah Paryaya Jñâna. This capacity is distinctly an acquired one. It is associated only with a person who has risen pretty high in the ladder of spiritual evolution. That particular stage at which this faculty appears is known as *Apramatta gunasthâna*.

The stages in spiritual evolution are fourteen. They are called *Gunasthānas*. These are—

1. मिथ्यादृष्टि ॥
2. सासादन सम्यग्दृष्टि ॥
3. सम्यग् मिथ्यादृष्टि ॥
4. असंयत सम्यग्दृष्टि ॥
5. संयतासंयत ॥
6. प्रमत्तसंयत ॥
7. अप्रमत्तसंयत ॥
8. अपूर्वकरगुस्थाने उपशमकः जपक ॥
9. अनिवृत्तिवाद्दसाम्परायस्थाने उपशमकः जपक ॥
10. सूक्ष्मसम्परायस्थाने उपशमकः जपक ॥
11. उपशान्तकपायत्रीतरागद्वन्द्वस्थ ॥
12. जीर्णकपायत्रीतरागद्वन्द्वस्थ ॥
13. सयोगकेवली ॥
14. अयोगकेवली चेति ॥

1. The first is the stage which represents spiritual blindness. A person in this stage is incapable of either perception of or belief in true reality. This is the lowest stage of spiritual existence where thought is without the value of truth and conduct without the value of goodness.

2. The second stage is the stage of retrogression. A person may advance in the path of evolution and become a *Samyagdrishti* (the fourth *Gunasthāna*). This stage is the opposite of the first. It is only from this stage (the fourth) onwards that a person is capable of having either truth or goodness. But sometimes a soul after reaching the fourth stage which is really the next step from the first may have the misfortune of spiritual degeneration. He may slip down to the bottom of the ladder. This process of slipping down is the stage of *Sasadana*.

It is only a transition period. The person will very soon settle down in the first stage. Hence the second stage does not really mean the next slip from the first. So also the third stage is the spiritual oscillation between first and fourth. It is also a transition stage.

3. The third stage represents the mixed quality. The characteristic of the first and of the fourth stage get inextricably mixed together. The spiritual character is indeterminate. A person cannot be brought under either the first class or the fourth class. Hence it is called *Misragunasthāna*.

4. The fourth stage represents the beginning of the spiritual well being. Here is the possibility of truth and goodness. But still there is not active effort to elicit true thought and good conduct. The absence of this effort is associated with the right spiritual disposition. The latter is called *Samyaktva*. A person who is in this stage and who is without the effort to exhibit the innate powers is *Asamyata Samyakdṛṣhti*.

5. The fifth stage represents partial effort to draw out the spiritual powers. In this stage a person has not only the desirable spiritual disposition but also makes some effort towards further development. He is called a *Desavīati*.

6. The sixth stage represents whole-hearted effort. Complete and possible control over self is associated with the true bent of the spirit. But still the whole-hearted good will is not yet free from tempting desires and impulses. There is the chance of these impulses getting the mastery for there is not yet complete renunciation. Hence this stage is *Pramatta Samyata*.

7. The seventh stage is called *Apramatta Samyata*. In this stage the tendency to be attached by the outer things is thoroughly overcome. Spiritual strength is firmly established. Spirit has conquered the body. This stage is the critical stage in the spiritual evolution. From here begins the double path of higher spiritual evolution. One path leads to absolute perfection. And the other relative perfection. The former is associated with the annihilation of Karmas. The latter with the suppression of them. The former is called *Kṣhapaka Sīnti*—the ladder of annihilation, the latter is called *Upaśama Sīnti*—the ladder of pacification of Karmas.

Manah Paryaya Jñāna appears only in a person who has reached this critical stage of higher spiritual evolution.

Hence it must be considered as an extraordinary psychic quality acquired only after reaching a high stage of spiritual evolution. Before proceeding to describe the characteristics of the other stages of evolution let us note the further qualities of *Manah Paryaya*. This Psychic capacity is peculiarly limited by time and space. Though it is higher than ordinary mental faculty, though it is supernormal still it should not be considered even as approaching *Kevala Jñāna*. Of the two kinds of mind-knowing *Vipula Matī* is considered to be greatly superior to the other. The limitations given are as follow :—

Rijumati Manah Paryaya from the point of time has a lower limit as well as a higher limit. In its lower limit it may apprehend the thoughts of another individual during his lifetime or it may extend to two or three Bhavas or births before and after. The upper limit is upto seven or eight Bhavas or births before and after. From the point of view of space its lower limit is to the radius of a *Gavyuti Gavyuti* or about two leagues and the upper limit is the radius of one *Yojana*. The second, *Vipulamati* has the lower time limit of seven or eight births whereas the higher is innumerable. Its lower distance limit is round a radius of one *yojana* and its higher distance limit is upto *Mānushottara* mountain and not beyond that. This *Manushottara Saila* is according to Jain Geography the limit of human habitation.

When we examine the limitations described above it is clear to us that the latter *Vipula Mati* is decidedly the higher supernormal faculty. Therefore the commentator's interpretation of *vipula* as *kutila* or crooked really means Rhythmic or undulatory manifestation. Whereas the former is straight and direct. The rhythmic manifestation is naturally capable of greater efficiency. This is illustrated by several rhythmic movements in Nature, as in the heart-beat. This Psychic faculty, evidently through this rhythmic or undulatory manifestation is able to achieve better and higher results than those of *Rijumati*.

8 The eighth stage represents the acquisition of a spiritual weapon called the first *Sukla Dhyana*. This is an instrument by help of which karmas are to be destroyed. This is a unique Psychic force never before experienced by the Self. Hence it is *Apurva Karana*. This stage is represented in both the ladders of development. *Upasamakaha* and *Kshapakaha*, i.e., self in this stage may be in the path of annihilation or in that of pacification of Karmas.

9 The ninth stage represents spiritual warfare. Equipped with the weapon of *Sukla Dhyana*, Self—the warrior, destroys the grosser desires. This spiritual warfare is also associated with both the paths of development.

Badara Samparaya. *Sampara* means warfare. *Badara* means gross warfare or conflict with gross desire, and impulses of this soul.

10 The tenth stage is the stage of the same spiritual warfare when the subtle impulses of the soul get destroyed. This stage also

has representatives in either ladder, i.e. as the result of the spiritual struggle the gross and subtle desires may either be rooted out or suppressed. One who roots them out is kshapaka and one who suppresses them is upasamakaha.

Sukshma Samparaya. Conflict with subtler impulses.

11. The eleventh stage is the stage where spiritual peace is secured, but here peace is the result of suppression. Hence it may not be quite secure. The spiritual harmony may yet be disturbed. If it gets disturbed then there may be the misfortune of slipping down again. But the fall will be to the Apramatta Gunasthana from which the two Srenis branched off.

12. The twelfth stage represents the corresponding step in the ladder of annihilation, i.e. after the destruction of subtle and gross desires with the help of Sukla Dhyāna the self may pass on to *kshina kashayasthana* which is the twelfth. This is just below the stage of perfection.

13. This stage is certainly the stage of Perfect Emancipation. Kevala Jñāna is reached but there is still yoga (Manavachanakaya or mind, speech and body). Hence this stage is called Sayogakevali, the kevali who has still yoga.

14. The last is the stage where even this yoga disappears. The stage immediately after the disappearance of yoga is called Ayogakevali. The Siddha state is considered to be a transcendental stage. Therefore it is considered to be beyond this classification of Gunasthānas. It is purely metemperical and therefore description by difference of degree will have no meaning with reference to this transcendental Ego.

46. Then the kevala jñāna—the ideal knowledge. This is the result of the destruction of the four Ghatiya Karmas, co-existence with infinite qualities such as infinite bliss the desire of all the faithful and the pure and that which makes even a *Devendia* discontented in his own glory.

जाणं जेयिणिमित्तं केवलणाणं ण होदि सुदणाणं ।
जेयं केवलणाणं जाणाणाणं च एत्थि केवलिणो ॥४६॥

Kevala Jñāna is knowledge par excellence. It is not conditioned by objects of knowledge. It is not even Srutajñāna which is consequent upon study. To the person who has

acquired perfect knowledge there is no diversity of knowledge
So let it be known

COMMENTARY

Kevala Jñāna completely comprehends all Dravyas and all their modifications. The author of Tatvartha Sutra says सर्वद्रव्यगोचरे केवलज्ञ The infinite number of Jiva Dravyas, the infinite number of Physical bodies, the two physical principles of rest and motion and infinite space and time all become transparent to Kevala Jñāna. There can be nothing which is not comprehended by this knowledge. The contents of this knowledge constitute the whole of reality. This is not conditioned by objects. It is absolutely self-determined. Therefore all the Dravyas and the Paryayas are at the same time evident to Kevala Jñāna. This unconditioned simultaneous comprehension of reality makes it fundamentally distinct from Mati Jñāna or Sruti Jñāna and also from the other two. The other four jñānas are limited in efficiency and extent. And Kevala Jñāna knows no such limitations. Again Mati, Sruti, and Avadhi, are subject to degeneration and corruption. But Manah Paryaya and Kevala do not have any such tendency. But the capacity of Kevala Jñāna is infinitely higher than even Manah Paryaya. In short it is the absolute and unconditioned wisdom.

47 After describing the five kinds of right knowledge (Samyak-jñāna), the author mentions the three Ajñānas or the kinds of wrong knowledge.

मिच्छता अपणाणं अविरदिभावो य भावआवरणा ।
जेयं पदुच्च काले तह दुणय दुप्यमाणं च ॥४७॥

If Mithyatva which veils the faculty of perception of and faith in reality appears, then knowledge gets vitiated and becomes Ajñāna and the regulative principle of conduct also becomes corrupt. Again during the process of investigating reality the standard of truth and the methods of reaching it all become misleading and untrustworthy.

COMMENTARY

Mithyatva is the condition of Ajñāna. Its presence in a soul is responsible for several undesirable consequences. This Mithyatva may be innate or acquired. In the case of persons who have congenital Mithyatva their faculty of understanding is also corrupt from

birth They have innate Ajñāna. Kumati and Kusruti But in the case of persons who acquired this Mithyatva after losing Samyaktva their right knowledge turns into erroneous one The effect of Mithyatva is not confined to corrupting the faculty of understanding It indirectly affects conduct also, such a person because of his Ajñāna is incapable of choosing the right path Evil becomes his good And lastly even if there is any effort after truth it ends in mere illusion so long as there is the primary source of evil, Mithyatva, intact

48 After describing Jñānopayoga he goes on to speak about Darsanopaya —The faculty of perception

चिदंशमवि चक्षुजुदं अचक्षुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं ।
अणिधणमणंतविसयं केवलियं चावि पणत्तं ॥४८॥

Perception or Darsana is of four kinds Perception through visual sensations, perception through non-visual senses, again that through the faculty of Avadhi, or clairvoyance, and lastly through kevala or infinite perception, which is unlimited and apprehends all reality.—Thus is it described

COMMENTARY

Darsana or perception implies merely the awareness that a thing exists It corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance Understanding the reality thus apprehended is Jñāna In a rough way Darsana and Jñāna may be said to correspond to the sensibility and understanding of Kant's system. Thus understanding and perception apprehend things gradually one after the other. But in the case of Kevalis the two faculties are co-extensive with the complete reality The whole existence is perceived and understood at the same time, and as there is no reality beyond such faculty, it is not necessary for such a person to attend to things one after the other

49 After describing Jñāna and Darsana the author in order to clear the doubt of a Naiyayika student for whom substance and quality are absolutely distinct, explains that the distinction is only relative, and he also mentions the diversity of Jñāna.

ण वियप्पदि णाणादो णाणी णाणाणि होंति णेगाणि ।
तम्हादु विस्सरुवं भणियं दवियत्ति णाणीहि ॥४९॥

The soul is not distinct from its attribute of Jñāna or knowledge and because the ways of knowledge are diverse

the world of reality or the universe is also said to be multiverse by the wise

COMMENTARY

There can be no knowledge apart from the knower. Self and its knowledge are inseparable. Again knowledge is also intimately related to the objects known. There are diverse forms of knowledge. This implies that the objects of knowledge are also diverse. Hence from the point of view of objects. They are both one and many—One because of the common *Dravyatva* and many because of the different ways of apprehending objects. The proposition that the reality is one and also many is not self contradictory according to the Jaina system, hence the statement that reality is universe is not incompatible with "the reality is a multiverse." The point emphasized in the *gathâ* is mainly the inalienability of the attribute from the thing.

50 Then he points out the absurdity of the view that substance and the attribute are entirely distinct

जदि हवदि दव्वमण्णं गुणदो य गुणा य दव्वदो अण्णे ।
दव्वणंतियमथवा दव्वभावं प्रकुव्वन्ति ॥५०॥*

If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances or again if the qualities can exist separate from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all (In either way the result would be absurd.)

COMMENTARY

The relation of substance and its qualities is an extremely difficult problem for a metaphysician

Some would emphasize the qualities to the detriment of substance and some would emphasize the substance at the cost of qualities. In either case the result would be absurd because of the false emphasis

We may have the world of unchanging reality of Parmenides or a world of eternal flux of Heracrites, but both these worlds are

*Sanskrit rendering

यदि भवति द्रव्यमन्यद्गुणतश्च गुणाश्च द्रव्यतोऽन्ये ।

द्रव्यानन्यमथवा द्रव्याभावं प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥ ५० ॥

so far removed from the world of our concrete experience. In our world of concrete experience things and qualities are of equal importance. In fact the distinction is not absolute.

There can be no qualities apart from substance nor substance without qualities. If substance is deprived of all its qualities and if it is still the possible substratum of qualities then different groups of qualities may get associated with that substratum, i.e., the same substance has the of qualities may chance of becoming infinite other substances.

This is a manifest absurdity. Or again if the attributes can float themselves without any living substratum then they would by their own combination constitute a thing and the category of substance is no more necessary. To think of reality as identical with qualities apart from the qualified thing is also equally absurd. On account of internal contradiction the view that qualities may be different from substance is condemned. The argument adopted by the author reminds us of Burkley and Hume.

✓ Burkley's argument against Locke's doctrine of substance similarly emphasizes the absurdity of an unknown 'x' which is substance for Locke. This unknown 'x' may get several determinations and thus may become several distinct things. But Burkley's main argument is slightly different from the author's. His attack on substance is based upon the absurdity of abstract ideas. Again Hume after reducing the world to a group of sense-presented ideas points out the absurdity referred to in the latter half of the Gatha by his doctrine that anything may be the cause of anything else.

Similar tendencies are not altogether absent in Indian thought. You have the one sided emphasis both in Vedantism and Buddhism. The idea of Nirguna reality and the principle of Kshanika Vada are the two rival doctrines, and both are condemned by the author, qualityless reality and the qualities bringing about a new reality every moment are both untenable according to the author.

(51) Next the author rejects the following views —

1. That substance and qualities are absolutely identical
2. That they are absolutely different
3. That they are absolutely identical and different at the same time.

Then he establishes their conditional or relative identity and relative difference.

अविभक्तमण्णत्तं द्रव्यगुणाणं विभक्तमण्णत्तं ।
णिच्छन्ति निश्चयह्नुं तव्विवरीदं हि व तेसिं ॥५१॥*

Those that know the truth do not recognise any of following the views as to the relation of substance and quality that they are absolutely identical and inseparable, that they are distinct and separate in every way, and lastly that they are both distinct and identical at the same time

COMMENTARY.

The doctrine maintained by the author is that substance and quality are not distinct and separable in *ravum-natura*, but only in thought, and there too, the distinction is only relative, i.e., the quality cannot be thought of as absolutely independent of substance. Still it can be attended to as distinct from the thing. Hence it is that the three views mentioned in the gathā are rejected

(52) From the point of view of Vyapadesa etc., substance and quality are in an aspect distinct

व्यपदेशा संठाणा संखा विसया य होंति ते बहुगा ।
ते तेसिमण्णत्ते अण्णत्ते चावि विज्झन्ते ॥५२॥†

The difference between Dravya and guna, substance and attribute, may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various. They hold good among things and their attributes whether these are considered different or identical

COMMENTARY

These differences hold good not only among different things but also in the case of a single complex thing which is capable of internal distinction. The difference due to Vyapadesa or name is of two kinds

* Sanskrit rendering

अविभक्तमनन्यत्वं द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तमन्यत्वं ।
नेच्छन्ति निश्चयवस्तुविपरीतं हि वा तेषां ॥ ५१ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

व्यपदेशाः संस्थानानि संख्या विषयाश्च भवन्ति ते बहुकाः ।
ते तेषामनन्यते अन्यत्वे चापि विद्यन्ते ॥ ५२ ॥

1 SHASHTI VYAPADESA. This is the relation of the sixth case or the possessive relation

2. KARAKA VYAPADESA due to causal relation. Each of these may be true of different things or of the same thing. The Possessive relation among different things is illustrated thus "Devadatta's cow". The same relation is illustrated by a single complex thing "The branch of a tree" or "Jinas' attributes." Here the possessive relation is distinctly internal in the very same thing

(2) Kāraka or causal relation. This is also Vyapadesa difference, i.e. difference due to Nomenclature or appellation. Kāraka sanjñā also holds good between two different things or in the same identical complex thing. Kāraka or causal relation is recognised to be of six forms, i.e. in a complete causal relation six elements are implied—

- 1 Karta or agent or subject
 - 2 Karma, the object or effect
 - 3 Karana, the instrument
 - 4 Nimitta, the purpose.
 - 5 Sakāsa, the place from which the effect issues.
 - 6 Adhikarana, the place in which the cause operates.
- The illustration given below implies all these six elements.

(a) Causal relation among different things. See the following sentence.—

देवदत्त = Devadatta (Karta or subject or agent)

फलं = a fruit (Karma or object)

अंकुशेन = with the hook (Karana or instrument).

धनदत्ताय = for Dhanadatta (Nimitta or purpose)

वृक्षात् = from the tree (Sakasa or the place of issue).

वाटिकायां = from the orchard (Adhikarana or the place of operation)

अयचिनोति = plucks down

This sentence illustrates the different aspects of causal relation that may exist among different things. The proposition "Devadatta plucks a fruit for Dhanadatta from a tree in his orchard with a hook" relates several independent things. Whereas the next illustration shows how the same causal relation with the six elements may exist in an identical thing.

तदैव, आत्मा (कर्ता) आत्मानं कर्मतापन्नं आत्मना (करण) भूतेन आत्मने निमित्तं आत्मनः सकाशात् आत्मनि अधिकरणं भूते ध्यायति ।

"Atma about himself with his self-reflection for his own purpose drawing out of himself and yet reposing in himself contemplates " Here the causal relation is with reference to the same complex thing.

(2) Samsthana—the difference of figure or form. This determinant also is illustrated with the different things and with the same thing

(a) Tall Devadatta's tall cow The Samsthana determinant is applied to two different things.

(b) The tall branch of a tall tree Here the determinant is applied to the branch and the tree which are not two separate things "Muta Dravyasya Murtaguna" Here also the determinant Murta or visual form refers to Dravya and gunâ which are not separate and distinct

3 Sankhya or number

(a) Devadatta's 10 cows. The quantitative difference here is between two distinct things—Devadatta and Cows

(b) But the quantitative difference may exist internally in the same thing as the 10 branches of the tree or the infinite attributes of Dravya.

4 Vishaya or locative difference

(a) "In the cowshed is the cow " Here the Vishaya or the locality is external or Bheda Vishaya

(b) Abheda Vishaya or the internal locative relation " In the substance are the qualities "

Thus the difference due to Vyapadesa, Samsthana, etc., is seen among different things or in the same thing which is internally differentiated Hence when one kind of relation is implied it need not be confounded with the other If substance and attributes are said to be different this difference need not be interpreted to make the two distinct and separate Hence the relation between substance and attribute can certainly be from one aspect a relation of difference and still the two need not be absolutely distinct In short the relation between substance and attribute may be one of identity and difference That this relation of identity in difference is not self contradictory is supported by analogy. The illustrations of the same thing internally differentiated given above justify the attitude of the author.

(53) Again he speaks of the relation of ownership or possession. This relation may exist between two different things or in the same thing internally differentiated. Hence by analogy he brings out the Ekitva—Ninatva aspect of the relation

णाणं धणं च कुव्वदि धणिणं जह णाणिणं च दुविधेहिं ।
भण्णंति तह पुधत्तं एयत्तं चावि तच्चण्हू ॥ ५३ ॥*

Just as Dhana and Jñāna (wealth and wisdom) make the owners Dhanī and jñānī (the rich and the wise) thus expressing two ways of relationship (unity and diversity) so also the relation between substance and qualities implies both the aspects of identity and difference. Thus say those that know the truth.

COMMENTARY

One who owns Dhana or wealth becomes on account of that ownership a Dhanī—the rich. Here too, different things because of the relation of possession are brought together, i.e., because of possession there is union and again because of possession the things uniting must be different. Things may exist as separate and distinct when the relation may unite them or there may be single thing which because of the relation may get differentiated. The illustration of Dhana, Dhanī is of the former kind. The illustration for the latter is jñāna, jñānī. The person to start with is one, but on account of this relation of possession the single entity gets differentiated. In order to be called jñānī one who possesses jñāna or wisdom the possessed thing must be differentiated from the owner. Otherwise the relation of ownership will have no meaning. Hence we have to admit that the relation of ownership implies both unity and diversity whether the things related are different or identical in themselves. Thus the author concludes that the relation between substance and its qualities exhibits both these characteristics. It is not incoherent to associate both the characteristics with the relation.

(54) Then he points out the absurdity that would result if jñāna and jñānī (the knower and knowledge) are taken to be entirely distinct and separate

*Sanskrit rendering

ज्ञानं धनं च करोति धनिनं यथा ज्ञानिनं च द्विविधाभ्यां ।

भण्णंति तथा पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं चापि तच्चक्षाः ॥ ५३ ॥

णाणी णाणं च सदा अत्थंतरिदा दु अण्णमण्णस्स ।
 दोण्हं अचेदणत्तं पसजदि सम्मं जिणावमदं ॥ ५४ ॥*

If self and its knowledge are always substantially distinct one from the other, then each will become non-conscious or non-spiritual entity That view being self-contradictory would undoubtedly conflict with the truth revealed by Jina

COMMENTARY

Soul and knowledge are called spiritual or conscious entities only because of their identity If the two are entirely absolute and distinct they would cease to be spiritual Soul would be deprived of thought and hence will cease to be a conscious being and knowledge or thought *per-se* would have no association with the thinker and hence will become again non-spiritual. Thinker without thought would be blind and thought without thinker would be chimerical The person who maintains such a view would contradict himself because of his own thought; the jaina view is free from such a contradiction

Here we have to notice one important thing "Jinava matam" is not to be taken as the reason for rejecting the opposite view

The real standard of truth or Pramana is not the principle of revelation Though no doubt the Jaina system of thought is very often referred to as revealed by Jina, the system is acknowledged to be true not because it is revealed by a great spiritual being but because the revelation is borne out by the nature of Reality

Jaina thinkers therefore attach more importance to absence of self-contradiction than to revelation

A doctrine must not contradict any previously accepted truth

"Purvapara Virodha" is the main thing that is dreaded by the Jaina thinker Hence the author's rejection of the opposite view because it is inconsistent with Jaina thought is really based upon the internal self-contradiction involved in the rejected view If it is interpreted otherwise then the Jaina position would become self-contradictory When the Jaina rejects the Vedas of Brahmanic thought, though they are claimed to be revelation from the divine

*Sanskrit rendering

प्रानी ज्ञानं च सदार्थान्तरितोत्पन्नोऽन्यस्य ।

द्वयोश्चेतनत्वं प्रसजति सम्यग् जिनावमतं ॥ ५४ ॥

being, on the ground that they involve internal inconsistency, he cannot have recourse to the very same method of depending upon revelation. For according to his principle even revelation must stand on logical evidence.

55.

If Self and thought be really distinct then the two would never be able to constitute a single spiritual being even by the process of combination.

न हि सो समवायादो अत्थंदरिदो दुष्णाणादो णाणी ।
अण्णाणीति च वयणं एगत्तप्पसाधगं होदि ॥५५॥*

55. If the Self is entirely distinct in nature from thought then he cannot become, even by combination with thought, Jñāni or the thinker. "Unthinking thing" will still be the name denoting the identity brought about by the combination of substance and quality which are in themselves unthinking things.

COMMENTARY

If Self and thought are in themselves unthinking things then by combination they would still be unthinking. Consciousness is not to be derived from non-conscious elements existing severally or in combination. If thought is an adventitious characteristic of the self then before the acquisition of thought he must have been either jñāni or Ajñāni (thinking or unthinking). If he is thinking then the combination with jñāna is unnecessary and useless. But if he be unthinking then, is that attribute "unthinking" again innate or adventitious? If it is adventitious then the self cannot acquire thought for this attribute is incompatible with his former acquisition. If the unthinking quality is innate then the thinking quality may as well be taken to be innate. Thought then is not an adventitious attribute of the self. Self is jñāni not as a result of combination of self and thought. Even the perfect knowledge Kevala jñāna is innate in the soul, though it is veiled for the time being by the Karmas.

* Sanskrit rendering .

न हि सः समवाया दथर्थान्तरितस्तु ज्ञानतो ज्ञानी ।

अज्ञानीति च वचनमेकत्वप्रसाधकं भवति ॥५५॥

Then since there is no other relation than identity between substance and quality the explanation by the principle of combination is shown to be unwarranted and absurd.

समवत्ती समवाओ अपुधव्भूदो य अजुदसिद्धो य ।

तस्मा दवगुणाणं अजुदा सिद्धिर्त्ति णिद्धिद्वा ॥५६॥*

56 The relation between substance and quality is one of co-eval identity, unity, inseparability, and of essential simplicity That is why the unity of substance and qualities is said to be not the result of union or combination.

COMMENTARY

The terms Samavâya implies mainly unity and also union. Union implies the existence of independent elements which constitute the unity The elements must be prior to the unity. Then unity will be the result of combination. The relation between Guna and Gunî is not one of combination.

Hence though the author designates the relation by the term Samavâya he strictly excludes the other implication of the term. The term means nothing more than oneness or unity Dravya and Guna, substance and quality are merely the different aspects of the same reality and as such they must exist together without beginning and without end

This eternal co-existence is implied by the term Samavâya. This co-existence of Dravya and Guna is termed Samavâya or unity by the author. The very same relation implies inseparability of the two though they are different in name Hence is the relation called *Aprithag-bhutatvam* Again since the unity is not brought about by combination of two independent elements it has *Ayutasiddhattvam* Therefore the relation is one of unity and not of union

57 and 58

Then he establishes by analogy that substance and quality though distinguishable in thought are not distinct in nature.

* Sanskrit rendering

समवर्तित्वं समवायः अपृथग्भूतत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वं च ।

तस्माद्द्रव्यगुणानां अयुना सिद्धिरिति निर्दिष्टा ॥५६॥

वर्णरसगंधफासा परमाणुपरूविदा विसेसा हि ।
 दब्बादो य अणण्णा अण्णत्तपगासगा होंति ॥५७॥
 दंसण्णाणाणि तहा जीवणिवट्ठाणि णण्णभूदाणि ।
 ववदेसदो पुथत्तं कुव्वंति हि णो सभावादो ॥५८॥*

57-58. Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the same way perception and understanding are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it, though from the point of name, form, etc., they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum Ego. In short though distinguishable in thought the faculties are not really distinct.

COMMENTARY.

The author establishes the proposition that distinction in thought does not necessarily imply distinctness in nature. What may be distinguished by comparison may in reality exist in essential unity. This result is obtained by the principle of analogy. In the case of matter the qualities are not distinct and separate, from the substratum though they may be referred to by different names, by different forms, and so on. Exactly in the same way are the conscious qualities of perception and understanding related to Jīva. As attributes they are distinct from the ego and may be distinguished by name, form, number, etc. But still they are not really distinct from it.

Distinctness necessarily presupposes an underlying identity between the things compared. Apart from this identity there can be no comparison and distinction. What are distinct must really

* Sanskrit rendering

वर्णरसगन्धस्पर्शाः परमाणुपरूपिता विशेषा हि ।
 द्रव्यतश्च अनन्याः अन्यत्वप्रकाशका भवन्ति ॥ ५७ ॥
 दर्शनज्ञाने तथा जीवनिबद्धे अनन्यभूते ।
 व्यपदेशतः पृथक्त्वं कुरुते हि नो स्वभावात् ॥ ५८ ॥

be identical Hence *distinction* in thought instead of presupposing distinctness in nature, implies identity This view of the author is borne out by modern thought. Thus ends the section dealing with the attribute of *upayoga*

59

The next section deals with the three remaining qualities of Jīva *Kaṭiṭva*, *Bhokṭṛitva*, and *Karmasamyuktatva* acting, feeling and being associated with Karmas. In the beginning the author describes the nature and number of Jīva Dravya which is the substratum of all the nine attributes.

जीवा अणाद्विहणा संता णंता य जीवभावादो ।
सद्भावदो अणंता पंचगुणप्रधाना य ॥५९॥ *

59 Jīvas according to their characteristics have neither beginning nor end, have beginning and end, have beginning but no end Thus having these five fundamental qualities they are as existences infinite in number

COMMENTARY.

Jīvas really are the agents, since they bring about different modes with the different names They are described as (1) without beginning or end, (2) with beginning and end (3) and with beginning and no end If we attend to the essential nature of Jīvas (*parīṇāmika bhāva*), i.e., their thought or consciousness then they may be said to have neither beginning nor end, as spiritual existences they are eternal. Neither are they created nor can they be destroyed

2 The very same Jīvas from the Psychic qualities of *Audāyika* *Āupashamika*, and *Kṣhayaopashamika* have both beginning and end.

3 But from the *Kṣhayaika* *Bhava* they have beginning but not end It cannot be said in the last case that because there is beginning there must also be an end When they are free from *Upadhī*s then they realise their true nature, then they become

*Sanskrit rendering

जीवा अनादिनिधनाः सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।
सद्भावतोऽनन्ता. पञ्चागुणप्रधानाः च ॥ ५९ ॥

Siddhās Jīvas that are found with such characteristics are infinite in number. Again it cannot be said that in the case of these Jīvas which really have neither beginning nor end the other characteristics would be inconsistent. The other characteristics are, having both beginning and end and having beginning but no end. These characteristics are true of Jīvas because of Karmic entanglements. The presence of Karmā with Jīva is the condition of Samsāric transformations and Jīvas in Samsāric cycles have both birth and death. But in the last stage towards emancipation from Karmās, Jīvas may be said to have only birth but no death. For there is spiritual immortality as the result of complete emancipation.

The five fundamental characteristics implied in this gāthā are the five Jīva Bhūvās mentioned in the 62nd gāthā.

These are (1) औद्यमिक (2) शौचमिक, (3) ज्ञायोपशमिक (4) ज्ञायिक (5) पारिणामिक भावाः.

The last one is the attribute of consciousness. This conscious nature is eternal. Hence Jīva is अनादिनिधन without beginning or end. The first three bring about Samsāric changes of birth and death. Therefore from their aspect Jīva has both beginning and end. The fourth is the characteristic of emancipation. The emancipated Self has beginning but no end.

60

Though Jīvas are truly eternal yet they are born and they die because of accidental conditions of Kārmic associations. To be eternal and to have births and deaths are not really conflicting.

एवं सदो विणासो असदो जीवस्स होइ उप्पादो ।
इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदं अण्णोण्णविरुद्धमविरुद्धं ॥६०॥*

60 Thus Jīvas that are, may die and those that are not may be born ; thus sayeth the Jina. Though the statements (this Sūtra and the 19th) are apparently conflicting they are not really contradictory.

* Sanskrit rendering

एवं सतो विनाशोऽसतो जावस्य भवत्युत्पादः ।

इति जिनवरैर्भणितमन्योऽन्यविरुद्धमविरुद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

COMMENTARY

From Dravyarthika Naya, i. e., from the aspect of essential nature Jīvas can have neither birth nor death. But from Paryayarthika Naya from the point of modifications they have births and deaths. The two propositions are quite compatible with one another as they state two different aspects of Jīva. The other proposition with which this gātha appears to conflict is the gātha 19

एव सद्दो विणासो असद्दो जीवस्स एण्यि उप्पादो ।

There is no death for the existing Jīvas; nor birth of the non-existing ones

This certainly appears to contradict the present Sutra and the commentator establishes that the conflict is only apparent and not real

61

Then it is pointed out that the death of Beings that are and the birth of those that are not are the result of Gatīnāmakarma. the Karma that brings about for the soul different modes of existence.

जेरइयतिरियमणुआ देवा इदि णामसंजुदा पयडी ।
कुर्वन्ति सद्दो णासं असद्दो भावस्स उप्पादं ॥६१॥*

61. Life in hell, life as plant or animal, as man or as Deva, these states of being are caused by their respective Nāma Karma Prakritis. These bring about death to the Jīvas that are and birth to those that are not.

COMMENTARY.

The different states of existence are the different modifications of Jīva brought out by upadhī or Karmic conditions. Those Karmas that determine the next individual state of Jīva are Nāma Karmas. These Nāma Karmas are the real causal conditions that lead the soul to manifest in a particular form. These forms appear and disappear. Birth and death are characteristics associated with these forms or modes. Just as waves may appear and disappear in the

Sanskrit rendering

नास्त्यतिर्यङ्मनुष्या देवा इति नामसंयुताः प्रकृतयः ।
कुर्वन्ति सतो नाशमसतो भावस्योत्पादं ॥ ६१ ॥

surface of ocean as the result of wind, while the sheet of water is really unaffected, so Jīva remaining eternal and changeless in its real essence is the basis of the different waves of existence appearing and disappearing. And these waves in the ocean of life are brought about by upadhīs or Karmic conditions. The characteristics of birth and death which are really true of the form of existence are also predicated of Jīva

62

After mentioning the Karmas as the condition of Samsāric cycle the author goes to describe their nature. Here he explains the origin of the five Bhāvas emotional states of consciousness.

उदयेण उवसमेण य खयेण दुहिं मिसिदेहिं परिणामे ।
जुत्ता ते जीवगुणा बहुसु य अत्थेसु विच्छिण्णा ॥६२॥ *

62. On account of the rise, suppression, annihilation, mixed suppression and annihilation of karmās, by the intrinsic nature of self unconditioned by Karmas, Jīva has five Bhāvas or thought characteristics. These are fully described in the Āgamas.

COMMENTARY.

Karmas are considered to be physical in nature. These physical conditions determine the Psychic characteristics. Five different classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. Each of these is the causal condition determining its corresponding Bhāva or thought state in Jīva

These conditions are—

1. Udaya, or rise of Karmās ,
2. Upaśama, or suppression of Karmās ,
3. Kshāya or eradication,
4. Kshāyopaśama, the mixed process of eradication and suppression ,
5. Parināma or the unconditioned thought.

'Sanskrit rendering

उदयेनोपशमेन च क्षयेण च द्वाभ्यां मिश्रिताभ्यां परिणामेन ।

युक्तास्ते जीवगुणा बहुषु चार्थेषु विस्तीर्णाः ॥ ६२ ॥

These five conditions (four physical and one spiritual) determine respectively the Bhavas.

And these are—

- 1 Audayika Bháva ,
- 2 Aupashamika Bháva ,
- 3 Kshâyika Bháva ,
4. Kshayopashamika Bháva ,
- 5 Parinâmika Bháva.

The last one is unconditioned by Karmas. It is Nirupadhi character, whereas the other four are generated by the changes in physical conditions or upadhis. The last Parinâmika Bháva is not causally connected with Samsara or Moksha. It is Nishkriya Bháva.

मोक्षं कुर्वति मिश्रौपशमिक क्षायिका मिधा ।

बन्धमौदयिको भावो निष्क्रिय पारिणामिकः ॥

63

Next it is pointed out how these Bhavas or thought states are brought about.

कर्म वेद्यमाणो जीवो भावं करोति जारिसयं ।

सो तेण तस्स कत्ता हवदित्ति य सासणे पट्ठिदं ॥ ६३ ॥

63 Being affected by the change in Karmic material Jiva experiences certain emotional states. Whatever emotional state thus appears in consciousness is due to the direct causal agency of Jiva. Thus say the Scriptures of Jainas.

COMMENTARY.

Jiva is said to be the direct and immediate cause of the several emotional states brought about by Karmic materials. The extrinsic cause is physical matter and the proximate cause is jiva itself. Karmas are always spoken of as of two kinds Dravya Karma and Bháva Karma. Dravya Karma is distinctly physical. A peculiar combination of Paramanus constitutes Karma Pudgala or Karmic-

*Sanskrit rendering

कर्म वेद्यमानो जीवो भावं करोति यादृशकं ।

स तेन तस्य कर्त्ता भवतीति च शासने पठितं ॥ ६३ ॥

matter. Matter under such modification has a special attraction towards Jivas ordinarily. Jîva in its world state is generally found in association with such Karmic matter. Karmic matter and conscious states are mutually determining each other. A change in Karmic matter may bring about a corresponding change in consciousness. This conscious change has a predominant affective tone. It is generally some form of emotion. This corresponding emotional state is Bhâva Karma. Since it is a Psychic event it is immediately determined by mind itself. It is this fact that is emphasized by the author in this gâtha.

The author recognises two distinct causal agencies as will be evident later on *Nimitta Kartâ* and *Upâdana Kartâ*. Distant or remote cause and substantial cause. Jîva is the substantial cause of all its modifications, and matter may still be an extrinsic cause. Then Jîva is the *Upâdana Kartâ* of the Bhavas while Karmic matter is *Nimitta Kartâ*.

64.

It is this fact that is mentioned in the next gâtha. That Self is the immediate cause of the emotional state while Kârmic matter is the indirect cause.

कम्मेण विणा उदयं जीवस्स ण विज्झदे उवसमं वा ।
खड्गं खओवसमियं तम्हा भावं तु कम्मकदं ॥ ६४ ॥*

64. The different forms of Bhâva Karmas such as, the rising, the sinking, the annihilating and partial annihilation and sinking cannot happen in the consciousness of a Jîva without corresponding changes in Dravya Karmas or Karmic matter. Therefore the Bhâvas such as Audayika which are brought about by the Bhâva Karmas may be said to be the effects of Dravya Karmas as well.

COMMENTARY.

A change in Dravya Karma or physical karma immediately brings about a change in Bhâva Karma i. e., a corresponding change pure or impure in consciousness. This Bhâva Karma in its turn brings

*Sanskrit rendering.

कर्मणा विनोदयो जीवस्य न विद्यत उपशमो वा ।
क्षायिकः क्षायोपशमिकस्तस्माद्भाषस्तु कर्मकृतः ॥ ६४ ॥

about its corresponding emotional state or Bháva. It may be pleasant or unpleasant. The chain of causation is as follows.—Dravya Karma, Bháva Karma and Bháva. Kármic matter, Kármic thought and an affective state. The last affective state or Bháva which is the immediate result of Kármic thought or Bháva Karma may also be said to be the effect of Dravya Karma. For there can be no Kármic thought or Bháva Karma in a jīva which is not determined by Dravya Karma.

65

The next gāthā is in the form of *Pūṛṇapakṣa* from the disciple. An objection is raised against the doctrine that Átmā is the sole and immediate cause of Bháva Karma.

भावो यदि कम्मकदो अत्ता कम्मस्स होदि किञ्च कत्ता ।
ण कुणदि अत्ता किञ्चि वि मुत्ता अण्णं सगं भावं ॥६५॥*

65. If these states of emotion or Bháva are really brought about by Kármic matter how can Átmā be said to be the cause of these Bhávas? But the soul's agency is such that while giving up its own state it can effect entirely alien or non-mental changes (i e, it is the cause of its own mental states which are also indirectly conditioned by Kármic matter).

COMMENTARY

As has been mentioned already Dravya Karma or Kármic matter and the nature of Jīva, both determine the occurrence of a Bháva or an emotional state. Still Jīva is taken to be the causal agent or Kartā to these emotional state. If the Bhávas are really due to Dravya karma or Karmic matter then how can it be consistently held that Jīva is Kartā. But the answer is given thus. Bháva is Psychic change and as psychic change it can only be brought about by Jīva. Soul cannot have direct causal relation with material and non-mental things. Again if the Bhávas have no causal relation to Jīva then there is no reason why it should be bound by Karma. Kármic bondage necessarily presupposes the intimate relation between Jīva and its emotional states. Since there will be no logical ground for bondage

† Sanskrit rendering

भावो यदि कर्मकृत आत्मा कर्मणा-मवलि कथं कर्ता ।
न करोन्यात्मा किञ्चिदपि मुक्त्वान्यं स्वकं भावं ॥ ६५ ॥

in the absence of causal relation then there is no chance for Samsāra which is the result of Kārmic bondage. This result contradicts our real experience for there is Samsāra. Therefore our original supposition that the soul is not causal agent for his emotional states is an impossible hypothesis. With this indirect demonstration, the author establishes that soul is the causal agent producing the emotional states which are also indirectly conditioned by Kārmic matter

The disciple who raises the *Purvapaksha* is evidently a believer in the Sankhya system.

अकर्ता निर्गुणः शुद्धो नित्यः सर्वगताक्रियः ।
अमूर्तश्चतनो भोक्ता जीवः कपिलशासने ॥

In answering *Purvapaksha* the author is really condemning the Sankhya view represented by the above sloka.

66

The answer is again strengthened by further detailed argument.

भावो कम्मणिसित्तो कम्मं पुण भावकारणं हवदि ।
ण दु तेसिं खलु कत्ता ण विणा भूदा दुक्त्तारं ॥ ६६ ॥*

66. Bhāva or emotional states are conditioned by Dravya Karma or matter. And Karma in its turn is indeed conditioned by Kārmic thought or Bhāva. Soul is not the essential cause in that case and still without essential cause those changes cannot happen

COMMENTARY.

The author here makes use of the distinction between Upadāna Kartā and Nimitta Kartā. Intrinsic or substantial conditions, extrinsic or alien condition. Soul is the essential cause of Kārmic thought, the emotional states of desire etc, Karmic matter is the essential cause of the changes in Kārmic matter, i. e., the changes in each case form an independent series and yet the two series are corres-

* Sanskrit rendering

भावः कर्मनिमित्तः कर्म पुनर्भावकारणं भवति ।

न तु तेषां खलु कर्त्ता न विना भूतास्तु कर्त्तारं ॥ ६६ ॥

ponding and interrelated. *Blâva* or the emotional states is distinctly a *Psychic* change. As a mental fact it is immediately determined by the nature of consciousness. So is the change in *Kârmic* matter. It is entirely determined by physical conditions. Matter cannot take the form of mental state nor the mind undergo a physical change. The author seems to suggest a kind of *Psycho-physical parallelism*. But this parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two series. The parallelism is transcended and reconciled by the doctrine of *Nimitta kartâ*. The author has in his mind such a sharp distinction between the thinking thing and unthinking thing as is associated with *cartisianism* and yet the two are related by a peculiar conception of *causal relation*. The unthinking thing may be the *Nimitta Kartâ* of the thinking thing and conversely the thinking thing may be the *Nimitta Kartâ* of the other, though certainly one cannot be the *Upâdâna Kartâ* of the other.

67

The same view is further elaborated

कुर्वं सगं सहावं अत्ता कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।

ण हि पोगलकस्माणं इदि जिणवयणं मुणेयव्वं ॥ ६७ ॥*

67. Soul which brings about changes in himself is the *Upâdâna* cause of such mental states. But not of changes in *Kârmic* matter which are distinctly physical in nature. Let the word of Jina be understood thus

COMMENTARY.

The author strengthens his argument by referring to *Âgama* or *Śrûta*. He draws the attention of the reader that this doctrine of causation is the right view upheld by the Scriptures

68

Then it is explained that *Jîva* and *Kârmic* matter are related to their respective changes according to the six aspects of causal relation

* Sanskrit rendering -

कुर्वन् स्वकं स्वमात्रं आत्मा कर्ता स्वकस्य भावस्य ।

न हि पुद्गलकर्मणामिति जिनवचनं ज्ञातव्यम् ॥ ६७ ॥

कम्मं पि सगं कुव्वदि सेण सहावेण सम्ममप्पाणं ।
जीवो वि य तारिसओ कम्मसहावेण भावेण ॥ ६८ ॥*

68. Kārmic matter itself through its own essential nature indeed brings about its own changes Jīva too in the same manner through its own impure states of thought that are conditioned by Karma brings about its own thought changes.

COMMENTARY

The author here emphasizes the fact that the mental states and the states of Karma form two independent series. A change in Kārmic matter is determined by antecedent physical change. Similarly the mental change in the Jīva is entirely determined by the antecedent mental change. In short Jīva is the primary condition of mental changes and Kārmic matter of its own changes. The Physical changes of Kārmic matter cannot be attributed to Jīva nor the mental changes of Jīva to matter.

The *Shatrakū* referred to by the commentator has reference to the six aspects of causal relation already explained. These are (1) Kariā (2) Karma (3) Karanī (4) Nimitta (5) Sakāsa and (6) Adhikarana. Each series of causal changes has by itself these six aspects i. e., the physical and the mental series are self-sufficient and complete.

69.

Having heard that the two causal series are independent the student ignorant of the principles of reasoning or the Nayas raises an objection.

कम्मं कम्मं कुव्वदि जदि सो अप्पा करेदि अप्पाणं ।
किध तस्स फलं भुज्जदि अप्पा कम्मं च देदि फलं ॥ ६९ ॥†

* Sanskrit rendering

कर्मापि स्वकं करोति स्वेन स्वभावेन सम्यगात्मानं ।
जीवोऽपि च तादृशकः कर्मस्वभावेन भावेन ॥ ६८ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

कर्म कर्म करोति यदि स आत्मा करोत्यात्मानं ।
कथं तस्य फलं भुङ्क्ते आत्मा कर्म च ददाति फलं ॥ ६९ ॥

69 If Karmic matter effects its own changes and similarly if Jīva brings about his own changes in himself why should he enjoy the results or fruits of Karma for which he is not responsible and how can Karma offer its fruits to him ?

COMMENTARY

If Kārmic changes form an independent physical series and if mental changes similarly form an independent Psychic series then why should Jīva be affected at all by physical changes and in what manner could the physical changes affect Jīva at all The student asks for the justification why the two really independent series should affect each other at all

70

The *Purvaṭpaksha* is answered by the seven following gāthās This one states that the Loka is filled with matter

ओगाढगाढणिचिदो पोग्गलकाययेहिं सव्वदो लोको ।
सुहमेहिं वादरेहिं य णंताणंतेहिं विविहेहिं ॥ ७० ॥*

70. With material bodies of form perceptible and imperceptible, infinite of infinites in number, and of multifarious kinds by constitution, the world is in every respect filled without interspaces

COMMENTARY.

The author is trying to answer objection by showing first the possibility of connection between Jīva and Kārmic matter. The world space is throughout filled with material bodies Some of these are minute and some of these are perceptible to the senses Of these minute forms some have the peculiarly necessary constitution which would make them fit to be Karmas. These are called Karma-Varganās Karma-Varganās are physical molecules of a particular constitution which gives them the tendency to be attracted by Jīvas They are otherwise known as karma-Prāyōgya Pudgala. The world that is filled with such materials also contains Jīvas The Jīvas and Karma Varganās co-exist and by the mere fact of contiguity Jīva and

*Sanskrit rendering

अवगाढगाढनिचितः पुद्गलकायैः सर्वतो लोके ।

सुन्मैर्यादृशैश्चानन्तानन्तैर्विविधैः ॥ ७० ॥

Kârmic matter are brought together. The settling of Kârmic molecules in Jîva is evidently explained by the author as a necessary result of contiguous co-existence. He does not want to assume that Jîva has positive attraction towards Karmic matter. If any such active influence on the part of Jîva is presupposed the author will be forced to acknowledge the inevitable causal interaction between matter and Jîva. The author does not want to encourage that view. Hence he explains the contact between Jîva and matter as due to local conditions. The commentator explains the principle of contiguity as.

✓ अञ्जनचूर्णं पूर्णं समुद्गकत्रय

The principle that the casket filled with collyrium powder becomes black by mere contact. Thus by analogy the author hopes to explain how two distinct things Jîva and matter become related together.

71

How is it relevant to say that the world is filled with Kârmic matter? How is it an answer to the above objection? The author in this gâtha shows the relation between the answer and the objection.

अत्ता कुणदि सहावं तत्थ गदा पोगला सभावहिं ।

गच्छन्ति कम्मभावं अण्णोण्णागाहमवगाढा ॥ ७१ ॥

71. Jîva as determined by its own nature creates its own changes. But existing in the same place there is Kârmic matter. This Kârmic matter gets inseparably bound with Jîva and manifests as modes of Karma such as Jñānavarāṇīya

COMMENTARY.

Here the author emphasizes the fact that Kârmic matter is entirely self determined in its modifications. So also is Jîva. Jîva according to Jaina belief has Samsâric changes from time immemorial; i.e., the series of Samsâric changes is without beginning. In this state it is destined to lose its pure thought and has the gross emotional qualities such as desire, anger, etc. While this Jîva is undergoing such

* Sanskrit rendering.

आत्मा करोति स्वभावं तत्र गताः पुद्गलाः स्वाभावैः ।

गच्छन्ति कर्मभावमन्योन्यावगाहावगाढाः ॥ ७१ ॥

emotional states determined by its own intrinsic Psychic nature there is in the same place Kârmic matter which as conditioned by those mental states undergoes modifications. These modifications are really determined by matter itself though externally conditioned by the mental states. The mental states of an impure character create a sort of adhesive quality in Jīva. The Kârmic particles merely by proximity cling to Jīva which has the adhesive quality. Jīva gets adulterated with Kârmic matters as milk and water. But this adulteration is not due to direct causal action upon Jīva.

72.

As a concomitant of the Psychic state Kârmic matter undergoes modification in its own way

जह पुगलद्व्याणं पहुप्पयारेहिं खंधणिव्वत्ति ।

अकदा परेहिं दिट्ठा तह कम्माणं वियाणाहि ॥ ७२ ॥*

72. Just as several molecular arrangements in matter are seen in diverse forms though uncaused by alien agency so also the manifestations in Kârmic matter occur undetermined by alien cause. So do thou understand

COMMENTARY.

The author makes himself clear by the illustration. The mere presence of light from the sun or the moon is enough to create the fiery sunset or sunrise or the rainbow or the halo. These changes are all due to molecular arrangement in matter. The sunlight is not directly interfering with matter in producing changes. The changes are the necessary concomitants of the presence of light. Similarly the presence of emotional states of desire or aversion in Jīva has as its concomitant, the changes in Kârmic matter. The rainbow of several iridescent colours is merely the concomitant of light and the different manifestations of Kârmic matter are also the concomitants of mental states as desire and aversion. From all these examples it is clear that the author wants to reject direct causal relation between the two series and yet he wants to make out that one series is the concomitant of other.

* Sanskrit rendering

यथा पुद्गलद्रव्याणां बहुप्रकारैः स्कन्धनिवृत्तिः ।

श्रुता परेद्रष्टा तथा कर्मणां विजानीहि ॥ ७२ ॥

73

The author explains why Jīva should enjoy the fruits of Karma of which he is not the cause essential. In answering this point the author employs the principles of *Naya*

जीवा पुगलकाया अणोणगाढग्रहणपडिवद्वा ।

काले विजुज्जमाणा सुहदुखं दिति भुजंति ॥ ७३ ॥*

73. Jīvas and Kārmic materials are bound together strongly. But when the time for their separation comes they fall apart. Karmas offer their results of pleasure and pain and the Jīvas enjoy them.

COMMENTARY.

Jīva and matter in reality have only one causal function of generating their own respective modes and yet because of the concomitants they may be said to be interdetermining from the *Vyavahāra* view Jīva because of its emotional states of desire and hatred develops an inclination towards matter. This inclination is only the *Nimitta* or an external condition. Kārmic matter so determined gets bound to Jīva. It is to be imagined that the material particles somehow cling to Jīva and cloud its intrinsic radiance. Changes may occur in molecules as determined by temporal conditions. There may be aggregation or disintegration in them. When such changes take place in *Dravya Karma* Jīva experiences pleasure or pain. These are said to be offered by Karma from a relative point of view though as a matter of fact they are the modifications of Jīva. One of the commentators says that just as we experience the activity and the change in our body so also we experience the changes in our Kārmic body for both of them are physical. When we don't question ordinarily our experiencing bodily changes, we need not question the possibility of experiencing the changes of Kārmic body. Thus ends the quality of *Bhoktā*—the enjoyer. Jīva is shown to be the enjoyer.

74

Then the author has a *resume* of the nature of the relation between causality and affective experience.

* Sanskrit rendering

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः अन्योन्यावगाढग्रहणप्रतिवद्धाः ।

काले विजुज्जमानाः सुहदुःखं ददति भुजन्ति ॥ ७३ ॥

तम्हा कम्मं कत्ता भावेण हि संजुदोध जीवस्स ।

भोत्ता दु हवदि जीवो चेदगभावेण कम्मफलं ॥ ७४ ॥*

74 According to *Nischya Naya* or real aspect Kârmic matter is the cause of its own changes. But from *Vyavahâra Naya* or relative aspect it is, in association with Psychic states of *Āulayika*, etc., also the cause of mental changes in Jīva. Lo! from this point Jīva becomes the enjoyer because he is by nature consciousness.

COMMENTARY.

The author makes a distinction between absolute point and relative point of view. Really Kârmic matter is the cause of its own molecular changes. From the relative point it may also be said to be the cause of mental changes. Similarly with Jīva. It is its own cause and from the other point it is also the cause of material changes. It is by nature conscious. Experience presupposes mental changes. Jīva may be said to experience directly its own mental states and yet Vyavahârically it experiences or is affected by things desirable and undesirable. If the aspects of view are remembered then both the propositions are consistent. You may say Jīva enjoys its own state and also that Jīva enjoys physical objects of sense presentation. Therefore it may very well be conceded that the proposition that Jīva is the essential cause of its own mental state is compatible with the proposition that Jīva is the enjoyer of Kârmic effects. He is the Kartâ as well as the Bhoktâ the doer and the enjoyer.

75.

The author again refers to the Lordship of the soul.

एवं कत्ता भोत्ता हीज्झं अप्पा सगेहिं कम्मेहिं ।

हिंइति पारमपारं संसारं मोहसंछण्णो ॥ ७५ ॥†

* Sanskrit rendering

तस्मात्कर्म कर्ता भावेन हि संयुतमथ जीवस्य ।

भोक्ता तु भवति जीवश्चेतकभावेन कर्मफलं ॥ ७४ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering :

एवं कर्त्ता भोक्ता भवन्नात्मा स्वकीः कर्मभिः ।

द्विएवमेते पारमपारं संसारं मोहसंछन्नाः ॥ ७५ ॥

75. The soul which is thus the agent of its own Karma, and the enjoyer of the fruits thereof, as conditioned by its own Karma gets blinded by the veil of ignorance and roams about in the world of *Samsāra* which is limited for the faithful and unlimited for the unfaithful.

COMMENTARY.

Jīva is the Lord of his own career, because he effects his own Karma, he enjoys the fruits thereof. He may roam about in the world of *Samsāra* as conditioned by his own actions, he may finally liberate himself from the bondage by walking the path of three jewels. Then he becomes free from his *upādhi*. This is the career of the *Bhābhya* Jīva. Throughout the career of the *Bhābhya* Jīva, Jīva has the characteristic of Lordship. Again the *Abhavya* devoid of the benefits of the Jewels is denied the above career. He is destined to roam about for ever in *Samsāra*. The *Abhavya* Jīva also in his own way is the Lord of his own career. Thus the career of Jīva is entirely self determined.

76.

Then it is shown how the soul which obtains the benefit of the three jewels is able to realise its true nature through its Lordship over its own career.

उवसंतखीणमोहो मार्गं जिणभासिदेण समुवगदो ।
पाणाणुमग्गचारी णिव्वाणपुरं वजदि धीरो ॥ ७६ ॥*

76. Suppressing or annihilating the veil of ignorance which clouds the faculties of perception and will, well equipped with the three jewels which constitute the path revealed by *Jīva*, the soul, the undaunted pilgrim that conquered the suffering and pain due to the environment, beckoned by the ideal of self-knowledge wades through the path and reaches the divine city of perfection.

COMMENTARY.

Jīva is co-eval with *Samsāra*. Ordinarily Jīva is associated with *Upādhis*. The most important of these is *Mohaniya Karma*. This is

Sanskrit rendering ·

उपशान्तक्षीणमोहो मार्गं जिणभाषितेन समुपगतः ।
ज्ञानानुमार्गचारी निर्व्वानपुरं व्रजति धीरः ॥ ७६ ॥

a sort of veil of ignorance whose effect is twofold. It may interfere with the faculty of perception or with the faculty of Will. On account of this interference there may be false knowledge or wrong conduct. In the former case it is called *Darśana Mohaniya*, in the latter *Châritra Mohaniya*. All the other Kârmic Upâdhis may be ultimately traced to the operation of this fundamental Karma. This Mohaniya or the veil of ignorance may sometimes get thin and transparent or may altogether be annihilated. On account of this happy occurrence Jîva may start on a very desirable career. On account of suppression or annihilation of *Darśana Mohaniya* Jîva is able to apprehend the nature of true reality. And thus has faith in the ultimate *tattvas*. The faith in and comprehension of *tattvas* may lead to clear knowledge of reality. By this suppression and annihilation of *Charitra Mohaniya*, Will may be right in its decision, for right volitional choice is the consequence of true knowledge. Right perception and faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct form the true path. These are the three jewels. Soul equipped with these three jewels must further conquer the environment. The suffering and pain due to environmental conditions should not touch Jîva in any way. After conquering the environment Jîva has to pursue the path of righteousness having as the goal complete self knowledge. This pilgrim in the path of life finally reaches the city of Nirvâna which is the *Summum Bonum* of life according to Jainism.

77 and 78

Then the author summarises the characteristics of *Jivâtikâya*.

एको चेव महत्त्वा सो दुवियप्पो तिलवखणो होदि ।
चदु चंकमणो भणिदो पंचगुणप्पधाणो य ॥ ७७ ॥*
छक्कापक्कमजुत्तो उवउत्तो सत्तमद्दसद्भावो ।
अट्ठासओ णवत्थो जीवो दसट्ठाणगो भणिदो ॥ ७८ ॥†

*Sanskrit rendering.

एक एव गहात्मा स द्विविकल्पखिलक्षयो भवति ।
चतुश्चक्रमणो भणितः पञ्चाग्रगुणप्रधानश्च ॥ ७७ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

पट्कापक्रमयुक्तः उपयुक्तः सप्तमद्दसद्भावः ।
अष्टाश्रयो नवार्थो जीवो दशस्थानको भणितः ॥ ७८ ॥

77-78. The great soul characterised by upayōga may be said to be essentially identical and one, is again of two kinds, has three fundamental qualities, roams about in four gatis; is marked by five primary emotional states; moves about in the world along the six directions; is capable of admitting seven fold predication, has eight qualities; generates the nine Padarthas; manifests in ten states of existence, thus is he is said to be.

COMMENTARY

The author in the form of a *Chulika* or summary ingenuously describes Jīva. He employs numerical description from one to ten. When all Jīvas are looked at from their essential characteristics they are substantially one. From the point of Upādhis they may be said to be of two classes the perfect and the imperfect, has three primary qualities. The three characteristics may be the three aspects of consciousness, knowledge, will and emotion; or may be the three Jewels Darśana; Jñāna and Charitra; or may be the three characteristics of Dravya in general, permanence through birth and death; or may refer to three forms of existences, *substance, qualities, and modes*. Jīva is again said to be subject to four gatis. The gatis are already mentioned. He is marked again by the five primary emotional states which are brought about by the five different changes of Kārmic matter. These also have been dealt with above. "Six" denotes the six directions of the world along which there may be possible movements for Jīva, "Seven" denotes these seven fold predication applicable to Jīva. These are the seven propositions forming the *Sapta-Bhāgi*. "Eight" denotes the eight characteristics of Jīva. Samsari Jīva has the eight Kārmic characteristics, such as Jñānāvarāṇa-Darśanavarāṇa, Mohaniya, etc. The perfect Jīva has the eight infinite gunas such as Ananta Jñāna, Ananta Darśana, Ananta Virya, Ananta Sukha, etc. "Nine" denotes the nine padārthās generated by Jīva in conjunction with matter. These are Jīva, Ajīva, Pāpa, Puṇya, Āsrava, Samvara, Nirjarā, Bandha, and Moksha.

"Ten" denotes the 10 states of existence. The ten states are the (1) liberated and the unliberated nine, which are five Ekendriya Jīvas (Prithvikāyika Apakāyika, Tejakāyika, Vayukāyika, and Vanaspatikāyika), and Jīvas with two, three, four and five sense organs respectively.

79.

The perfect and the liberated soul has nothing to gain by going from one place to another. Therefore he may stay in the very same place where he attains Nirvāna. But according to Jaina view he goes to the summit of the world. The author explains why he should do so.

पयडिद्विदिअणुभागप्पदेसवंधेहिं सव्वदो मुक्को ।

उडुं गच्छदि सेसा विदिसावज्जं गदिं जंति ॥ ७९ ॥*

79 When Jīva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma which are of different aspects of substance, duration, fertility, and extensivity, he reaches the summit of the upper world. Others who are in Samsāra move about in all the directions except the four diagonal corners.

COMMENTARY.

This gātha refers to a religious dogma. The liberated Jīva or Siddha Jīva has the intrinsic movement upwards. It tends to move vertically upwards till it comes to a stay at the summit of the Lokā. For it cannot move beyond, because of the absence of the moving principle of *Dharmastikāya*.

But Samsāri Jīvas after death are said to have movements in six directions. They are denied the four diagonal courses. Along the cardinal points and up and down they can move. These are the *anusrenis* the ladder paths of disembodied Jīvas.

The disembodied Jīva has still the *Kārmāna Sarīra*—body constituted by Kārmic matter. This body is *sukshma*—subtle body. Is there any electro-magnetic condition which constrains the Kārmic body to move only in the six directions? We don't want to speculate.

Sanskrit rendering :

प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागाग्रदेशवन्धैः सर्वतो मुक्तः ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति शेषा विदिग्बज्जं गतिं याति ॥ ७९ ॥

CHAPTER II.

PUDGALASTIKAYA.

The author mentions the four different kinds of material objects.

खंधा य खंधदेसा खंधपदेसा य होंति परमाणू ।
इति ते चदुव्वियप्पा पुग्गलकाया मुण्येयव्वा ॥ ८० ॥

These are the four basic modifications out of which the multifarious modes of matter are formed.

80. Be it understood that matter exists in four main modes: *Skandhas*, *Skandhadeśas*, *Skandhapradeśas* and primary atoms.

COMMENTARY.

Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. This class refers to complete molecular constitution. *Skandhadeśa* is said to be incomplete. But still it is an aggregate. Similarly *Skandhapradeśa*. These three are the differences in molecular constitution. The last class refers to the primary atom which is the unit constituting the other three classes. This is explained in the next *Gāthā*.

81

The respective characteristics of these four classes are given below.

खंधं सयलसमत्थं तस्स दु अट्ठं भणंति देसोत्ति ।
अट्ठं च पदेशो परमाणू चेव अविभागी ॥ ८१ ॥

Sanskrit rendering

स्कन्धाश्च स्कन्धदेशाः स्कन्धप्रदेशाश्च भवन्ति परमाणवः ॥
इति ते चतुर्विकल्पाः पुद्गलकाया ज्ञातव्याः ॥ ८० ॥

Sanskrit rendering

स्कन्धः सकलसमस्तस्य त्वधं भणन्ति देश इति ॥
अर्द्धाद्विं च प्रदेशः परमाणुश्चैवाविभागी ॥ ८१ ॥

81. The complete molecule of matter is *Skandha* ; a half of it is *Skandhadesa* ; a half of that half is *Skandhapradesa* ; and what cannot be divided is the primary atom.—thus say (the learned).

COMMENTARY.

The complete *Skandha* refers to the molecule which has all the physical qualities without any exception. Any physical body perceived by us may be taken as an example of complete *Skandha*. If the process of bisection is continued to infinity the limit of the series is the *Paramānu*—that which cannot be divided further. Conversely starting from the atom an aggregate of two, three, etc., more atoms will generate *Skandhan*. An aggregate of infinite number of atoms is the complete *Skandha*.

(Note the atomic basis of Physics.)

82

Pudgala ultimately refers to the class of primary atoms. But the name is also applied to the derivative classes of *Skandhas*.

वादरसुहुमगदाणं खंधाणं पुग्गलोत्ति ववहारो ॥
ते होंति छप्पयारा तेलोक्कं जेहिं णिप्पणं ॥ ८२ ॥

82 *Skandhas* are of two kinds. Those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest themselves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled.

COMMENTARY

The term *Pudgala* is specially applicable to the primary atoms. These are the indestructible material basis of the world. The *Skandhas* or molecules though derivative and secondary are also called by the same name *Pudgala*. These molecules or *Skandhas* have the characteristics of touch, taste, smell, sound and colour. They can increase or decrease being aggregates. They can grow or

*Sanskrit rendering

वादरसौदम्यगतानां स्कन्धानां पुद्गलः इति व्यवहारः ॥
ते भवन्ति षट्प्रकारास्त्रैलोक्यं चैः निष्पन्नं ॥ ८२ ॥

decay. They are minute or large. These *Skandhas* or molecular aggregates are of six different kinds which are mentioned in the next gāthā. These aggregates or *Skandhas* in their six different forms completely fill the three Lokās.

83

The six different kinds of *Skandhas* are enumerated.

पुढवि जलं च छाया चउरिंदियविसयकम्मपाओग्गा ।
कम्मातीदा येवं छद्मेया पोगगला होंति ॥ ८३ ॥

83. The *Skandhas* or molecular aggregates exist in six different forms:—Earth, water, shadow, the objects of the four senses except sight, and kârmic matter, and molecules which are unfit to become karmic matter.

COMMENTARY

The six kinds of *Skandhas* are otherwise called thus :—

1. Bâdara bâdara—Solid.
2. Bâdara—Liquid.
3. Sukshma-bâdara—Apparently solid like a shadow.
4. Bâdara-sukshma—Minute particles evident to the senses.
5. Sukshma—Minute, not perceptible.
6. Sukshma Sukshma—Very minute.
1. Is that which cannot become combined or one, when broken; like wood or stone.
2. Is the one whose parts become one again when broken; as water, etc.
3. The larger cannot be broken, or divided or caught as shadow, lightning darkness.
4. Though minute yet evident to the senses as taste, smell, colour, etc.
5. Minute and imperceptible as Kârmic matter.
6. Those below Kârmic matters upto *Skandhas* made up of two atoms.

84

Thus after describing the various *Skandhas* the author explains the nature of Paramânu or primary atoms which are the constituent elements of *Skandhas*.

सर्वेसिं खंधाणं जो अंतो त वियाण परमाण ।

सो सस्सदो असद्वो एक्को अविभागि मुत्तिभवो ॥ ८४ ॥

84. Do thou understand that whatever is the limit of all *Skandhas* is the primary atom. That same is eternal unsounding (silent) occupying one space point and of corporeal form.

COMMENTARY.

The limiting unit of the process of division of molecules is the *Paramānu* or the primary atom. Since it cannot be further sub-divided it is called atom. Since it occupies a single point of space it is one. Since it is the eternal and inalienable substratum of corporeal things it is eternal. Since it is the constitutive basis of physical objects it is the generator of physical things. Since it cannot by itself bring about sound vibrations, it is non-sounding or silent. These are the characteristics of the primary atom.

It may be noted here that according to Jaina thought matter is indestructible; so also is *Jiva*. It is not due to the creative fiat of a Will. It cannot be destroyed. Atoms are the constitutive elements of physical bodies. Thus according to Jaina view, matter and space are objectively real. In this respect the view is quite similar to that of modern science. Again it is worth noting that the atom is described as non-sounding. Several Indian systems of thought associate sound with *Akāśa*, a term which is quite ambiguous. It means either space or ether. But the Jaina thinkers distinctly explain sound as due to molecular impingement. Unless one molecule of matter strikes against another there is no possibility of sound. An atom by itself is incapable of producing sound. Hence it is silent. Jaina physics of sound is also quite scientific.

85

This primary atom is not of four kinds as some people would have such as earth, air, fire and water. But it is only one in nature though it is the constitutive basis of the four *Dhatūs* or modes of

*Sanskrit rendering.

सर्वेषां स्कन्धानां योऽन्त्यस्तं विजानीहि परमाणुं ॥
स शाश्वतोऽशब्दः पक्वोऽविभागी मूर्तिर्भवः ॥ ८४ ॥

physical existence. The atom has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements."

✓ आदेशमत्तमुत्तो धादुचदुक्कस्स कारणं जो दु ।
सो णेओ परमाणू परिणामगुणो स्वयमसद्वो ॥ ८५ ॥

85. Whatever thing by its very name implies, perceptual form; is the essential cause of these four elements; is characterised by unthinking *mūrtā* nature and is unsounding; that is the atom; so be it understood.

COMMENTARY.

✓ The author denies the qualitative difference of paramānus. By the very name an atom implies the division of physical objects having the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. From the point of spaciality it is beginning middle and end in one. From the general principle that substance and quality are inseparable, it follows that the spacial unit of atom is also the spacial unit of contact, or of smell, or of colour, i.e., the unit of space occupied by the atom is also the unit of space accommodating the sense colours. If the primary atom through its manifestation were to part with either smell or with the smell and taste or with smell taste and colour then the very atom would be annihilated. Therefore the separability of the quality cannot be associated with the atom. Again fire, air, earth, and water, have as their constitutive cause the atom. Wonderful are the qualities of primary atoms when their potential characteristics are taken into consideration. The non-manifested sense qualities become actual in the aggregates or Skandhas. But in the case of sound it can't be said that it is present in the atom even in *Sakti* or potentiality for sound implies several molecules of several spacial units. Therefore such a characteristic cannot consistently belong to an atom which has only one spacial unit. Paramānu is called *Mūrtā* for another reason also; because it can be a perceptual object for *Paramavadhu*. It is called so not because it is perceived by our senses. It is distinctly transcending the capacity of our senses though it can be perceived by the *Kevali*.

*Sanskrit rendering

आदेशमात्रमूर्तः धातुचतुष्कस्य कारणं यस्तु ॥
स ज्ञेयः परमाणुः परिणामगुणः स्वयमशब्दः ॥ ८५ ॥

Then he describes how sound is actually produced by atoms which are really without sound quality.

सद्वो खंधप्पभवो खंधो परमाणुसंगसंघादो ॥

पुट्टेसु तेषु जायदि सद्वो उत्पादगो णियदो ॥ ८६ ॥

86. Sound is generated by skandhas. Skandhas themselves are the aggregates of atoms. When these aggregates strike one another sound is produced which may be natural or artificial (hence sound may be indirectly associated with atoms also).

COMMENTARY.

If the skandhas constituted by Primary atoms strike one another there is sound. If they strike of their own accord then there is natural or *svabhāvika* sound. If the striking is due to other agencies then it is *Prāyogika* or purposeful sound. The illustrations of *Svabhāvika* or natural sound are thunder of the clouds and the roar of the sea. *Prāyogika* or purposeful sound is again of two kinds *Bhashātma* or Language and *Abhashātma*, non-language. The language sound again may be *Aksharātma* or *Anaksharātma*, articulate and inarticulate. The articulate sound is made up of alphabetical sounds; the inarticulate is the language of animals.

Non-language sounds are of four kinds :—

1. *Tata* sound produced by stringed instruments.
2. *Vitata* the sound produced by drum.
3. *Gaṇa* sound produced by cymbals, etc.
3. *Sushira* sound produced by pipes and other wind instrument.

Further description of the primary Atom. That it is *Ekaṇṇadesa* or occupies one spacial point is specially referred to.

*Sanskrit rendering

शब्दः स्कन्धप्रभवः स्कन्ध परमाणुसङ्घसंघातः ।

पुट्टेषु तेषु जायते शब्द उत्पादको नियतः ॥ ८६ ॥

णिच्चो णाणवकासो ण सावकासो पदेसदो भेत्ता ।
खंधाणं पि य कत्ता पविहत्ता कालसंखाणं ॥ ८७ ॥

87. The primary atom is eternal, is spacial, and yet non-spacial, is the differentiating factor of *skandhas* and is also the cause of their changes. It is also the determinant of time and number.

COMMENTARY.

Paramānu is associated with one space point. Since it is not capable of disintegration it is indestructible and eternal. Though it occupies only one space point since it is the substratum of colour and other sense qualities, it has spaciality accommodating qualities. But as it has only one space point and as it is without beginning, middle, or end, and as it cannot accommodate another space point it may also be called non-spacial. Being the constituent element of skandhas it may be said to be the determinant of the difference of skandhas. For the same reason it is the substantial cause of skandhas. By its own change of position it becomes the measure of time. A single instant of time corresponds to a single shift of an atom from one position to the immediately next. It is also the measure of number or quantity. Being the constitutive element of skandhas it brings about quantitative difference of things (*Dravya Sankhya*). Since its associated space point is the constitutive element of space it is indirectly the cause of quantitative difference of space (*Kṣētra Sankhya*.)

Since its motion from point to point corresponds to duration of time it is also the basis of quantitative difference of time.

(*Kāla Sankhya*.)

Again because it is the basis of modification of things through aggregation or disintegration it is also the condition of the quantitative difference of modes or (*Bhava Sankhya*).

Thus according to Jaina view the primary atom is the direct unit of things and the indirect unit of space, time, and change. The

*Sanskrit rendering :

नित्यो नानवकाशो न सावकाशः प्रदेशतो भेत्ता ।

स्कंधानामपि च कर्त्ता प्रविभक्ता कालसंख्यायाः ॥ ८७ ॥

quantitative difference in these things and also the qualitative difference in physical objects may ultimately be traced to the constitutive of Paramānu.

88

Further description of the qualities of Paramānu and its modes.

एकरसवर्णगन्धं दो फासं सद्व्यकारणमसद्वृत् ।

स्वधन्तरिदं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥ ८८ ॥

88. That substance which has a single taste, colour, and smell and two contacts; which is the cause of sound, itself unsounding, which is different from skandhas though constituting them is the Paramānu. So do thou learn.

COMMENTARY.

The Primary atom is examined with reference to different sense qualities of physical objects. Five colours are recognised generally in external things of which only one colour can be associated with the Paramānu. According to Jaina view a Paramānu is an object of perfect *Avadhi* perception. Though an atom is metemperical to a finite individual it is distinctly a *Rupa* or *Vismal* object for the super-normal faculty of *Avadhi*. If the description in the *Gāthā* is based upon such super-normal perception, unfortunately it cannot be verified by our experience. But still there is a way of imagining the truth. An atom may be associated with a single light wave. If it is not able to obstruct more than a single light wave of a particular wave length then it must manifest itself as having only one colour to a super-normal faculty. Whether it is actually so constituted as to behave in that fashion it is for the physicist to determine. We have here only to notice the uncompromising realistic attitude of Jaina thought.

Of the five different states ordinarily recognised, an atom can have only one. Of the two different smells it may have either. Of the eight contact qualities smooth and rough ; heavy and light ; are the

*Sanskrit rendering :

एकरसवर्णगन्धं द्विरुपशं शब्दकारणमशब्दं ।

स्वधन्तारितं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥ ८८ ॥

qualities of skandhas. These cannot be in the atom. The remaining four qualities may be present in an atom in pairs. The elements constituting the pair must be mutually compatible. *Snigdha* and *Sita*, *Ruksha* and *Ushna*, may constitute the consistent pairs, i.e., viscosity or adhesiveness may co-exist with cold and hardness and repulsiveness may co-exist with heat.

This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are identical material units.

It is extremely interesting to notice the elaborate analysis of sense qualities which is even as minute as that of modern Psychology. But the ancient Psychological analysis of smell is as halting as the modern one. Smell could be analysed only into disagreeable and agreeable. Several attempts made in recent years to go beyond this crude difference merely ended in failure where the modern scientists succeeded there the ancient thinkers also achieved success, i.e., in the analysis of the other senses. Another point worth noticing is the analysis of cutaneous sensations into eight elements. This is almost modern in its achievement. This indirect Psychological value is more important than the description based upon super-normal perception which unfortunately cannot be verified by Science in its present state.

89

By way of summary, the author enumerates the different forms of corporeal existence. The description may also be taken as a sort of extensive definition of matter.

उपभोज्यमिन्द्रियं हि य इन्द्रिय काया मनो य कर्माणि ।
जं हवति मुत्तमणं तं सर्वं पुद्गलं जायते ॥ ८९ ॥

89. Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense organs, the various kinds of *Sāmanās*, or bodies of Jivas, the physical *manās* or brain, the karmas, &c. are *Mūrtā* objects. Understand that all these are *Pudgala* or matter.

*Sanskrit rendering :

उपभोग्यमिन्द्रियं हि य इन्द्रिय काया मनश्च कर्माणि ।
यद्भवति मूर्तमन्यत् तत्सर्वं पुद्गलं जानीयात् ॥ ८९ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The author enumerates the different states of matter. All objects of sense perception are corporeal. An object may be apprehended through any one of the senses. Therefore, anything that has the sense quality of colour, contact, smell, taste, or sound comes under this definition. Not only the objects of sense perception but also the sense organs are physical. Thirdly the different *Sariras* or the bodies of *Jivas* are also physical. These are five in number. *Audârîka*, *Vaikrîyaka*, *Âhâraka*, *Taijasa*, and *Kârmâna Sarîras*. The author includes *Dravya Mana* or mind under the same class. Evidently it means brain which is no doubt physical. *Dravya Karmas* are also material since they are constituted by physical atoms. And again he implies *no-karmapudgalas*, organised matter forming part of organism. This *no-karma* matter refers to matter assimilated by the organism through the process of Metabolism. And by the word "others" he refers to the several atoms and *Skandhas* not already enumerated. All these are material.

The five *sarîras* referred to in the *Gâthâ* require elucidation.

1. *Audârîka Sarîra*. *Udârana* means *Sthula* or gross. The *Sarîra* is called *Audârîka* because it is constituted by *Sthula* or gross matter. It is also derived from *udara* womb that which is born from the womb is *Audârîka*. Any way *Audârîka Sarîra* refers to organic bodies animal and human.

2. *Vaikrîyaka Sarîra*. Term *vikrîya* implies the wonderful bodily transformations that are associated with a *Deva* or divine being. A *Deva* can take any kind of body he pleases from minute to huge forms. That kind of *sarîra* is called *Vaikrîyaka Sarîra*.

3. *Âhâraka Sarîra* when a *yogi* during *Tapas* has certain difficulties about intricate facts of reality, there shoots forth a kind of subtle body from him. This stretches out so far as to be in communion with another well-informed person, from whom the information sought for is secured by a sort of telepathic response. This shooting body from the *yogi* is *Âhâraka Sarîra*.

✓ 4. *Taijasa Sarîra*. This refers to the shining body or the light-body.

5. *Kârmâna Sarîra*. This refers to the kârmic body of each *Jîva*. Every *Jîva* carries this kârmic body with itself when it roams through the cycle of *Samsâra*.

The first alone is the object of sense perception, and the others are subtle bodies. The succeeding one is subtler than the peceeding one in order. cf. the *Sutra*. पश्यन् सूक्ष्मं for further description of these *rāśis*, we may refer the reader to *Tattvārtha Sutra* where the author describes the characteristics by several *Sutras*. (*Sutra* 36 to the end of 2nd chapter).

Thus ends the chapter on matter or *Pudgalastikaya*.

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CHAPTER ON DHARMA AND ADHARMA.

90

The author first describes *Dharma* or the principle of motion.

धम्मत्थिकायमरसं अवण्णगंधं असद्वृमप्फासं ।
लोगोगाढं पुट्टं पिहुलमसंखादियपदेसं ॥ ६० ॥

90 *Dharmāstikāya* is devoid of qualities of taste, colour, smell sound and contact It pervades the whole world, it is continuous because of inseparability, has extension because of its co-existensiveness with space Though in reality of *Ekaṇṇadesa* yet in *Vyavahāra* is of many *pradesas*.

COMMENTARY

The author introduces important principles without which the world would be incomplete *Dharmāstikāya* and *Adharmāstikāya* are distinctly peculiar to Jaina system of thought. The former is the principle of motion and the latter of rest These terms are used in a technical sense by Jaina writers. Non Jaina writers both European and Indian have many of them misunderstood these technical names. We shall reserve our discussion to the end of this chapter

✓ In the above *Gāthā* the author clearly describes the nature of *Dharma* or the principle of motion. Since it is non-corporeal or *Amūrta* it has no sense qualities which are generally associated with matter. The qualities of contact, colour, taste, smell and sound are not to be associated with *Dharma* Therefore it is not physical. Again it is not an aggregate of simple element as matter is. Therefore *Dharma* is continuous and non-composite. Its influence is co-extensive with the whole world Therefore it may be said to be co extensive with *Lokākāsa* without any gaps or intervals. It cannot be said to have manifested at any particular time of the World's History much less is it created It is coeval with the world and co-extensive with space, and because of the latter character it is an *Astikāya*.

Sanskrit rendering

धर्मास्तिकायोऽरसोऽवर्णगन्धोऽशब्दोऽस्पर्शः ।
लोकावगाढः स्पृष्टः पृथुलोऽसंख्यातप्रदेशः ॥ ६० ॥

Next *Gātha* describes the remaining qualities of *Dharmāstikāya*.

अगुरुगलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदं णिच्चं ।
गदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं सयमकज्जं ॥ ९१ ॥

91. Because it has the infinite manifestations of the incorporeal nature *Agurulaghu*, and because of its dialectic nature of persistence through appearance and disappearance it is a real existence. Itself being unaffected by movement it conditions the motion of those that can move, matter and life.

COMMENTARY.

The author next establishes the substantial reality of *Dharmāstikāya*. It has the characteristic change and modification of all the primary entities though it is incorporeal. Therefore it is permanent and real. It is the indispensable condition of movement in physical objects as well as in living beings. But itself cannot be moved by any other thing because it is incapable of movement.

The author explains by a well-known analogy how it is the condition of motion.

उदयं जह मच्छाणं गमणाणुगहयरं हवदि लोए ॥
तह जीवपुग्गलानं धम्मं दव्वं वियाणेहि ॥ ९२ ॥

92, Just as water itself being indifferent or neutral, is the condition of movement of fishes so *Dharma* itself non-motive, is the *sine qua non* of motion of *Jīvas* and *Pudgalas*.

COMMENTARY.

The author explains the function of *Dharmāstikāya* by a very striking example. Water is the indispensable condition for the life

*Sanskrit rendering.

अगुरुलघुकैः सदा तैः अनन्तः परिणतः नित्यः ।
गतिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतः स्वयमकार्यः ॥ ९१ ॥

*Sanskrit rendering :

उदकं यथा मत्स्यानां गमनानुग्रहकरं भवतिलोके ।
तथा जीवपुद्गलानां धर्मं द्रव्यं विजानीहि ॥ ९२ ॥

of the fish The fish lives and moves only in water. But water neither moves with the moving fish nor does it stimulate the fish to move. It is practically indifferent towards the moving fish. If the fish moves, it is due to its own intrinsic and spontaneous activity, and not to the causal agency of water Such is the relation of *Dharmāstikāya* to objects of the world. If objects move from one place to another, the movement is due to the intrinsic condition of the object. But still *Dharmāstikāya* is the *sine qua non* of motion of the objects of the world. i.e., in short it is merely the condition, and not the generative cause, of motion.

93

Next the author describes the *Adharmāstikāya* or the principle of rest.

जह हवदि धम्मदव्वं तह तं जाणेह दव्वमधमवखं ।
ठिदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभदं तु पुढवीव ॥ ६३ ॥

93. The nature of *Adharma* is essentially similar to that of *Dharma*. But it is like the earth (which is the resting place of things) the *sine qua non* of rest for things in motion (both animate and inanimate)

COMMENTARY

Adharma or the principle of rest has all the characteristics associated with *Dharma* or the principle of motion This is also devoid of sense qualities This is also non-corporeal. This is in itself non-spacial and yet it is co-extensive with *Lokākāśa* These characteristics it has in common with the principle of motion. But it has its own differentiating quality. In this respect it is compared with earth which is the resting place of things. Moving things whether animate or inanimate are not arrested and brought to rest by the earth. But if there is no earth to support, there will be no possibility of rest for the moving things. Similarly the *Adharmāstikāya* without interfering with motion itself is the condition of rest for the moving things.

*Sanskrit rendering

यथा भवति धर्मद्रव्यं तथा तज्जानीहि द्रव्यमधर्माख्यं ।
स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं तु पृथिवीव ॥ ६३ ॥

Then the author gives the reason why *Dharma* and *Adharma* are considered *Asthāyas* or existences.

जादो अलोगलोगो जेसिं सद्धभावदो य गमणठिदी ।

दो वि य मया विभत्ता अविभत्ता लोयमेत्ता य ॥ ६४ ॥

The two things which by their existence bring about the difference between the world and beyond, which are respectively the condition of motion and rest, which are different in function, but same in nature and *Pradesa*, are *Dharma* and *Adharma*. These are uncreated and of the same magnitude as *Lokākāsa*.

COMMENTARY.

The existence of these two principles must be postulated as the necessary condition of the world for without this there will be neither motion nor rest among things. There will be neither the world nor beyond. If the material particles and jivas are not kept together as a system then they will get scattered through the whole place resulting in sheer chaos. There will be no definite world. There will be neither the beyond or *Alokā*. The difference between *Loka* and *Aloka* is entirely due to the coherent system of molecules and *Jīvas*, conditioned by these principles. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are said to be distinct because of the difference in function. The former is the condition of motion, the latter of rest. But they are quite similar in nature and are indistinguishable because of their non-exclusive co-existence in space. They are in themselves *Nishkriyā Dravyas*. Non-active and non functional and yet condition the things living and non-living in their motion and rest. For this reason they are limited entirely to the world. Their function will not be felt beyond the world for the simple reason that there are no things beyond.

* Sanskrit rendering:

जातमलोकलोकं ययोः सद्भावतश्च गमनस्थितिः ।

द्वावपि च मतौ विभक्तावविभक्तौ लोकमात्रौ च ॥ ६४ ॥

Next the author points out that *Dharma* and *Adharma* are in themselves neutral, and indifferent condition respectively of motion and rest in other things

ण य गच्छदि धम्मत्थी गमणं ण करेदि अण्णदवियस्स ॥
हवदि गती स प्पसरो जीवाणं पुग्गलाणं च ॥ ६५ ॥

95. *Dharmāstikāya* does not move itself nor effect motion in other things. But it forms the condition of motion in living and non-living things.

COMMENTARY.

Then it is determined that *Dharma* and *Adharma* being in themselves entirely neutral from the external condition of motion and rest respectively *Dharmāstikāya* itself is incapable of movement nor can it be an efficient cause of motion in other things such as, physical objects and living beings. In what way can it be said to condition motion? certainly not like the horses that, while themselves running, indirectly cause the motion of persons on their back. *Dharmāstikāya* does not carry things, locomotion of things and persons is not brought about by *Dharma* for it is a *Nishkriya Dravya*. But it behaves like water which by its mere presence is the condition of motion in fishes, i.e., *Dharmāstikāya* by its mere existence conditions motion without being the efficient cause of motion. *Jīvas* and *Padgalas* have motion because of their own efficient causes and yet motion in them will be impossible, but for the external condition of *Dharmāstikāya*.

Similarly *Adharma* being neutral in itself is the external condition of rest. It is merely a *Bahurangahetu*. Just as the earth is the standing place for horses and the shadow of a tree, the place of rest for the pilgrims so *Adharma* is the non-efficient external condition of things at rest.

Then the reason why *Dharma* and *Adharma* are merely neutral conditions (*Udāsīnahetu*).

* Sanskrit rendering :

न च गच्छति धर्मास्तिको गमनं न करोत्यन्यद्रव्यस्य ।
भवति गतेः सः प्रसरो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च ॥ ६५ ॥

विज्जदि जेसिं गमणं ठाणं पुण तेसिमेव संभवदि ।
ते सगपरणामेहिं दु गमणं ठाणं च कुव्वंति ॥ ६६ ॥

96. To whatever things there is motion to the very same there can be rest, or cessation of motion, such things of their own spontaneous efficiency effect either motion or rest.

COMMENTARY.

The author explains why these are called *udāsīnahetu*. He wants to emphasize that Dharma is not the intrinsic condition of motion nor Adharma of rest, i.e., he wants to deny that they are *Mukhyahetu*. What if they are the *Mukhyahetu* for motion and rest, then the things that are in motion must continue to be so for ever and the things that are at rest must remain in the same state for ever. But things don't behave in that fashion. Therefore it is inferred that these are only *Udāsīnahetus* or neutral or external conditions. This only means that they are not efficient causes. Ordinarily we perceive that things moving come to rest and things at rest begin to move. That shows that both motion and rest are associated with single things. Since this fact prevails in nature we have to infer that motion and rest are not produced by Dharma and Adharma as *Mukhyahetu*. Motion and rest must be traced to the intrinsic and efficient nature of things themselves. That clearly shows that Dharma and Adharma are merely *Bahīrangahetus*.

NOTE

✓ After taking to task the several writers who misunderstood the technical terms Dharma and Adharma, Mr. J.L. Jains writes (in pp. 25 of his *Outlines of Jainism*).

"Matter goes to struggle with the unwary or infatuated soul ; time times the conflict, space makes possible the arena ; dharma keeps the combatants to struggle on ; and adharma assists them when they are inclined to rest." Again in the same page "dharma and adharma are the necessary conditions of its continuance in its endless vicissitudes, merit and demerit, high and low, happiness and misery, as

*Sanskrit rendering :

विद्यते येषां गमनं पुनस्तेषामेव सम्भवति ।
ते स्वकपरिणामैस्तु गमनं स्थानं च कुर्वन्ति ॥ ६६ ॥

far as disturbance and tranquillity. Of course, dharma and adharma are in their nature and *modus operandi* the same. It is the same sword in the hand of a devoted soldier or fanatic rebel."

I am afraid that Mr Jaini is still thinking of dharma and adharma as quasi-moral instruments in the hands of a Jīva.

The terms should not in the least be associated with any kind of moral struggle and tranquillity. Motion and rest contemplated in this connection on distinctly physico-mathematical. They should not therefore be interpreted even metaphorically to mean anything more than that connotation. We have to remember the following points —

1. Dharma and Adharma—are *apūṛta dravyas*. They have no sense qualities of colour, etc.
2. They are *ajīvas*—non-living
3. They have spatial relation though in themselves *eka-pradesi*.
4. They are *Nishkriyas*—non-active
5. They are *Bahuranga hetu* or *udāsīna hetu* and not *Mukhya hetu*.
6. They are non-discrete and continuous.

There are some of the important common qualities emphasised by the Jaina Thinkers. Of course that they are *astikāyas* need not be emphasised.

If we ponder over these qualities, then they can never be connected with moral struggle or evolution.

The Jaina philosopher recognised in the world matter, Life and Space. But are they enough? No. There would be no world. The Atoms and Jīvas may be scattered throughout the infinite space. Therefore there must be something else besides these three. That something must be able to maintain a coherent system of Jīvas and atoms, must have the function of preventing the flying atoms; must limit the boundary of the world of things and persons. For the author distinctly says that without *Adharma* there will be only chaos; there will be no world. Therefore the Jaina Thinkers pointed the existence of a fourth entity which binds together things and persons. So the hypothesis of *adharma*.

This is something like Newton's gravitation, but *adharma* is slightly different. Its main function is to arrest things. But then

there is this difficulty If there were *adharma* alone how could there be motion at all in things ? There would be an eternal paralysis of Reality. To remove this difficulty *Dharma* had to be posited. The function of *Dharma* is to guarantee motion within the limits imposed by *adharma*. This is the reason for the second hypothesis.

But the trouble is not yet over If the two exist within a spatial limit one guaranteeing motion and the other rest, then the things in motion must be in motion for ever, and things at rest must be there for ever. But our experience is not of that kind One and the same has motion or rest, it may move or it may come to stay. Therefore *Dharma* and *Adharma* must be deprived of their causality They can be only *Bahiranga-hetu* or *Udāsina-hetu*, (i.e) they must be indifferent and neutral in themselves and yet must be indispensable to the completion of the world

This seems to be the logical development of the system The most approximate modern conception answering to the description will be *Ether* of the physicist But the Jaina systems require two such entities functionally different, one acting like *Newton's gravitation (adharma)* and the other guaranteeing motion within the limits It would not be quite accurate to think of *centripetal* and *centrifugal forces*, because *dharma* and *adharma* are *Nishkriyas*. Does it mean the *duality of electro magnetic influence of Ether* ? The constitution of an atom is supposed to be a system of electrons (positive and negative) Had the Jaina thinkers any such idea about the whole world ? We can only contemplate. But of this much we are certain that *dharma* and *adharma* are parts of the physical system They are two different entities without which the system of reality would be impossible and incomplete

Again *Dr. Seal* suggests that *dharma* is "answering somewhat to *Leibniz's* Pre-established harmony..... it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements, the fact of an order in the movements of *Jīva* and *Pudgala*," (Note E at the end of *Dravya Samgraha*, S. B. J. pp LVIII)

As the whole letter is not quoted I am not in a position to know what *Dr. Seal* has to say about *adharma*. With due deference to the great Philosopher I beg to state that he misses the point. *Dharma* need not necessarily be associated with simultaneous

movements as I pointed out. *Adharma* seems to be logically prior to *Dharma*) in the construction of the system. Hence I am not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony which has a special function in the system of a "*windowless monads*" There certainly is the idea of corresponding movements. Hence *Dharma* is not the "system of movements." Its meaning is distinctly *subsequent* to that of *adharma*. How could *adharma* be connected with Leibnitz's System? Then what is the force of that reference?

CHAPTER ON ĀKĀSA OR SPACE.

97

In this Chapter the author describes the nature and characteristics of space. The term Ākāsa here means space and not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy.

सर्वेसिं जीवाणं सेसाणं सह य पुग्गलाणं च ॥

जं देदि विवरमखिलं तं लोए हवदि आयासं ॥ ६७ ॥*

97. What contains or accommodates completely all Jivas and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world space or Lokākāsa.

COMMENTARY.

Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system. Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self-contradictory and impossible. On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases its arguments. But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly shown that space and time are not really self-contradictory. Euclidian space is quite possible and may be real.

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic of the other Indian systems of Philosophy. The term Ākāsa is used in an ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether. As Doctor Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word Ākāsa is Ether. He invariably translates the term into Ether. For according to the Hindu creation theory, Ākāsa is the primieval substance from which the other elements appear. Therefore Ākāsa must mean some subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space. But the Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation. Therefore they found it possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space ; space therefore is a fundamental element of the system of reality according to the Jaina view.

98

The same point is further elaborated.

*Sanskrit rendering

सर्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

यद्वाति विवरमखिलं तल्लोके भवत्याकाशं ॥ ६७ ॥

जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा य लोगदीणण्णा ।
तत्तो अणणमण्णं आयासं अंतवदिरित्तं ॥ ९८ ॥*

98 Life, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest and also Time, these are not distinct from the world But that which is the same as the world, and also distinct from it, is Ākāśa or space which is infinite.

COMMENTARY.

The constituent elements of the world are the infinite number of Jīvas, and the infinite physical objects, the principles of motion and rest, and space and time. Of these space contains the other five. The space which is co-extensive with these objects is called Lokākāśa. But that is only a part of the real space. Beyond the Loka there is Ālokākāśa or Anantakāśa, This Anantakāśa is pure space There are no objects animate or inanimate in this Infinite Beyond. Not a tiny molecule of matter nor a stray Jīva, would step beyond the limits of Loka. The system of objects is held together by the principles of Dharma and Adharma. And these principles are confined to Lokākāśa.

Thus we have to note that Mathematically pure space is recognised to be possible and real by Jain thinkers. Arguments against pure space have already been said to be generally fallacious.

99.

Ākāśa thus accommodates the other Dravyas. Why should it not be taken also as the condition of motion and rest. The author shows why it cannot be such a condition.

आगासं अवगासं गमणद्विदिकारणेहिं देदि जदि ।
उद्धंगदिप्पधाणा सिद्धा चिद्धन्ति किध तत्थ ॥ ९९ ॥†

*Sanskrit rendering .

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मा च लोकतोऽनन्ये ।
ततोऽनन्यद्वन्द्वदाकाशमन्तव्यतिरिक्तं ॥ ९८ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering .

आकाशमवकाशं गमनस्वित्तिकारणाभ्यां दद्वानि यदि ।
उद्ध्वंगतिग्राधानाः सिद्धाः तिष्ठन्ति कथं तत्र ॥ ९९ ॥

99. If space, in addition to accommodating other things, conditions their motion and rest, then why do these Siddhas whose tendency is to go upwards come to stay at the summit of the world ?

COMMENTARY.

The author evidently explains why it is necessary to postulate the existence of Dharma and Adharma. Cannot Ākāśa be credited with the functions of motion and rest in addition to its own function of accommodating things ? According to the author such a Hypothesis would be impossible. It would be conflicting with other facts for if it is also the condition of motion and rest, then wherever there is Ākāśa there should be free chance for motion and rest. But neither a single Jīva or a single atom of matter could step beyond the limit of Lokākāśa though there is Ākāśa beyond ¹. Therefore the author concludes that space is not the condition of either motion or rest. These require independent principles as their condition. Ākāśa cannot be a substitute for Dharma and Adharma. This argument should be considered conjointly with the arguments in the previous Chapter for the necessity of Dharma and Adharma. We have to notice especially that one which points out the difference between Cosmos and Chaos to be based upon principles of state and motion. The Jaina system evidently considers the world incomplete and unreal without the statical and dynamical principles.

100

The author strengthens the argument by showing that according to Jaina faith the perfected ones come to a stay in the summit of the Loka.

जह्ना उवरिद्धाणं सिद्धाणं जिणवरेहिं पण्णत्तं ।
तह्ना गमणद्धाणं आयासे जाण णत्थित्ति ॥ १०० ॥*

100 Because the Siddhas or the perfected ones stay in the summit of the world—So it is revealed by the great Jina.

*Sanskrit rendering

यस्मादुपरिस्थानं सिद्धानं जिनवरैः प्रवृत्तं ।
तस्माद्गमनस्थानमाकाशे जानीहि नास्तीति ॥ १०० ॥

Therefore there cannot be in space either the condition of motion or of rest.

COMMENTARY.

That the Siddhas reside in the summit of the world is one of the religious doctrines of Jainas. If space be credited to be the condition of motion and rest it would contradict the scriptures. To avoid this internal contradiction space should not be supposed to be the condition of motion and rest. The argument *prima facie* is based upon a religious Dogma. But really it is another form of the same philosophical argument which maintained that without the principles of Dharma and Adhrama there would be no distinction between Loka and Aloka. The argument in this Gātha is merely the converse of the above. Since there is a definite Loka or Cosmos, and since there is space beyond, there must be something besides space which maintains the integrity of the system of things and persons. For space itself cannot have that function of maintaining the unity of the world.

101.

The author shows that the supposition about space is impossible by bringing in a really strong argument

जदि हवदि गमणहेदू आगासं ठाणकारणं तेसिं ।

पसजदि अलोगहाणी लोगस्स य अंतपरिवुड्ढी ॥१०१॥*

101. If space be the condition of motion and rest, of life and matter, then there would happen the disappearance of Aloka or the beyond and the destruction and dissipation of Loka or the world.

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact the world is an integral system of things, living and non-living, existing in space. That there is some force or power which holds the constituent elements of the world together is a necessary pre-supposition even of modern science. It is really wonderful that Jaina thinkers several centuries ago felt the same intellec-

* Sanskrit rendering :

यदि भवति गमनहेतुराकाशं स्थानकारणं तेषां ।

प्रसज्यलोकहानिलोकस्य चान्तपरिवृद्धिः ॥ १०१ ॥

tual necessity as to suppose a physical force which maintains the cosmic unity. The reason given for that Hypothesis is still more interesting. If there is no such power and if things living and non-living were left in space by themselves without a further principle to hold them together there would only be chaos, no systematic world. This argument must be considered very important for it gives us an insight into the scientific ideas of the ancients. The positive science of ancient Indians must have been fairly advanced in order to promulgate such physical theories as are contemplated by the author.

102.

If then space cannot be the determining condition of motion and of rest, the latter facts must be due to some other conditions. Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be admitted to be the necessary constituents of the system of reality.

तस्मा धर्माधर्मा गमणद्विदिकारणानि नाकाशं ।

इदि जिणवरेहिं भणितं लोकस्वभावं सुणंताम् ॥ १०२ ॥*

102. Dharma and Adharma alone are the condition of motion and rest respectively, and not Ākāśa or space. So was the nature of the Cosmos revealed by the great Jina to his audience (in Samavasarana)

COMMENTARY.

The author summarises his position as to the nature of Loka. He distinctly asserts that the coherence of the world is due to principles of Dharma and Adharma and not to space. The author further states evidently to strengthen his own case in the eyes of the faithful that such was the message delivered by the Jina to his audience, consisting of Ganadharas, and Chakradharas, and several others in Samavasarana. The description of the world is as revealed by the Omniscient to his disciples.

103.

The author states that Lokākāśa or world, Space, Dharma and Adharma, are all co-extensive and coincident. Hence they may

* Sanskrit rendering .

तस्माद्धर्माधर्मौ गमनस्थितिकारणे नाकाशं ।

इति जनवरैः भणितं लोकस्वभावं शृण्वताम् ॥ १०२ ॥

be considered as one conventionally, as they are all incorporeal entities in the same locality. But they are in reality different from one another on account of their functional difference.

धर्माधर्मागासा अपुवधभूदा समानपरिमाणा ।

पुधगुवलद्विविसेसा करंति एगत्तमणत्तं ॥ १०३ ॥*

103. Dharma, Adharma, and space, are mutually interpenetrating and coincident. Hence they are one from the point of locality, they are of the same size and form, and constitute an inseparable unity. But from the difference of function they also exhibit their diversity.

COMMENTARY.

This Gatha is interesting for this reason that Dharma and Adharma being constitutive elements of the world are said to be confined to Lokākāśa. Their influence is not felt beyond the boundary of the world for their influence is fundamentally related to things material and spiritual. These two mysterious physical principles are all pervading and co-extensive with the world space. Their existence cannot be inferred from their difference of locality. There is no such difference. But yet they have fundamentally different functions and on account of these differences they are really diverse. In short they are one in *Pradesa* but different as *Vastus i. e.*, they have a unity of Locality with diversity of function and nature.

This functional difference is emphasized by the author only because these three Dravyas are *Amūrta* ones. There is no other way of differentiating them unlike physical objects which can be distinguished by sense qualities and unlike Jivas which can be differentiated by conscious qualities. Dharma and Adharma have to be determined only by their function in the economy of the physical realm.

Thus Ends the Chapter on Space

*Sanskrit rendering.

धर्माधर्माकाशाण्यपुण्यभूतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।

पृथगुपलब्धिविशेषाणि कुर्वत्येकत्वमन्यत्वं ॥ १०३ ॥

CHULIKA.

104.

Then the resume of the five Astikāyas and Dravyas. They are described as Mūrta and Amūrta (Physical and non-physical) and Chetana and Achetana (conscious and non-conscious).

आगासकालजीवा धम्माधम्मा य मुत्तिपरिहीणा ।

मुत्तं पुग्गलदब्बं जीवो खलु चेदणो तेसु ॥ १०४ ॥†

104. Space, Time, Life, Dharma and Adharma, these are Amūrta Dravyas and are therefore without sense qualities. Matter alone is Mūrta and has these qualities. Again of these life alone is conscious.

COMMENTARY.

In this Gātha the author classifies the Dravyas according to two principles. According to the first classification, they are grouped into Mūrtas and Amūrtas. Mūrta Dravya is one which has the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound, and colour. That which is devoid of these qualities is Amūrta. Here, space, time, Jīva in itself, Dharma and Adharma, are all Amūrtas. Matter alone is Mūrta. That which has the nature of consciousness is Chetana and that which is otherwise is Achetana. Space, time, and matter, Dharma and Adharma are all Achetanas. Jīva alone is Chetana Dravya.

105

Again the Dravyas are classified into Sakryas and Nishkryas, active and non-active.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया सह सक्किरिया हवन्ति ण य सेसा ।

पुग्गलकरणा जीवा खंधा खलु कालकरणा दु ॥ १०५ ॥*

105. Jivas and physical objects become sakryas or causal agents when determined by certain condition. The rest are not

* Sanskrit rendering

आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मौ च मूर्तिपरिहीनाः ।

मूर्तं पुद्गलद्रव्यं जीवः खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥ १०४ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

जीवा पुद्गलकाया सह सक्रिया भवन्ति न च शेषाः ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवाः स्कन्धाः खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥ १०५ ॥

causally active. Jiva is active because of Kârmic matter. *Skandhas* or physical bodies are active because of time

COMMENTARY.

According to this classification *Dravyas* are either *Sakryas* or *Nishkryas*. Any causal activity is described to be *Sakrya*. If there is no such causal activity then it is *Nishkrya*. The activity contemplated here may be merely any change brought about by external conditions. Jivas and matter are *Sakrya Dravyas* for they become *Sakrya* under certain conditions, space, time, Dharma and Adharma are all *Nishkryas* or non-active entities. The external condition of activity of Jiva is merely the group of Karmas. These are material. The external condition of the activity of matter is time. Temporal succession brings about changes either of aggregation or disintegration in physical objects. There can be no change in matter without time as there can be no change in Jiva without Kârmic matter, but Jiva in perfect states can be free from Kârmic matter. In this state the *Siddha* Jiva is practically *Nishkrya*, i. e., it is not subjected to causal category. But it cannot be so with matter for there is no chance for matter to exist independent of time. It must always be subject to change due to time. Therefore it is always *Sakrya*.

One of the commentators relying on the religious dogma that *Siddha* Jiva gets to the summit of the world, speaks of *Siddha* also as *Sakrya*. If at all there is any causal change, it is this initial change of locality. But in the perfect state it will be more accurately described as *Nishkrya* for already Jiva is described to be beyond causal series in its state of perfection. To be consistent with that attitude it is better to consider *Siddha* as *Nishkrya*.

106.

The difference between *Mûrta* and *Amûrta* is again described in other words

जे खलु इन्द्रियगोष्ठ्या विसया जीवेहिं हुंति ते मुक्ता ।
सेसं हवदि अमुत्तं चित्तं उभयं समादियदि ॥ १०६ ॥*

*Sanskrit rendering

ये खलु इन्द्रियगोष्ठ्या विसया जीवेर्भवन्ति ते मुक्ता ।
शेषं भवत्यमुत्तं चित्तमुभयं समाददति ॥ १०६ ॥

106 All those objects that are apprehended or perceived by the senses are Mūrta objects. The rest are Amūrtas. Mind apprehends both Mūrta and Amūrta objects.

COMMENTARY.

The author again tries to explain the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual objects. All those objects that are objects of the senses are Mūrta Dravyas. The term Mūrta therefore implies the inherence in the object of the sense qualities of colour, taste, smell, etc. Those objects that have not these characteristics are Amūrta Dravyas. According to this description Physical objects are distinctly Mūrta Dravyas. But Physical objects may exist in different forms. There may be minute molecular constitution and the primary atoms. These are certainly not perceived by the senses and yet they also come under Mūrta category for they form the potential basis of the gross or physical objects which are evident to the senses. In short all those objects which are *Pratyakṣa* to the senses are Mūrta objects and those objects which are known through *Parokṣa* are Amūrtas. Under the Amūrta category come such facts as Dharma and Adharma and all Psychic states. (We have to note here that the term *Pratyakṣa* is used in Vyavahāra sense.) Mind, which is in itself an Amūrta Dravya is able to know both Mūrta and Amūrta Dravyas. Mūrta Dravyas are apprehended *Pratyakṣa* and Amūrta *Parokṣa* or mediately.

Thus ends the Chulika or Summary.

107.

In the treatment of Panchāstikāya, time has only a 'secondary place. Therefore the author gives a subordinate place to time and mentions about it in the summary. The section dealing about time therefore is merely a part of the *Chulika* and it is not considered as an independent chapter by the author as well as the commentators.

कालो परिणामभवो परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूदो ।

दोषहं एस सहस्रो कालो खणभङ्गुरो नियदो ॥ १०७ ॥*

*Sanskrit rendering

काल परिणामभव परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूतः ।

द्वयोरेष स्वभावात् कालः क्षणभङ्गुरो नियतः ॥ १०७ ॥

107 Relative time is determined by changes or motions in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time absolute. The former time is ephemeral (having beginning and end). The latter is eternal, such are the characteristics of the two.

COMMENTARY.

The author differentiates between relative time and absolute time. The different conventional periods from *Samaya* or moment onwards are the relative time. The different periods of relative time are measured by changes in other things. Movement of Physical objects is mainly the unit of measuring the different periods of relative time. The changes which measure the periods of relative time are themselves the effect of real or absolute time. The periods of relative time have both beginning and end. But *Dravyakāla* or real time is eternal, is without beginning or end.

The author takes up an attitude which is very familiar to common sense and science. The distinction is quite identical with *Newtonian* distinction between relative and absolute time. According to the author time is a real *Dravya*, it is not merely a form of mental activity. The idealistic thinkers both in the east as well as in the west have treated time as merely an appearance. But the Jaina thinkers evidently form an exception for them, time is not an appearance but a reality. The main argument against the reality of time is the so-called self-contradiction in the motions of continuity and infinity. Time has these characteristics of continuity and infinity and yet it is also constituted by instants or *Dravyakālānīs* as the Jaina writers call them. How can there be continuity constituted by primary elements of instants? This difficulty is not peculiar to time. It is common to space, as well as matter. In all these cases Philosophers emphasize the impossibility of obtaining continuity and infinity from simple elements. On account of this impossibility space, time and matter were condemned to be appearances.

But the problem has been taken up by the Mathematicians. The wonderful mathematical discoveries of the continental mathematicians such as, *Cantor*, *Peano* and *Frege* have shown clearly the intrinsic fallacy in all the arguments against the reality of time and space. The problem is developed by mathematicians as a special case of

"transitive and continuous series" To go into further details would be too mathematical. The discussion may very well be reserved to the general introduction. It is enough to note here the wonderful correspondence between the ideas of the author, and those of philosophical Mathematicians of our present day.

Another point worth notice is that time is the cause of changes or modifications in things. The author not only admits the reality of time but also recognises its potency. In this respect one is reminded of the great French Philosopher Bergson. Bergson has revealed to the world that time is a potent factor in the evolution of Cosmos. Changes and modifications in things are absolutely impossible without time, and that is just the view of the author.

108.

In order to clear the doubt of the disciple of a different *Sangha*, who disbelieves the reality of time, the author emphasizes the existential nature of time.

कालो ति य ववदेसो सद्भावपरूपगो हवदि णिच्चो ।
उत्पण्णप्पटुंसी अवरो दीहंतरट्ठाई ॥ १०८ ॥*

108. The name time or Kāla denotes an existential fact. The thing so denoted—Time is real but the other relative time has from the point of present moment, origin and end almost simultaneously. But it may also be of long duration.

COMMENTARY.

The author differentiates the real time from relative time. Real or absolute time is eternal existence But relative time is merely of finite duration But from the aspect of moment it has no duration at all. Origin and end are together in a single moment. It has *Kshanikatva* as its nature as against *Nityatva* of the other But the *Kshanikatva* may apparently disappear and relative time may have long duration. Even then it has both beginning and end and as such it is different from Dravya Kāla or absolute time.

*Sanskrit rendering

काल इति च व्यपदेशः सद्भावपरूपको भवति नित्यः ।
उत्पन्नप्रध्वंस्यपरो दीर्घान्तरस्यायी ॥ १०८ ॥

109.

Then the quantitative appreciation of time and the absence of *Kayâtva* or Corpus for the same

एदे कालागासा धम्माधम्मा य पुग्गला जीवा ।

लभन्ति दव्वसणं कालस्स दु णत्थि कायत्तं ॥ १०६ ॥*

109. Time, space. Dharma, and Adharma, matter, and Jiva these things are called Dravyas. Of these, to time alone there is no *Kayâtva*.

COMMENTARY.

In this Gátha, the author emphasizes the fact that time has *Astitva* or existence but not *Kayâtva* speciality. It is one of the six Dravyas. The name Dravya is applicable to all those existences which have continuity through origin and decay. Time has such a nature. Therefore it shares the name Dravya with the other things herein enumerated.

But the other Dravyas are also called *Astikāyas* because they have extension or *Bahupradesa*. But time has no such *Bahupradesa*. Therefore it is not an *Astikāya*.

This nature of time is described in mathematical terms by the author elsewhere (*Pravachana-Sāra*). Time has *Urdhva-Prachaya* whereas the other Dravyas have *Tiryak-Prachaya*. In the language of Modern Mathematics the former term corresponds to mono-dimensional asymmetrical series, the latter multi-dimensional series. According to Mathematical Philosophy extension is multi-dimensional series. *Kāyatva* therefore is generated by *Tiryak-Prachaya* but *Urdhva-Prachaya* cannot be associated with extension since it is unilateral. Therefore time is not an *Astikāya*. More of this in the general introduction.

110

The fruit of contemplating upon these facts—Panchāstikaya.

Sanskrit rendering

एने कालाकाशे धर्माधर्मौ च पुद्गला जीवा ।

लभन्ते द्रव्यसंज्ञां कालस्य तु नास्ति कायत्वं ॥ १०६ ॥

एवं प्रवयणसारं पञ्चत्थियसंग्रहं वियाणित्ता । ✓

जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुखपरिमोक्खं ॥११०॥*

110. Thus one who with the knowledge of, and faith in this short summary of Panchāstikāya—the essence of the Divine word gives up desire and aversion (towards worldly things) realises freedom from sorrow.

COMMENTARY.

Here the author indicates the path to eternal bliss. The path consists of the three jewels or *Ratna Traya*. Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. सन्त्यक् दर्शनं ज्ञानं चारित्र्यं मोक्षमार्गः । and *Samyak Darśanam* is defined to be *Tattvārta Śraddhānam*. The *Tattvas* are the existence described in short in Panchastikāya or the reality itself may be considered as a system of Panchāstikāyas. One who believes in the nature of reality, one who tries to understand its constituent elements must next try to realise his own true nature. When faith and knowledge get the co-operation of effort or *charitra* then there is the surity of heavenly bliss

111.

Then the manner of obtaining such a freedom.

मुणिकण एतदट्ठं तदणुगमणुज्झदो निहदमोहो ।

पसमियरागद्वेसो हवदि हदपरावरो जीवो ॥ १११ ॥†

111. Whoever knowing this truth (that self is the greatest reality) endeavours to reach or realise the same gets free from spiritual stupidity or *Darśna Mohaniya*, and as the result of that, roots out desire and aversion (*charitra Mohaniya*), and finally becomes the conqueror of *Samsāra*.

* Sanskrit rendering :

एवं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसङ्ग्रहं विज्ञाय ।

यो मुञ्चति रागद्वेषौ स गाहते दुःखपरिमोक्षं ॥ ११० ॥

† Sanskrit rendering :

ज्ञात्वैतदर्थं तदनुगमनोद्यतो निहतमोहः ।

प्रशमितरागद्वेषो भवति हतपरापरो जीव ॥ १११ ॥

COMMENTARY

He describes the order of events that ends in Moksha. The greatest thing mentioned in this SCRIPTURE is the SELF. Whoever understands the glorious nature of self-consciousness cannot but attempt to realise the same. On account of that effort the wall round the faculty of faith or Darsana Mohaniya gets removed. By the removal of this ignorance dawns the knowledge of SELF. Through self-knowledge the rooting out of desire and aversion the destruction of Charitra Mohaniya or the palsy of the good will. Hence the shattering of kârmic shackles ; then with freedom radiates the eternal glory of the Divine Person.

Thus ends the Book I.

BOOK II.
NINE PADĀRTHAS;
112.

The six Dravyas and the five Astikayas are of two kinds, life and non-life. These two things life and non-life form the two primary elements among seven Tattvas and nine Padārthas. Besides these two the other Tattvas and Padārthas are derivative. They are due to the combination or separation of these two primary Tattvas. Life and non life. On account of combination occur the following Padārthas, Punya (virtue), Pāpa (vice), Āsava (incoming of Karma) and Bandha (bondage). The four which lead to Samsāra, originating by their separation the following Padārthas occur. Samvara (prevention of incoming Karma), Nirjara (withering away of existing Karma), Moksha (emancipation from all Karma or Freedom). Of these Moksha Tattva is the most important, being the summum Bonum of life. The path to this goal is described by the author who begins by praying to the last of the Jinas, Lord Mahāvīra who revealed the path.

अभिवन्दिष्ये शिरसा अपुनर्भवकारणं महावीरं ।

तेषां पदार्थभङ्गं मार्गं मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥ ११२ ॥*

112. Bowing my head in reverence to Mahāvīra, the saviour of the world, I describe those two primary Padārthas life and non-life, and the various derivative Padārthas and also the path to heaven.

COMMENTARY.

This *Namaskara sloka* is *Mudhyahamangala* (Salutation for the middle of the books). The author worships Vardhamana Mahāvīra, the last of the Tīrthankaras, he is considered to be the revealer of the true path. All *Sastras* are traced to Mahāvīra as the originator.

In the second book the author is concerned with the career of life. In the first book, he described in detail the nature of the constitutive elements of the world. In the second book he is going to follow the spiritual evolution. Evolution or development implies a struggle and

*Sanskrit rendering

अभिवन्द्य शिरसा अपुनर्भवकारणं महावीरं ।
तेषां पदार्थभङ्गं मार्गं मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥ ११२ ॥

the primary conditions of struggles are Jiva and Ajiva, life and non-life. Jiva is situated in an environment of Ajiva or non-living things. Of the Ajiva's matter is of primary importance. The struggle is mainly between life and matter. According to the Jaina doctrine the struggle is without beginning. The spiritual evolution consists in progressive emancipation of Jiva from physical shackles.

The reality therefore is looked at from a different angle of vision. The different aspects of the struggle and evolution form the Tattvas and the Padārthas. The author is no more concerned with Astikāyas and Dravyas. The very same group appear in another form. The Mula Tattvas or the primary elements, are Jiva and its non-living environment. By the combination and separation of Jiva and Ajiva are generated, the other Tattvas and Padārthas which are derivative and secondary. The central actor in the Drama is Jiva. And the culmination of the development is Moksha. The second book therefore is concerned with the career of life from Samsāra to Moksha.

113.

First the author takes up *Mokshāmārga* or the path to heaven as he wants to describe it in short.

सम्मत्तणजुत्तं चारित्तं रागदोसपरिहोणं ।

मोक्खस्स हवदि मग्गो भव्वाणं लद्धुद्धोणं ॥ ११३ ॥*

113. Right conduct uninfluenced by the desire or aversion, together with right faith and right knowledge, forms the path to heaven to those faithful Jivas who realise self knowledge through the five attainments or Labdhis.

COMMENTARY.

Here the author indicates the path to Moksha or the three jewels. The Gātha is merely the paraphrase of the very first Sutra of *Tattvarthadhigama*.

Three elements constitute the path. Darsana, or belief, Jñāna knowledge and Charitra or conduct. But all the three must be of the

*Sanskrit rendering:

सम्यक्त्वा ज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्रं रागद्वेषपरिहीनं ।

मोक्षस्य भवति मार्गो भव्यानां लब्धयुद्दीनां ॥ ११३ ॥

the right sort Belief in the true nature of reality is Darśana, which is right. This Samyak Darsana, is considered to be the result of suppression or eradication of that particular Karma called Darsana Mohaniya whose function is to blind that faculty of belief or Darsana. The understanding of the nature of these Tattvas, the constitutive categories of reality is Samyak Jñāna. The term Samyak implies the absence of doubt and error Conduct as conditioned by right belief and right knowledge is Samyaka Charitra or right conduct.

These form the indispensable elements of the *Moksha mārga*. Unless all the three are present there would be no path.

In this Gātha the author indicates eight main conditions of the path.

1 The co-operation of right belief and right knowledge, without these there would be no path.

2. Conduct is the main constituent element ; not any conduct but only right conduct.

3. This implies that there should be no *Rāga* or *Dvesha*, Desire or aversion, the presence of these would nullify the *Mārga*.

4. Conduct of that kind forms the path to Moksha or liberation, but does not lead to Bandha or bondage

5. The path so constituted is the right and the reliable one ; and as such it is distinct from several *Mithya Mārgās* or false paths

6. The path is available only to *Bhavya Jīvas* or the good matured ones and not to *Abhavyā*s of intrinsic evil disposition.

7 Even among the *Bhavyas* only to those who secured five attainments or the *Panča Labdhis* but not to those who had not those attainments.

8 Only those who have eradicated completely all *Kashāyas* or the gross emotions which have the tendency to stain the purity of self ; but one in whom such emotions are still present cannot walk the path of righteousness

The three elements constituting the *path* are the three jewels, or *Ratnatraya*. This *Ratnatraya* is spoken to be of two kinds *Nischaya Ratnatraya* and *Vyavahāra Ratnatraya*. The former is from the absolute point of view and the latter is of relative point of view. When the *Ratnatraya* is distinctly based upon self then it is *Nischaya*

Ratnatraya. Darsana, Jñāna and Chāritra, all have reference to self and self alone. This *Nischaya Ratnatraya* first implies the belief in the ultimate nature and importance of self, i.e., the belief that *Paramātmā* is nothing but self. Again consequent upon this firm belief there must be knowledge of self. Complete knowledge of self is the next element of the *Nischaya Ratnatraya*. The knowledge of all other Tattvas centres round the Personality. Knowledge of the Person therefore is knowledge *par excellence*. And lastly realisation of the *Paramātmā* or the great Person would be Charitra *par excellence*.

Vyavahāra Ratnatraya is constituted by Darsana Jñāna and Chāritra which are based upon *Parātattoās* or objective ideals. Belief in an objective divinity independent of our Self for example, would be *Vyavahāra Darsana*. Knowledge of such alien entities would be *Vyavahāra* knowledge and attempting to realise our ideals and aspirations through the help of such alien personalities either through sacrifices or propitiations is *Vyavahāra Charitra*. These three constitute *Vyavahāra Ratnatraya*.

The five *Labdhis* referred to in the Gātha are, (1) *Kshāyopasamā Labdhi*, (2) *Desana Labdhi*, (3) *Prayogya Labdhi*, (4) *Visudhālabdhi*, and (5) *Karanālabdhi*.

स्वयमेव समिध्विसोहि देशनाप्रयोग्यकरणलब्धी य ।

चत्वारि वि सामान्याः करणं पुनर्होदि सम्मत्ते ॥*

गोममटसारः Jivakānda, gātha 650

To Samsāri Jiva there is continuous fruition of old and existing Karmas and combination with novel and incoming Karmas. On account of this Karmic encircling there should be no chance for such a Jiva to realise its pure and perfect form independent of Kārmic effects. Then how can we talk of Moksha or Emancipation for Samsāri Jivās or the worldly souls ?

By way of reply to this objection from the disciple the Master says " You have seen this in your experience—that a hero watches

*Sanskrit rendering

स्वायमेव समिध्विसोहिः देशनाप्रयोग्यकरणलब्धिश्च ।

चत्वारोपि सामान्यः करणं पुनः भवति सम्यक्त्वे ॥

for an opportunity for vanquishing his enemy. Whenever the enemy is in his minimum strength on account of several reasons, the hero without losing the chance carefully prepares for the struggle making use of his mature deliberation and select instruments. Thus is the enemy vanquished."

Similary Samsārī Jīva embarrassed by ancient as well as fresh Kārmic enemies patiently waits for an opportune moment. As a natural consequence of Kārmic matter duration may come to an end ; or its intensity and fertility may be declining to minimums. At that moment the *Bhavya Jīva* which is patiently aspiring for spiritual greatness, strikes with vehemence and vanquishes the enemy. This suppression of Karmas at their weakest moment is *Kṣayaopasama Labdhi* No. 1.

After this initial assertion of spiritual independence their may appear a change of disposition in the nature of Jīva which may thereafter be hankering for good. This hankering for good may manifest in good and useful conduct (*punya*) ; and as such it may be the condition for *Punya Karma Āsava*. Nevertheless the declension of the disposition towards good is *Viśvadhā Labdhi* No. 2.

Then with this changed disposition Jīva may have the good fortune to obtain a master who would instruct him in the path. This instruction may lead to the removal of ignorance and error and to the acquisition of Jñāna. This may guarantee progress for the Jīva along the rungs of spiritual ladder. This good fortune of obtaining instruction is *Upadesa Labdhi*. (*Desana*) No. 3.

The duration and intensity of some Karmas may go on mutually aggravating each other to their maximum. After reaching the maximum they have to decline of their own accord. This declining stage of Karmas after reaching maximum is another opportunity known as *Prayogyata Labdhi* (co relative of Kārmic glow) No. 4.

Again after reaching a certain stage in the spiritual development—*Guṇasthānās*, their may appear certain psychic instruments, e.g., *Sukladhyana*. This attainment of spiritual instruments and other supernormal powers is known as *Kāraṇa Labdhi* No. 5.

These are the Labdhis or attainments which a Jīva by good fortune may secure

These *Labdhis* are not to be confounded with what are known as *Navā Kevala Labdhis* Nine attainments about the time of Kevala Jñāna.

At the *Kevali* stage of development the following facts happen to the person.

1. The all penetrating *Kevala Jñāna* which is the result of annihilation of the *veil* of knowledge

2. The all illuminating perception or *Kevala Darsana* or *Kshâyika Darsana*, which is also the concomitant of the destruction of the veil of perception.

3. The all merciful attitude of the great spiritual Harmony known as *Kshâyika Abhaya Dānam*.

4 Even after relinquishing all kinds of good and nourishment, in order to maintain the *Surira* for a time there is the incoming or assimilation of subtle physical principles This is *Kshâyika Lābha* gain or income after *Kshâyika* state.

5. Then this happy events introduced by Indras -such as showing flowers over head is *Kshâyika Bhoga*. This is the consequence of complete annihilation of *Bhogantaraya Karma*.

6 Similary the introduction of *Simhasana*. (Lion thrones) Chattra, *Chamara*, etc , (umbrella, etc ,) is *Kshâyikaupabhoga* which is the consequence of destruction of *Upbhogantaraya Karma*.

7 Then the realisations of Omnipotence. *Ananta viriya* which is the result of complete eradication of *Viryantaray Karma*.

8. Then by this complete destruction of the seven *mula prakritis* (fundamental Karmas) happens *Kshâyika Simyaktoam* Absolute Belief in the true nature of Reality.

9 And finally *Kshâyika Châritra*. This implies the absolutely self-determined thought activity of the pure and perfect person *Siddha* or *Arhanta* This thought activity is again the consequence of absolute emancipation from all *Upādhis*

The former class of *Labdhis* is always referred to as *Pancha Labdhi's* and the latter as *Navakevala Labdhis* in Sastras in order to avoid confusion. Therefore it is not necessary to emphasise the difference further.

It is enough to remember that Pancha Labdhis have reference to (*Samsari Jina*), and Navakevala Labdhi to *Mukta Jina*.

114

Then Vyavahāra Samyak Darsana is described.

एवं जिणपण्णत्ते सद्वहमाणस्स भावदो भावे ।

पुरिसस्साभिणिबोहे दंसणसद्धो हवदि जुते ॥ ११४ ॥

114. If a person who thus with great interest believes in the Padārthas revealed by Jina obtains *Matī Jñāna*. Then in his case the term *Darsanika* "he is a believer" has relevancy.

COMMENTARY.

To believe in the real nature of *Ātma* and other Padārthas is *Vyavahāra Samyaktva*. Conventional or relative belief This is the popular means of attaining salvation. The real immediate condition of salvation is the suppression or Annihilation of the *Sapta Prakritis* or seven fundamental kinds of Kārmic matter.

These are :—

1. Anantanubandhi Krodha.
2. Anantanubandhi Māna.
3. Anantanubandhi Māyā.
4. Anantanubandhi Lobha.
5. Samyaktva.
6. Mithyātva.
7. Samyak Mithyatva.

These seven constitute the *Sapta Prakritis*. The Prakritis 1 to 4 are sub-divisions of Charitra Mohaniya and the other three of Darsana Mohaniya.

If these get abated then there is the chance for *Samyak Darsana* or right belief.

115.

Then the description of the nature of the three Jewels or *Ratnatraya*.

सम्मतं सद्वृहणं भावार्ण तेसिमधिगमो णणं ।
चारित्तं समभावो विसयेसु विरुद्धमग्गाणं ॥ ११५ ॥*

115 Belief in the real existences or Tattvas is the right faith Knowledge of their real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world is right conduct. These three are found in those who know the path.

COMMENTARY.

The Gātha may be interpreted either as referring to *Vyavahāra Ratnatraya* or to *Nischaya Ratnatraya* The description of the three jewels may be consistent with the relative path or with the absolute path

In describing Samyak Darsana and Samyak Jñāna right belief and knowledge, the author indicates the nine Padarthas which are the objects of the said belief and knowledge The Second Book mainly treats of the nine Padarthas, And the description of the *Ratnatraya* may be considered as an indirect introduction to the Padarthas which are .—

1. Jiva = life.
2. Ajiva = non-life.
3. Pāpa = sin
4. Punya = virtue.
5. Âsrava = flow-in of Karmas.
6. Samvara = the prevention of the incoming Karmas.
7. Nirjara = eradication of Karmas
8. Bandha = bondage.
9. Moksha = liberation or emancipation.

The first two are the primary Padarthas and the others are derivative.

* Sanskrit rendering

सम्यक्त्वं श्रद्धानं भावानां तेषामधिगमो ज्ञानं ।
चारित्र्यं समभावो विषयेष्वविरुद्धमार्गाणाम् ॥ ११५ ॥

116.

Of the nine Padārthas or categories Moksha is the most important, as it is the goal of life. Hence *Ratnatraya* which is the means to realise the goal was first described. Then the nine categories or Padārthas are enumerated in detail

जीवाजीवा भावा पुण्यं पापं च आसवं तैसि ।

संवरणिज्जरबंधो मोक्षश्च य हवन्ति ते अष्टा ॥ ११६ ॥*

116. Life and non-life (Jiva and Ajiva) are the two primary Padārthas. Out of these appear righteousness (Punya), sin (Pāpa), their source or inflow (Āsrava) their prevention (Samvara) their partial annihilation (Nirjāta) Bondage (Bandha) and Salvation (Moksha). These are the nine Padārthas.

COMMENTARY.

Of these Jiva or life alone has consciousness. Ajiva is so called because of the absence of consciousness. These are the five Dravyas mentioned previously matter, space, condition of motion and that of rest, and finally time. These five constitute the non-life. Life and non-life are the root Padārthas. Seven other Padārthas enumerated above originate from the different relations of Jiva to Padgala or matter.

Purity of thought in self is the subjective righteousness or Bhava Punya. As conditioned by this there is the corresponding objective righteousness of Kārmic matter, or Dravya Punya. Similarly evil thought or the impurity of the heart is known as subjective sin or Bhāva Pāpa. As the result of this there is the Kārmic matter or Dravya Pāpa, whose nature is vicious. The appearance of lust, desire, and aversion, is the subjective influx of Karmās, Bhavāsrava. As the concomitant of these affective states Kārmic matter flows in towards the soul, which flowing is Dravyāsrava or the physical current of Karmās. Suppressing the states of lust, desire, and aversion

*Sanskrit rendering

जीवाजीवौ भावौ पुण्यं पापं चासवस्तयो ।

संवरणिर्जनरब्ध्या मोक्षश्च भवन्ति ते अर्था ॥ ११६ ॥

by the principle of renunciation is the subjective inhibition or prevention which is *Bhāva Samvāta*. This refers to the closing up of the spring of evil thought as the concomitant of this Psychic inhibition of evil, there appears the withering away of Kārmic matter which is *Dravya Nirjarā*. *Moha* or spiritual stupor, desire, and aversion, these bring about a characteristic proneness, towards Kārmic matter in the nature of Jiva. This proneness towards the Kārmic environment is of the nature of Psychic disposition which spins out a cocoon of evil thoughts enshrouding the self. This is *Bhāva Bandha*. On account of this disposition there results the settling in of kārmic matter on the Jiva. This is objective bondage or *Dravya Bandha*. Lastly realisation of the purest and perfect self after complete emancipation from evil is the subjective salvation or *Bhāva Moksha*. The absolute annihilation of Kārmic matter and the liberation of Jiva from the physical shackles is the objective Moksha or *Dravya Moksha*. In all these cases the Bhāva aspects refer to Jiva and the Dravya aspects to matter.

117.

Then the duality of Jiva the first of the Padarthas

जीवा संसारत्वा णिव्वादा चेदणप्पमा दुविहा ।
उवओगलक्खणा वि य देहादेहप्पवीचारा ॥ ११७ ॥*

117. Having the nature of consciousness, characterised by Upayoga—faculties of perception and understanding, Jivas are of two kinds. One incarnate of the world; and the other discarnate of heaven.

COMMENTARY

- * Chetanā or conscious nature and its manifestation through perception and understanding are the intrinsic characteristics of all Jivas which are of two classes. Samsari Jivas and Mukta Jivas. The former has the limitation of Upādhis, Samsari Jivas are always associated with some kind of body, gross or subtle. The Mukta Jiva

* Sanskrit rendering

जीवा संसारत्वा निवृत्ताः चेतनात्मका द्विविधा ।
उपयोगलक्षणा अपि च देहादेहप्रवीचारा ॥ ११७ ॥

is free from such bodily limitations, because of complete emancipation from material conditions Kārmic and non Kārmic. As a result of *Upādhis*, *Chetana* and *Upayoga* of the former get limited and encircled and as a result of the destruction of *Upādhis* the very same become perfect and pure in the case of *Siddhas*.

The five kinds of *Sarīras* have already been mentioned

118.

Samsāri souls are again twofold—fixed ones and the moving ones. The fixed ones or the *Sthāvara* Jivas are here described.

पृथ्वी य उदगमगणी वाउवणप्फदिजीवसंसिदा काया? ।
देति खलु मोहबहुलं फासं बहुगा वि ते तेषां ॥ ११८ ॥*

118 Vitalised by Jivas are the following bodies —Earth, water, fire, air, and also plants. These are many in number. They yield to their respective Jivas only one kind of feeling contact; and that too associated with highly intensified stupor of ignorance

COMMENTARY

This Gatha refers to *Ekendriya* Jivas. Jivas having only one sense. These as a result of their Kārmic intensity may degenerate to such an extent as to be associated with the five kinds of physical objects enumerated above. Earth, water, fire, air and plants. These kinds of physical objects are used as bodies by these Jivas

There is no difficulty in understanding the organic nature of the plant world especially after the discoveries of Dr Bose, it is not necessary to elaborately defend that plants are living organisms. But the organic nature of the other four kinds, earth, water, fire and air, is somewhat obscure. The commentators themselves do not help us in the difficulty, so much so, that some of the European Scholars who have studied Jainism have come to the conclusion that Jainism is very primitive since it believes in the existence of souls in material and inorganic things. This argument of the existence of primitive

*†Sanskrit rendering

पृथिवी चोदकमग्निर्वायुवनस्पती जीवसंश्रिताः काया ।
ददति खलु मोहबहुलं स्पर्शं बहुका अपि ते तेषां ॥ ११८ ॥

beliefs in Jaina system is brought forward in favour of the antiquity of Jainism. Certainly it is very pleasing to be assured of a hoary past ; but it is no compliment to Jainism if its beliefs are identified with the primitive notions of the Hottentot.

It is almost incredible to believe that Jaina thinkers with their uncompromising dualistic attitude accepted the doctrine that *Achetana* physical objects had souls of their own. The definitions of Jiva and Pīḍaḷa are clearly unmistakable. There is no possibility of any confusion. Mutually they are as much contradictory to a Jaina thinker as to a *cartesian* philosopher.

The clue to the difficulty is supplied by the doctrine that the four kinds of *Ekeन्द्रiya* Jivas associated with fire, air, earth and water are *Sūkshma Ekeन्द्रiya* Jivas, i.e., microscopic organisms having only one sense. That the Jainas believed in the existence of microscopic organisms needs no elaborate evidence. The rules of conduct prescribed for Jaina *Grihastas* and *Yatis* are sufficient testimony. Again this interpretation is further strengthened by the following point. All the five kinds of *Sthavira* Jivas are considered to have four kinds of *Prānās* or life principles

1. Feelings of Contact.
2. *Kayabala Prāna* or strength of body
3. *Uchhvasa Nischvasa Prāna* or respiration.
4. *Ayuh Prāna* or duration of life

To suppose that these four *Pranas* are associated with really inorganic bodies would be inconsistent with the other aspects of the system. Therefore it is incumbent upon us to emphasize that the Jivas associated with inorganic bodies are mainly *Sūkshma Ekeन्द्रiya* Jivas or microscopic organisms, for it is only with an organism that *Prānās* can be consistently associated.

This does not remove all our difficulties. Whether there can be organisms associated with fire is still an unintelligible problem. We don't want to dogmatise on the matter. Evidently for the sake of symmetry fire is added on to the enumeration of the other kinds of physical forms. We can only confess that the doctrine for want of sufficient light from the commentators remains a very obscure part of Jaina thought leading to strange conjectures. Where there

is scope for speculation we beg to offer our own Hypothesis as an alternative interpretation.

119.

These have monosensic and non Psychic vitalism.

एदे जीवणिकाया पंचविहा पुढविकाइयादीया ।

मणपरिणामविरहिदा जीवा एगेंदिया भणिया ॥ ११९ ॥*

119. These Jivas such as the earth-bodied ones are of five different castes. All of them are devoid of mental states. They have a single sense So are they described in the scripture

COMMENTARY.

The author points out that these *Sthavara* Jivas are utterly devoid of Psychic states They have only one kind of feeling of contact. This description indicates a difference between the botanical and the zoological realms and the *Sukshma Ekendriyas* or the microscopic organisms of the four kinds also share the nature of the plant world.

120

Though devoid of mental states they are not non-conscious in essence. Really they are to be considered as unconscious but not non-conscious. The author explains by illustration their unconscious nature

७'डेसु पवहु'ता गभ्मत्था माणुसा य मुच्छगया ।

जारिसया तारिसया जीवा एगेंदिया जेयाः ॥ १२० ॥†

120. Just as life or *Chetana* is associated with unconsciousness in the following cases eggs, foetus growing in mother's womb and the man in a trance so also the monosensic

* Sanskrit rendering

एते जीवणिकाया पञ्चविधाः पृथ्वीकायिकाद्या ।

मन परिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया भणिताः ॥ ११९ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering —

अण्डेषु प्रवर्द्धमाना गर्भस्था मानुषाश्च मूर्च्छां गता ।

यादृशास्तादृशा जीवा एकेन्द्रिया ज्ञेयाः ॥ १२० ॥

organisms are unconscious, though having life or Chetana. Thus be it understood

COMMENTARY

The author establishes that these monosensic beings have life and also potential Chetanā or consciousness. It is ordinarily acknowledged that there is life and consciousness in the germ in the case of eggs, foetuses, and in men in trance. Here unconsciousness is no objection to the belief of their living nature. Similarly these monosensic organisms though devoid of consciousness have life and potensy for consciousness.

121

Then the author by way of illustration enumerates some of the organisms having two sense organs

संवृक्कमादुवाहा संखा सप्पी अपागदा य किमी ।
जाणंति रसं फासं जे ते वे इंदिया जीवाः ॥ १२१ ॥*

121 Sea snail, cowrie shell fish, conch shell fish, mother o pearl and earth-worm are organisms which have two senses, touch and taste. Hence are they bisensic

122

Then author enumerates some of the organisms having three senses

जूगागुंभीमक्कणपिपीलया विच्छियादिया कीडा ।
जाणंति रसं फासं गंधं ते इंदिया जीवा ॥ १२२ ॥†

122. The louse, the bug, the red and ordinary scorpion, the ant and other insects have three senses are triacsthetic.

* Sanskrit rendering —

संवृक्कमादुवाहाः शङ्खा सुक्तयोऽपादका. क्रमय. ।
जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं ये ते इन्द्रियाः जीवा ॥ १२१ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering —

यूकाकुम्भीमत्कुणपिपीलिका वृश्चिकादय कीडा ।
जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं गन्धं त्रिन्द्रिया. जीवा ॥ १२२ ॥

123.

Then the author enumerates some of the organisms having four senses.

उद्दंसमसयमविखयमधुकरभमरा पतंगमादीया ।

रूपं रसं च गन्धं फासं पुण ते वि जाणंति ॥ १२३ ॥*

123. Again, the Gadfly, the mosquito, the fly, the bee, the beetle and the dragon fly and the butterfly—These organisms experience, touch, taste, smell and sight hence they are quadraesthetic—have four senses.

124.

Then the beings with five senses, are enumerated

सुरणरणारयतिरिया वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्दण्हू ।

जलचरथलजरखचरा वलिया पंचेंदिया जीवा ॥ १२४ ॥†

124. *Devas*, human beings, hell beings, and higher animals all these have five senses, colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. Some of the animals are water animals, some land animals and some birds of the air. There are very strong ones also among these

COMMENTARY.

The classification of *Jivās* according to sense organs is based more upon the behaviour of insects and animals, than on the structure. In the case of bisensic insects given in *Gāthā* 121, the classification seems to be correct. Taking the sea snail for example it has touch all over the body and very sensitive in the tentacles on the head. It has no tongue but the base of the respiratory organs determines the kind of water that should enter the respiratory chamber. The mobile lips

*Sanskrit rendering —

उद्दंसमशकमक्षिका मधुकरी भ्रमरा पतङ्गाद्या ।

रूपं रसं च गन्धं स्पर्शं पुनस्नेऽपि जानन्ति ॥ १२३ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering —

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दज्ञा ।

जलचरस्थलचरखचरा वलिन पञ्चेन्द्रिया जीवाः ॥ १२४ ॥

of the snail also act as gustatory organs. There is no special auditory organ but there is an organ in the foot, called the otocyst which enables the creature to keep its balance in the water. This evidently corresponds to the semicircular canals of the human ear whose function is to determine the positions of our body in space. Generally they have some sensitive parts to light also, but this is not considered as an eye by the author. *Cornu*, *conch*, and mother of pearl have similar structures and ordinary earth worms also have the sense of contact and some kind of gustatory sense. In their case also the skin is sensitive to light, but it is treated as insignificant.

Next in the case of organisms with three senses the enumeration contains some dubious specimens. The louse and the bug have the sense of touch, taste and smell. Ants also have these three senses. But some of them have sight also. But ordinarily their sense of smell is the most predominant. Lord Alibon, Sir John Lubbock after several years of patient observation comes to the conclusion that ants become aware of objects in the environment only through smell. But in the case of caterpillars and scorpions there are eyes. But anyhow they are included under this class.

In the next class are included the mosquitoes, flies, bees, etc. These insects have clearly four senses. Contact, taste, smell and sight. But in the case of some for example, beetle and the bee a peculiar humming sound is produced. Naturalists suppose that these insects must respond to sound and they have some organ in the abdomen which is supposed to be responsive to sound vibrations. Whether what they experience is sound or some other vague sensation of contact nobody can be certain. Therefore we may take the author's description as almost accurate. Lastly many of the higher animals and human beings are included under the next class, five sensed organisms. They have also sense of hearing to boot. But the distinction between other higher animals and human beings is that the latter have a well developed consciousness. These are *Sumanaska Panchendriya Jivas*, whereas the other *Panchendriya Jivas* are devoid of mind. Evidently the distinction implies the presence of self-consciousness in the one class and the absence of the same in the other.

Then the author enumerates the several subspecies of the four

fundamental kinds of *Jivas* already differentiated according to the four *gatis*

देवा चउणिकाया मणुया पुण कम्मभोगभूमीया ।

तिरिया बहुप्पयारा णेरइया पुढविभेयगदा ॥ १२५ ॥*

125. *Devas* are of four classes Human beings are of two classes. Inhabitants of *Kāma Bhoomi* and those of *Bhoga Bhoomi* Animals are of numerous kinds. Hell beings of seven according to their respective regions.

COMMENTARY.

This *Gātha* presupposes the peculiar Jain cosmogony According to the Jainas *Loka* is arranged in three orders, the lower world, the middle world and the upper world. In the upper world there are different regions one above the other, so also in the lower world. The different regions of the upper world are inhabited by *Devas*, the different regions of the lower world one below the other are inhabited by beings thrown into hell The conception is something analogous to that of *Dante*.

This *Gātha* classifies *jivās* according to the principle of *gati*, i.e., the principle of *gatimārgana*. But the previous *gathas* had the classification according to the principle of sense organs or *Indriya Margaṇā*.

Devas are said to be of four kinds.—

Vide—*Tattvārtha Sutra Chapter IV, Bhavanavasis, Vyantaras, Jyotiṣkas, kalpavasis, or Vaimānikas* Each class is further subdivided into several species. Each sub class has its own special characteristics physical and Psychical, and has the characteristic periods of life. It is not possible to enter into the details

The hell beings are seven According to the hells inhabited by them. The seven hells are, *Ratna Prabha, Saṅkara Prabha, Valuka, Panka, Dhuma, Tama, and Maha Tama*. The hell beings again have their respective characteristics of suffering, age, and other

*Sanskrit rendering —

देवाश्चतुर्निकायाः मनुजा पुनः कर्मभोगभूमिजाः ।

तिर्यञ्चः बहुप्रकाराः नारकाः पृथिवीभेदगताः ॥ १२५ ॥

Psycho-physical characteristics with graduated intensity. These two classes of beings are only of doctrinal importance to us.

Coming to human beings and animals the principle of classification is much simpler. The animals are recognised to be of numerous species, and human beings again are divided into two classes those born in *Karma Bhoomi* and those born in *Bhoga Bhoomi*. This classification is again only the result of the peculiar geography of the Jaina system. Geography and cosmogony form an important branch of Jaina Literature. It is one of the four *Anuyogas*. Jainas recognise four main departments of their Scripture (1) *Prathamānuyoga* dealing with the life of the *Tirthankaras* and the other great personalities. (2) *Karanānuyoga* dealing with the structure and constitution of *Loka*, the cosmos. (3) *Charanānuyoga*, dealing with principles of conduct prescribed for the householder as well as *Sannyast*. (4) *Dravyānuyoga* dealing with the metaphysical aspects of reality. Jainas whenever they speak of *Jivas* and other *Dravyas*, always assume the special constitution of the world according to their religious dogma. If more detailed knowledge of these things is desired reference must be made to treatises on *Lohasvarūpa* or the form of the world.

126

Jivas described according to the different *Gati Marganas*, are not to be supposed to maintain that state permanently. *Jivas* undergo several modifications assuming different states of existence with the different durations of life. Thus do they roam about in *Samsara*.

खीणे पुव्वणिवट्ठे गदिणामे आउसे च ते वि खलु ।
पापुण्णंति य अप्पणं गदिमाउस्सं सलेसवसा ॥ १२६ ॥*

126. When the existing *Karmas* determining the *gati* and the age of a *Jīva*, decay, then that *Jīva* get into another *gati* with a different duration of life as determined by its last conative state or aspiration known as *Lesyā*.

*Sanskrit rendering —

क्षीणे पूर्वनिवट्ठे गतिनास्ति आयुषि च तेऽपि खलु ।
प्राप्नुवन्ति चान्यां गतिमायुष्कं स्वलेस्यावशात् ॥ १२६ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The *Gatî* or state of existence of a particular *Jîva* is determined by a particular *Karma* known as *Gatînamakarma*. So is the duration of a particular *Jîva* determined by *Ayuh Karma*. When these two *Karmas* exhaust themselves to the very last then age of the *Jîva* will come to an end and the *Jîva* has to change its state of existence : i. e. it will have to enter into another *Gatî* with a different duration of life. This entrance into the next state is generally determined by *Karmas* acquired during the lifetime. But the fundamental factor which immediately determines the passage into the other stage must be determined by *Gatînamakarma* and *Ayuh Karma* of the succeeding stage. *Jîva* before quitting a particular *Gatî* acquires these two fresh *Karmas* determined by the last conative state or *Lesyâ*. The term *Lesyâ* is used not in its usual sense. In this place it implies merely the particular activity of *Yoga* or *Mana*, *vachana*, *kaya*, manifesting in the last desire or aspiration of life. This *lesyâ* may be pure or impure according to the ideal aimed at. And according to its value it forms the two *Karmas* in their pure form or impure form. According to the determining antecedent *Karmas* the *Jîva* incarnates in a particular place with a particular body and with particular Psycho-physical development. Thus he may have a pleasant life or drag on a miserable existence.

127

But the *Samsâric* cycle is not eternal for *Jîva*. On account of *Labdhis* or lucky spiritual attainments a *Jîva* may realise the three jewels. Then it may free itself from *Kârmic* matter as gold is purified from drops. Then it is the pure self.

एदे जीवणिकाया देहप्पविचारमस्सिदा भणिदा ।

देहविहूणा सिद्धा भव्वा संसारिणो अभव्वा य ॥१२७॥*

127. These different classes of *Jîvas* are again said to be of two kinds incarnate ones and discarnate ones. The latter are *Siddhas* ; whereas (the former) are the *samsari* souls who are again of two species *Bhavyas* and *Abhavyas*.

*Sanskrit rendering

एते जीवणिकाया देहप्रविचारमाश्रिता भणिताः ।

देहविहीनाः सिद्धाः भव्याः संसारिणोऽभव्याश्च ॥ १२७ ॥

COMMENTARY

Here the author summarises the nature of *Jivas*. The first principle of division is the possession of a body. All the incarnate ones are said to be *Samsari Jivas* and all the discarnate once are *Siddha Jivas* or pure souls. But the former class is again sub-divided, the principle of division being the capacity to become perfect. Those *Samsari Jivas* which have this capacity under special opportunities are called *Bhavyas* whereas those *Samsari Jivas* which have no such capacity are called *Abhavyas*.

This distinction of *Samsari Jivas* into *Bhavyas* and *Abhavyas* corresponds to Drummond's division of souls into organic and inorganic. The organic souls, given the proper opportunity, have the capacity to develop and attain spiritual perfection, whereas inorganic ones have no such capacity of spiritual growth. This is one of the Jain religious dogmas whose metaphysical basis is not quite clear. Most probably the distinction is as arbitrary as that of Drummond's.

128.

The five senses and the six bodies examined above are not essential elements of *Jiva*.

ण हि इंदियाणि जीवा काया पुण छप्पयार पणत्ता ।
जं हवदि तेसु णाणं जीवो त्ति य तं परूवन्ति ॥ १२८ ॥*

128 The five senses and the six kinds of bodies mentioned above these are not of the essence of soul. Whatever in the midst of these manifests as consciousness that they call by the name *Jiva*.

COMMENTARY

The sense organs and the various bodies are associated with *Jiva* only from the conventional point of view. The very same characteristics are really its accidental adjuncts. Senses such as touch taste, etc. and bodies such as earth body, etc., are not *Jiva*, because they have

*Sanskrit rendering

नहीन्द्रियाणि जीवाः कायाः पुन षट्प्रकाराः प्रज्ञप्ताः ।

यद्भवति तेषु ज्ञानं जीव इति च तत्प्रकल्पयन्ति ॥ १२८ ॥

nothing in common with the thought which is the true nature of *Jiva*. But in the midst of these sense organs and physical conditions there is the principle of consciousness which sheds light upon itself and other objects, i.e. which manifests as knowledge of the subject and the object. That thinking thing is said to be *Jiva* or soul

129

Then the author mentions the special characteristics of *Jiva*, characteristics which distinguish *Jiva* from material and other *Dravyas*

जाणदि परस्सदि सव्वं इच्छदि सुखं विभेदि दुखादो ।
कुव्वदि हिदमहिदं वा भुज्जदि जीवो फलं तेसिं ॥१२९॥*

129. What knows and perceives the various objects, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruit thereof—that is *Jivâ*.

COMMENTARY.

In this *Gâthâ* the characteristic behaviour of *Jivâ* is described. What is mentioned to be consciousness in the previous *Gâthâ* is here indicated by several purposeful activities which have meaning only with reference to consciousness. Perception and understanding of objects are the function of *Jivâ* or consciousness. This function cannot be associated with matter. So also is the tendency to desire pleasure and to avoid pain. It is distinctly the nature of life to continue beneficial activity and to discontinue harmful activity. Such conduct can have reference only to *Jivâ*. Inorganic mechanical activity can never exhibit such purposive nature. These various instances of purposeful activity as against mechanical activity clearly mark out *Jivâ* from the other *Dravyas*. The whole *gâthâ* then may be taken as the definition of *Jivâ* through its behaviour.

130.

The author summarises the characteristics of *Jivâ Padârtha* in the first half of the *Gâthâ* and introduces the other *Padârthas* in the second half.

* Sanskrit rendering .

जानाति पश्यति सर्वमिच्छति सौख्यं विभेति दुःखात् ।
करोति हितमहितं वा भुङ्क्ते जीवः फलं तयोः ॥ १२९ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Consciousness is not the only reality. There are several *Achetana* or nonconscious entities which are grouped under *Ajiva Padārtha*. In this respect Jaina thought is fundamentally distinct from the idealism which admits the reality of only one thing, consciousness. One tendency in philosophic thought tries to reduce everything to consciousness. The other tendency tries to maintain that matter alone is real and everything is unreal and derivative. Both these extremes are avoided by Jaina thought. There are conscious entities as well as non-conscious entities constituting the system of reality.

This *Gāthā* is said to be the condemnation of the *advaitic* view that everything is *Brahma*.

132

In this *Gāthā* the author explains what *Achetanatva* or non-consciousness means.

सुहृदुखजाणणा वा हिदपरियम्मं च अहिदभीरुत्तं ।
जस्स ण विज्जदि णिच्चं तं समणा विंति अज्जीवं ॥१३२॥*

132 Wherever such attributes of life are never found as the feeling of pleasure and pain, desiring only the beneficial activity and avoiding the harmful activity that the wise ones call *Ajiva* or non-life.

COMMENTARY.

What is *achetanatva* the characteristic of *Ajiva Padārthas*? That which has not got the fundamental characteristics of life. These characters are feeling pleasure, pain, continuing beneficial activity and avoiding harmful activity. Whatever is devoid of these characteristics is *Ajiva*. This may be taken as negative definition.

133

Though matter in the form of *karma* and *no-karma* is intimately related to *Jiva* yet it is quite distinct in nature.

*Sanskrit rendering

सुखदुःखज्ञानं वा हितपरिकर्म चाहितभीरुत्वं ।

यस्य न विद्यते नित्यं तं श्रमणा विन्दत्यजीवं ॥ १३२ ॥

संठाणा संघादा वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्धा य ।

पोग्गलदव्वप्पभवा होति गुणा पज्जया य बहू ॥१३३॥*

133. From, structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and sound, these are associated with matter. They are again of various kinds They are either attributes or modes of matter.

COMMENTARY.

The physical attributes are colour, taste, smell, sound and touch. Each of these is again of many kinds Configuration or form is innumerable according to the different forms of physical objects. Combination or structure is of infinite kinds The structure of *skandhas* from two atoms onwards is referred to These are modes of matter These modifications may be organic related to life or inorganic Just as the inorganic matter is distinct from life so also this organic matter distinct from it though associated with it.

134

If form, structure and other characteristics are not to be associated with *Jiva* than what is the real nature of *Jiva*.

अरसमरूपमगंधमव्वत्तं चेदणागणमसद्धं ।

जाण अलिंगगहणं जीवमणिद्दिट्ठसंठाणं ॥१३४॥†

134 Understand that life has no sense qualities of taste, smell colour, touch and sound It has no form either. It has only thought or consciousness

COMMENTARY

The several sense qualities associated with matter are not present in *Jiva* *Jiva* or life is not to be apprehended through sense perception Its nature is not to be inferred through any of its sense qualities for

*Sanskrit rendering

संस्थानानि संघाता वणरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।

पुद्गलद्रव्यप्रभवा भवन्ति गुणाः पर्यायाश्च बहवः ॥ १३३ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

अरसमरूपमगन्धमव्यक्तं चेतनागुणमशब्दं ।

जानीह्यल्लिङ्गग्रहणं जीवमनिर्दिष्टसंस्थानं ॥ १३४ ॥

it has no such attributes. Again it has no form corresponding to that of physical objects. *Jiva* is formless being spiritual. Such are the characteristics of life and consciousness.

Thus ends the Ajiva Padārtha.

135, 136 & 137.

After describing the primary categories of life and non-life the author goes to seven other derivative *Padārthas*, originating from either the synthesis or analysis of the two primary ones. *Jiva* and *Kârmic* matter are the primary generating categories for the rest. Hence these two are taken up here for examination.

जो खलु संसारत्थो जीवो तत्तो दु होदि परिणामो ।
परिणामादो कम्मं कम्मादो होदि गदिसु गदी ॥१३५॥
गदिमधिगदस्स देहो देहादो इंदियाणि जायन्ते ।
तेहि दु विसयग्रहणं तत्तो रागो व दोसो वा ॥१३६॥
जायदि जीवस्सेवं भावो संसारचक्रवालम्मि ।
इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदो अणादिणिधणो सणिधणोवा ॥१३७॥

135—7. To a *Jiva* in *Samsāra* desire and aversion will naturally occur. On account of these states *Kârmic* matter clings to the *Jiva*. The *Kârmic* bondage leads the *Jiva* through the four *Gatis* or states of existences. Entering into the *Gati*, *Jiva* builds up its own appropriate body, being embodied he gets the senses. Through the sense objects of the environment are pursued. From perception appears desire or aversion towards those objects and from desire the cycle begins again.

*Sanskrit rendering

यः खलु संसारत्थो जीवस्ततस्तु भवति परिणामः ।
परिणामात्कर्म कर्मणो भवति गतिषु गति ॥ १३५ ॥
गतिमधिगतस्य देहो देहादिन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।
तैस्तु विषयग्रहणं ततो रागो वा द्वेषो वा ॥ १३६ ॥
जायते जीवस्यैवं भावः संसारचक्रवाले ।
इति जिणवरैर्भणितोऽनादिनिधनः सनिधनो वा ॥ १३७ ॥

Thus desire brings *Karma*, *Karma* leads to *gati*, *gati*, means body, body implies senses, senses lead to perception, and perception again to desire or aversion and so on *adinfinitum*. But the cycle ends in the case of *Bhavya Jiva* whereas it is unending to the *Abhavyas*. But it has no beginning in either case. Thus is it taught by the *Jina*, the conqueror of *Samsāra*.

COMMENTARY

The author describes the causal series that constitute the cycle of *Samsara Jiva* according to Jaina doctrine is enshrouded by *Kārmic* conditions from eternity. On account of this association with *Kārmic* matter *Jiva* experiences the emotional states of desire, etc., These emotional states are conditioned by the *Kārmic upādhis*. But these states in their turn bring about the acquisition of fresh *Kārmic* matter. The acquisition of *Kārmic* matter means that the *Jiva* should manifest in any one of the four *gatis*. Manifestation means embodied existence. Body implies sense organs. Sense organs again are the windows for the soul to apprehend the environment. Awareness of the objects in the environment generates the affective states in the soul. These affective states once again begin the series of the above mentioned causal series.

Thus by the mutual interaction between mind and matter there appears the cycle of *Samsara*. In the case of the fortunates ones who are capable of spiritual emancipation this whirligig comes to an end. But in the case of the unfortunate ones who are incapable of spiritual salvation the cycle goes on for ever.

138

THEN THE CHAPTER ON PUNYA AND PĀPA OR VIRTUE AND VICE.

After describing the veil of *samsara* which is the condition of the nine categories or *padarthas* the author examines *Punya* and *Pāpa* and their respective Psychic antecedents.

मोहो रागो दोसो चित्तप्रसादो य जस्स भावम्मि ।
विज्जदि तस्स सुहो वा असुहो वा होदि परिणामो ॥१३८॥*

*Sanskrit rendering

मोहो रागो द्वेषश्चित्तप्रसादश्च यस्य भावे ।

विद्यते तस्य शुभो वा अशुभो वा भवति परिणामः ॥ १३८ ॥

138. Whatever *Jīva* has in himself *Moha*, corrupting the faculty of belief, desire and aversion, or the purity of thought is subject to the hedonic state of happiness or misery.

COMMENTARY

The Psychological conditions determining virtue and vice are described. *Moha* is the mental state brought about by the ripening of *Darsana Mohaniya Karma*. The *Kārma* that clouds the faculty of perception and belief *Raga* and *Dvesha*, desire and aversion, are the result of *Charitra Mohaniya*. The karma that misleads the will while the former misleads cognition. Thus when cognition and will are determined by the *Kārmic* conditions they may manifest in Volitional states marked by virtue or vice. If the objects of cognition and will is desirable and good then the mental state is *Subha Parinama*. If it is undesirable and bad then the mental state is *Asubha Parinama*. In the former case there results happiness to the individual whereas in the latter misery.

139

Next the author describes the subjective states of good and evil *Bhava Punya Pāpa* and their corresponding *karmic* conditions or *Dravya Punya Pāpa*.

सुहपरिणामो पुण्यं असुहो पावन्ति हवदि जीवस्स ।
दोण्हं पोगलमत्तो भावो कम्मत्तणं पत्तो ॥१३९॥*

139. Good will or pure thought is righteousness. Bad will or evil thought is sin. Conditioned by these two mental states of the *Jīva* the classes of *karmic* molecules which are physical in nature undergo modifications and manifest as *Dravya karmas* such as *jñānavarmya*.

COMMENTARY

Pure thought is *Bhava Punya*. This conditions *Dravya Punya*, the *Kārmic* matter facilitating the purity of the heart. Evil thought is *Bhava Pāpa* sinning in the heart. This conditions the *Dravya*

* Sanskrit rendering

शुभपरिणामः पुण्यमशुभः पापमिति भवति जीवस्य ।
द्वयोः पुद्गलमात्रो भावः कर्मत्वं प्राप्नोति ॥ १३९ ॥

Pāpa which aggravates the evil disposition of the soul. Thus from the Psychic conditions which are *amurta* their result the different *Cārmic* modifications which are physical and *murta*. Thus the *Bhāva karmas* and the *Dravya karmas* are mutually interacting

140

He establishes that *karmic* matter is physical in nature and therefore is *Murta*.

जह्ना कम्मस्स फलं णिसयं फासेहिं भुंजदे णियदं ।

जीवेण सुहं दुखं तह्ना कम्माणि मुत्ताणि ॥१४०॥*

140 Because the fruits of *karma* the objects of happiness or misery are experienced by *Jiva* through the sensations of touch, etc., therefore the *karmas* are physical and *Murta*.

COMMENTARY.

The fruit of *karma* is either a desirable or an undesirable object pleasant or unpleasant to the *jiva*. This object is experienced through sense perception. Senses are physical, objects apprehended through the sense organs are also physical. Therefore the *karmic* effects are physical and *Murta*. Cause and effect are identical. Therefore the author concludes that the *karmās* themselves are physical and *Murta*. Since their effects are physical. Of course this refers to *Dravya karmas*.

141

Karmas past or present are physical and *Murta*. *Samsarī Jiva*, because of its *Karmas* is also physical and *Murta*. Hence there is the chance for fresh accretion of *Karmās*. Hence the liability to continued bondage.

मुत्तो फासदि मुत्तं मुत्तो मुत्तेण वंधमणुहवदि ।

जीवो मुत्तिविरहिदो गाहदि ते तेहि उग्गहदि ॥१४१॥†

141. Past Karma which is physical in nature comes into contact with the present Karma which is also physical in nature

* Sanskrit rendering

यस्मात्कर्मणः फलं विषयः स्पर्शमुज्यते नियतं ।

जीवेन सुखं दुःखं तस्मात्कर्माणि मूर्त्तानि ॥ १४० ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

मूर्त्तं स्पृशति मूर्त्तं मूर्त्तं वन्धमनुभवति ।

जीवो मूर्त्तिविरहितो गाहति तानि तैश्चागाहते ॥ १४१ ॥

Thus existing *Kārmic* matter enters into combination with incoming *Kārmic* matter. *Jiva* though in itself spiritual and *Amūta* is certainly corporeal (in its *Samsāric* state) because of its coeval *Karmas*. Therefore it absorbs the fresh *Kārmic* matter and is absorbed by that (because of mutual attraction of molecules)

COMMENTARY.

In this *Gātha* the author explains how there could be a contact between *Jiva* and *Karma* which are *Amūrta* and *Mūrta* respectively. That there is the possibility of combination among physical molecules is accepted by all and it is a fundamental presupposition of Jaina thought that *Jiva* is in *Samsara* to start with, i. e. it is from time immemorial associated with *Kārmic* matter. Because of this associated *Karma*, *Jiva* itself has body and is *Mūrta*. Because of this intimate association with *Kārmic* matter there is the chance for fresh bondage and *Samsāra*. The *Gāthā* must be taken as an explanation of the perpetuity of the *Samsāric* cycle. Given the initial presupposition that *Jiva* in its natural state exists in *Kārmic* bondage then we can understand the reason for the *samsāric* cycle from bondage to *Gati* and *Gati* to bondage and so on. The series of causality is certainly assumed to be infinite i. e. without beginning though it may come to an end with the emancipation. An infinite past is not a mathematical impossibility. Therefore though it is admitted that the series may come to an end it need not necessarily have a beginning. Through the infinite causal interaction therefore, a *Jiva* may acquire fresh *Karmas* though in itself it is spiritual and *Amūta*. Thus ends the chapter on *Punya Pāpa Padārthas*.

142

CHAPTER ON *Āsava Padārtha*.

Asrava means the fountain source of righteousness or sin. First the *Punyaasrava* or the spring of virtue is taken for description.

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुकंपासंसिदो य परिणामो ।
चित्ते णत्थि कलुस्सं पुण्णं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥१४२॥*

* Sanskrit rendering

रागो यस्य प्रशस्तोऽणुकम्पासंश्रितश्च परिणामः ।

चित्ते नास्ति कालुष्यं पुण्यं जीवस्यासवति ॥ १४२ ॥

142. Whatever *Jiva* has desires high and noble, thoughts based on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no evil impulses towards the same, the pure *Kârmic* matter flows in as conditioned by the above mentioned springs of righteousness.

COMMENTARY

Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right conduct—*Bhâta punyasrava*, as conditioned by these springs there flows *Punya Dravya Karma* pure *Kârmic* matter into the soul. noble desires and pure thoughts, those springs of subjective righteousness may be followed by objectively evil deeds if they have not the co-operation of *Samyak Darśana* or right belief. But if those springs are saturated with right belief then there is no conflict between subjective states and objective conduct. The subjectively pure springs of conduct have the chance of being succeeded by series of right conduct till the attainment of heavenly bliss. In short subjective purity unaccompanied by right belief will still keep the soul tied to the wheel of life whereas the same in association with the right belief will gradually lead the soul to *Nirvāṇa*.

143

Then the noble desires are illustrated.

अरहंतसिद्धसाहुसु भक्ती धम्मम्मि जा य खलु चेष्टा ।
अनुगमणं पि गुरुणं पसत्थरागो त्ति वुच्चंति ॥१४३॥*

143. Love and devotion towards *Arahanta*, *Siddha* and *Sāhūs*, living according to the rules of conduct household and ascetic, and faithfully following the Masters, these are said to be the noble ideals.

COMMENTARY

Noble ideals are associated with noble objects deserving of worship and devotion. These are what are known as the *Pancha Parameshthīs*. *Arahantās*, *Siddhās*, *Sādhūs*, *Acharyās* and *Upādhyayās*. The term *Arahanta* denotes a perfected being who is still in the world, i.e., who

*Sanskrit rendering

अरहन्तिस्त्विदंसाहुषु भक्तिर्दमे या च खलु चेष्टा ।
अनुगमनमपि गुरुणां प्रशस्तगत इत्युक्ति वन्ति (?) ॥ १४३ ॥

has still his bodily state. It corresponds to the term *Sayogakevali*, the person who attained *Kevalajñāna* or perfect knowledge and who still has *Yoga* or *Mana vachana Kāya*. The term *Siddha* represents the perfect soul, without the *Yoga* or *Mana vachana Kāya*. *Sadhu* represents the great ones who are on the path of perfection. It represents mainly the *Yātis* who have attained great spiritual advancement through *Tapas*. *Ācharya* represents the organiser of the *Sangham*, the chief of a group of ascetics as well as the householders. The term *Upādhyāya* represents the great religious teachers whose function it is to instruct the people, lay and ascetic, about the chief tenets of religion and also about the rules of conduct. Reverence and devotion to these great ones and a desire to follow the path marked out by them constitute the noble aspiration which leads to *Punya*.

144

Then *Anukm̐pa* or charity is described

तिसिदं बुभुक्खिदं वा दुहिदं ददूणं जे दुदुहिदमणो ।
पडिवज्जदि तं कियया तस्सेसा होदि अणुकंपा ॥१४४॥*

144. If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry, and the miserable, offers relief to them, out of pity, then such behaviour of that person is love or charity

COMMENTARY

This is the second condition generating *Punya Bhava* or the good will. The act of charity implies two things. The feeling of sympathy at the sight of the needy and the sufferers, and secondly active relief to them. Mere feeling of sympathy is ineffective. Active relief as the result of the feeling of sympathy is essential to charity. This kind of charity is common to the ordinary mortals and it manifests in only temporary relief. But in the case of the wise ones *Anukm̐pa* or charity manifests in a higher form at the sight of the struggling souls in the ocean of *Samsara* they manifest a generous sympathy and help them towards emancipation. Thus *Anukm̐pa* is of two kinds, lower and higher according as its result is temporary and superficial or radical and permanent

*Sanskrit rendering

तृषितं बुभुक्षितं वा दुःखितं दृष्ट्वा यस्तु दुःखितमना ।
प्रतिपद्यते तं कृपया तस्यैवा भवत्यनुकम्पा ॥ १४४ ॥

145.

After describing the ideals and aspirations forming the positive condition of good will, the author describes its negative condition, i.e., the impure emotions that are to be avoided in every way to secure the purity of the heart or *Subha Parināma*.

क्रोधो व जदा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।
जीवस्स कुणदि खोहं कलुसो त्ति य तं बुद्धा वेत्त ॥१४५॥*

145 Whenever anger, pride, deceit, and covetousness, appear in the mind of a *Jīva* they create disturbing motion, interfering with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation of thought is called impure thought by the wise.

COMMENTARY.

Impurity of thought is explained to be the interference of thought and will by grosser emotions, enumerated in the *Gāthā*. Freedom from such emotional interference is also a necessary condition of righteousness. Thus noble desires (*Piṇasata Rāga*) charity (*Anukāmpa*) and freedom from impurity of the heart (*Chitta Akaluṣa*) these three constitute the spring of righteousness or *Puṇyāsra*.

146.

Then the springs of evil or *Pāpāsra*.

चरिया प्रमादबहुला कालुस्सं लोलदा य विसयेसु ।
परपरितापपवादो पावस्स य आसवं कुणदि ॥१४६॥†

146. Inordinate taste for wordly things, impure emotions, hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or covertly ; these constitute the springs of evil

* Sanskrit rendering

क्रोधो वा यदा माणो माया लोभो वा चित्तमासाद्य ।
जीवस्य करोति क्षोभं कालुष्यमिति च तं बुद्धा वदन्ति ॥ १४५ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

चर्या प्रमादबहुला कालुष्यं लोलता च विषयेषु ।
परपरितापपवादः पावस्य आसवं करोति ॥ १४६ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The five above mentioned ignoble thoughts constitute the subjective side of the springs of evil (*Bhāva Pāpa Asrava*) conditioned by these mental states impure *Karmic* matter flows into the *Jiva*. And this inflow is the objective side of the evil or *Dravya Pāpa Asrava*, i.e., there is the acquisition undesirable and dark physical conditons by *Jiva* on account of the above mentioned, impurities of thought.

• 147.

Again the subjective springs of evil are described in detail

सण्णाओ य तिलेस्सा इन्द्रियवसदा य अत्तरुद्दाणि ।
णाणं च दुप्पउत्तं मोहो पावप्पदा होंति ॥ १४७ ॥*

147- The different animal instincts, the different soul-soiling emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of perception and will, these constitute the springs of evil.

COMMENTARY.

Samjñā are the instincts, these are—

Āhāra Samjñā—Preying instinct

Bhaya Samjñā—The instinct of fear.

Maithuna Samjñā—or the sexual instinct

Parigraha Samjñā—The acquisitive instinct.

These instincts are liable to generate evil Next.

Lesya or the soul-soiling tints.

These are six in number—

Krishna or the black.

Neela or the blue

Kapota or the grey.

Peela or the yellow

Padma or the lotus-hued

Sukla or the white

*Sanskrit rendering

संज्ञाश्च तिलेस्सा इन्द्रियवशता चार्त्तरौद्रे ।

ज्ञानं च दुष्प्रयुक्तं मोहः पापप्रदा भवन्ति ॥ १४७ ॥

१. 'अदृष्टदाणि' इत्यपि पाठः ।

These *lesyas* or the tints of the soul, perhaps denote a peculiar kind of *Aura* of each soul corresponding to its grade of spiritual development and ethical purity. Very often these tints are associated with the different emotional states present in *Jiva*. Therefore this Psychic *Aura* is not a fixed and permanent adjective of a *Jiva*. They change and appear as concomitants of Psychic conditions. We have to assume that these colours are apprehended only by an occult and supernormal vision. It would be simply absurd to associate these colours as the intrinsic colours of the *Jiva* itself for that would make the *Jiva* a *Mūrta* and *Rūpa Dravya*—a material thing. That would be quite inconsistent with the Jaina system.

Of the six *lesyas* or the tints the first three *Krishna*, *Neela* and *Kapotā* the black, blue and grey are associated with the darker emotions which constitute the springs of evil.

The next constituent of the spring of evil is yielding to the temptations of the senses. Spiritual development depend upon controlling the senses. The soul is very often compared to the charioteer and the sense to restive steed. If the charioteer is led away by the horses that means danger and destruction because there would be no good in life much less the possibility of spiritual emancipation.

Ārta or suffering refers to the painful feeling experience when desirable things and persons are lost and when undesirable and unpleasant ones are got. This experience is also the fountain of evil. *Raudra* refers to wrath or misplaced enthusiasm in cruelty, deceit, theft and sensuality. Evil thoughts consist in shunning good objects and apprehending and attending to evil ones. And lastly *Mohaniya* that spirit-paralysing stupor in its dual form corrupts the faculties of perception or will. *Darsana Mohaniya* and *Charitra Mohaniya*. In either form it is a source of evil.

These are the subjective conditions of evil. *Bhāva Pāpa-Asrava*, the inner springs of sin, whereas these bring about the inflow of the dark *Kārmic* matter.

This inflow is the Physical or objective side of evil i.e., the *Dravya-Pāpa-Asrava*. *Kārmic* material of an undesirable kind flows towards the soul as the result of the above mentioned Psychic conditions.

Thus ends the chapter on *Āsrava*.

CHAPTER ON SAMVARA PADĀRTHA.

The category that denotes the process of suppressing or blocking, the springs of good and evil treated in the previous chapter, is *Samvara*. The author considers first *Pāpa Samvara* or the prevention of evil.

इन्द्रियकषायसङ्गा निगृहीता जेहिं सुदृमगम्भि ।
जावत्तावत्तेहिं पिहितं पापासर्वं छिद्रं ॥१४८॥*

148. To whatever extent the five senses, the four taints of emotions, the four instinctive appetites, are suppressed by a person, well established in the path or righteousness, to such extent the door way for the entrance of evil is closed for that person.

COMMENTARY.

The volitional suppression of the above mentioned Psychic tendencies is *Bhāva Samvara* or the subjective inhibition of the evil. This condition is the antecedent of the physical arrest of the inflow of the *Kārmic* matter which is *Dravya Samvara*. This *Samvara* or the inhibition of the springs of evil is possible only to that person who has the three jewels or *Ratnatraya*, right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. One who has not adopted the path cannot succeed in the attempt to block the spring of evil.

149.

Evil thoughts and sin are the cause of misery as they lead to suffering in the world as well as in hell, hence they ought to be avoided. Noble thoughts and the consequent happiness of *Deva* state in *svarga* or *Devaloka* is also insignificant when compared with heavenly bliss. To one whose ideal is self-realisation therefore, the happiness of *Devaloka* is also worthless. He should shun that course also. Pleasure consequent upon *Punya*, and pain of *Pāpa* are both imperfect and undesirable by the side of the ultimate ideal *Moksha*. Both the doorways of *Punya* and *Pāpa* have to be blocked. Shunning

*Sanskrit rendering

इन्द्रियकषायसङ्गा निगृहीता येः सुदृमगर्गे ।
यावत्तावत्तेषां पिहितं पापासर्वं छिद्रं ॥ १४८ ॥

action that leads to misery is natural. But action which leads to pleasure and which stimulates desire is also a hindrance towards self attainment and therefore must be avoided. It is this sentiment that is expressed in the next *Gāthā*

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व सव्वदव्वेसु ।

णासव्वदि सुह असुहं समसुः दुक्खस्स भिक्खुस्स ॥ १४९ ॥*

149, If a *Bhikshu* looks upon happiness and misery as same, if he is free from desire, aversion, and stupor of perception and will, then *Kārmās* both beneficial and harmful do not approach that being

COMMENTARY

There are three fundamental states of consciousnesses *Subha Parināma*, *Asubha Parināma*, and *Suddha Parināma*, pleasant and beneficial, unpleasant and harmful, and pure and perfect respectively. The last alone is the ultimate ideal. The other two have to be transcended.

150

Next the author describes the mental states conducive to *Samvara* or the prevention of *Karmas*

जस्स जदा खलु पुण्णं जोगे पावं च णत्थि विरदस्स ।

संवरणं तस्स तदा सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥ १५० ॥†

150 As long as a person pure in life, is really free from, action conducive to pleasure or pain through either thought, speech or body, so long is he protected from *karmas*, beneficial and harmful, that is, they are prevented from approaching him

COMMENTARY.

Effective states of desire and aversion, and activity of thought, speech or body are the conditions that attract *Karmās* good and

* Sanskrit rendering

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा सर्वद्रव्येषु ।

नाक्षयति शुभमशुभं समस्तदुःखस्य भिक्षोः ॥ १४९ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering

यस्य यदा खलु पुण्यं योगे पापं च नास्ति विरतस्य ।

संवरणं तस्य तदा शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥ १५० ॥

bad towards the soul. When those conditions are removed there will be *Karmās* approaching the *Jiva*, that is complete *Samvara*—a protective wall round the self shutting out all *karmas* is established. This *Samvara* again is twofold *Bhāva Samvara* and *Dravya Samvara*. The subjective exclusion of thoughts and desires, that may lead to bondage, and the objective exclusion of *Kārmic* matter from self. Thus ends the *Samvara Padārtha*.

151

THE CHAPTER ON NIRJARA PADĀRTHA.

The author describes the nature of *Nirjara* or the withering away of *Karmās*.

संवरजोगेहिं जुदो तवेहिं जो चिट्ठदे बहुविहेहिं ।
कम्माणं पिज्जरणं बहुगाणं कुण्णदि सो णियदं ॥१५१॥*

151. That mighty personality which after closing the springs of *Karmās*, good and evil, and equipped with the faculty of pure thought, controls its life according to manifold forms of *Tapas*, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of *Karmās* manifold.

COMMENTARY.

The faculty of pure thought, protected from all *Karmās*, associated with twelve kinds of *Tapas*, and leading to immortality, to annihilation of all *Karmās*, is the subjective side of *Nirjara* or *Bhāva Nirjara*. As a concomitant of this there appears the annihilation of *Kārmic* dust, that clouds the divine beam of pure self.

The means for obtaining *Nirjara* is *Tapas* which is of two main forms, outer and inner. Each of these is again of six different kinds. These are :—

(a) Outer *Tapas* consisting of—

- (1) *Anāsana*.
- (2) *Avamodarya*.
- (3) *Vritti Parī Sankhyāna*,

*Sanskrit rendering :

संवरयोगेनाभ्यां युक्तस्त्वपोभिर्यद्वेष्टते बहुविधैः ।
कर्मणां निर्जरणं बहुकानां करोति स नियतं ॥ १५१ ॥

(4) *Rasa Parityaga*.

(5) *Vivikta Sayjāsana*

(6) *Kāyaklesa*

(b) Inner Tapas consisting of—

(1) *Prāyaschitta*.

(2) *Vīraṇa*

(3) *Vaiṇa Vṛittya*

(4) *Svādhyāya*.

(5) *Vyutsarga*.

(6) *Dhyāna*

(1) *Anasana* is abstaining from food To obtain control over the senses and will, to root out desires and appetites to destroy *Karmās*, to facilitate meditation and to study peacefully the scriptures, fasting is the means and fasting in order to secure such results is *Anasana Vrata*

(2) *Avamodarya*.

To sustain control of the will and the senses, to regulate disorders of, *Vata*, *Pitta*, and *Sleshma*, the humours of the body, to secure self knowledge, and meditation, eating with a limit or a little less than the normal is *Avamodarya*

(3) *Vritti Pari Sankhyāna*.—In order to control the will which would by nature hanker after all the objects of taste limiting the number of items of *Dharma*, or in the case of *Bhikshus*, resolving in one self to accept food only from a particular house is *Vritti Pari Sankhyāna* or numbering or limiting the items of food.

(4) *Rasa Parityaga* In order to control the flesh to get rid of drowsiness and sleep, to promote clearness of thought, abstaining from fatty and sweet substances is *Rasa Parityaga* or relinquishing sweet essences

(5) *Vivikta Sayjāsana* To have ones bed, in separate and vacant rooms or caves or on rocks free from insect pests is *Vivikta Sayjāsana* or lonely bed The place must be free from insect pests in order that the person may have peace of mind, preparatory to meditation and separate beds of course to avoid temptations of the flesh.

(6) *Kāyaklesa* getting the body enured, to pain and suffering by standing in the sun, living under a tree and sleeping in the open in

the winter cold, etc., is *Kāyaklesa* or mortification of the body. This will harden the body and make the person fit for the arduous task of religious life. How is this *Kāyaklesa* different from what is known as *Paṛishaha Jaya* or the victory over troubles. The latter means overcoming the suffering due to the natural environment, whereas the former is voluntary training of the body. If it is voluntary why is it called outer *Tapas*. Because it pertains mainly to physical objects. *Next Inner Tapas* Because the object is mainly to control the mind. These are called inner Tapas

(1) *Prāvāschitta* is removing the evil ideas that are born of intoxication of worldliness

(2) *Vinaya* is humility towards gurus and masters

(3) *Vaiyavṛitya*. Personal attendance and other kinds of service to Munis who are weary, sick, or infirm

(4) *Swādhyaya* is quickening of thoughts by concentration of attention

(5) *Vyutsarga* renouncing the belief that this body is mine, is *Vyutsarga* or isolation of self.

(6) *Dhyāna* calm meditation on the self after controlling the vagaries of thought is *Dhyāna*

152.

Meditation on self is shown to be the main condition of *Nirvāṇa*

जो संवरेण जुत्तो अप्पट्ठमसाधगो हि अप्पाणं ।
मुणिकण भ्मादि णियदं णाणं सो संघुणोदि कम्मरयं १५२*

152. Clinging to the ideal of self realisation, being fortified against *Karmās* through *Samvara*, the yogi, who truly understands the word of the master, and meditate upon Self—Pure thought with controlled senses, will completely wash off the *Kārmic* dust.

COMMENTARY

The main condition for annihilating *Karmas* is stated here. The person is to be equipped with *Samvara* or fortification round the

*Sanskrit rendering

य. संवरेण युक्त आत्माथप्रसाधको ह्यात्मानं ।

ज्ञात्वा ध्यायति नियतं ज्ञानं स संघुनेति कर्मरजः ॥ १५२ ॥

self against Karmâs, desirable and undesirable. The springs of *Pariṇāma*, *Sṛbha* and *Asṛbha*, are to be completely blocked. Instead of diverting ones attention to environmental objects, thought is to be fixed on Self. This reflection upon the Self is to be made secure enough by controlling the senses. If a person under such circumstances meditates upon the Self, according to the instructions from the Masters, he is sure to attain purity of self by completely washing off the *Kârmic* dust by the flood of *Dhṛāna*.

Then the divine glory of the Self will shine without interruption.

153

The origin, nature, and effect of meditation

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व जोगपरिकम्मो ।
तस्स सुह सुहडहणो ज्झणमओ जायए अगणी । १५३ ॥*

153 In the person that has neither desire nor aversion, and that is free from ignorant attachment to sense pleasures and from the activity of thought speech and body, there flames forth the fire of meditation that burns out all *Karmas* beneficial as well as baneful

COMMENTARY.

Dhṛāna or meditation is thought directed towards the pure self. This is the means of self realisation. Ignorance that stupifies the faculties of perception and will must be got rid of. There should be neither attachment nor hatred towards the objects of the environment. Then there should be unruffled peace, in thought, speech and body. Meditation attended by such circumstances manifests as the fire that destroys the rubbish heap of *Karmas*. It is this fire of meditation that reveals the stirring beauty of pure Self. This is *Nirjara*.

Thus ends the Chapter on *Nijara*.

CHAPTER ON *BANDHA PĀDĀRTHAS*.

154

The nature of *Bandha* or *Kârmic* bondage is described

*Sanskrit rendering

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा योगपरिकर्म ।

तस्य शुभाशुभद्वन्द्वो ध्यानमयो जायते अग्निः ॥ १५३ ॥

जं सुहमसुहमुदिण्णं भावं रत्तो करेदि जदि अप्पा ।
सो तेण हवदि वंधो पोग्गलकम्मेण विविहेण ॥१५४॥*

154 When *Ātma* out of desire aversion, and corruption of knowledge and will, experiences affective states pleasant and unpleasant, then because of the very same states the self gets bound by *Kārmic* matter of various kinds.

COMMENTARY.

Bandha is of two kinds *Bhāva Bandha* and *Dravya Bandha*. The former refers to the appropriate psychological conditions that bring about the actual bondage with *Kārmic* molecules. The latter is *Dravya Bandha*. On account of desire the *Ātma* experiences happiness or misery. Such emotional states create in the *Ātma* a disposition peculiarly favourable for the *Kārmic* molecules to settle in. This Psychological disposition is the intrinsic condition of bondage.

155

The two aspects of bondage internal and external are again described.

जोगणिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मणवयणकायसंभूदो ।
भावणिमित्तो वंधो भावो रतिरागदोसमोद्भूदो ॥१५॥

155. Combination of *Kārmic* matter with *Jiva* is due to *Yoga*. *Yoga* is the action of mind, speech and body. The opportunity for combination is created by *Bhāvas* or the affective states and such affective states are due to desire, aversion and perverse cognition.

COMMENTARY.

Here is described bondage both internal and external, Psychical and physical. The *Kārmic* matter that flows towards the soul is the

*Sanskrit rendering

यं शुभाशुभमुदीर्णं भावं रक्त. करोति यद्यात्मा ।
स तेन भवति बद्धः पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन ॥ १५४ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

योगनिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मनोवचनकायसंभूतः ।
भावनिमित्तो बन्धो भावो रतिरागद्वेषमोद्भूतः ॥ १५५ ॥

manifested *Kārmic Skandha* around the *Jīva*. This attraction of *Skandhas* is due to *yoga*, i.e. the *Kārmic Skandhas* get aggregated and intermixed with *Jīva* because of the activity of *yoga*, or of *mana carchana kāya*, mind, speech and body.

Bandha then is the state of being so bound by *Kārmic* matter. This *Kārmic* formation around the *Jīva* is occasioned by the Psychological dispositions known as *Bhāva*. *Bhāva* is the emotional state of desire or aversion, or perverse cognition and will. All these states are brought about by *Mohaniya*, that fundamental *Karma* responsible for spiritual delusion. *Yoga* is the external condition of bondage since it brings about directly the combination of *Kārmic* matter with *Jīva*. But the internal condition is the *Bhāva* or the disposition of the self.

156

Again the conditions of bondage from another point of view are described.

हेतू चतुर्विध्योऽष्टविकल्पस्य कारणं भणितम् ।
तेषां पि च रागादी तैसिम्भावे ण वञ्चन्ति ॥१५६॥*

156. The eight kinds of *Karmas* are said to be caused by the four external conditions or *Dravya Pratyaayas*. But these conditions themselves are the result of desire, etc., or *Bhāva Pratyaayas*. Without these intrinsic conditions there will be no bondage.

COMMENTARY.

In some Philosophical works of Jainas, the eight *Karmas* are traced to the four causal conditions *Mithyatva*, *Avirata*, *Kashāya* and *Yoga*. Our author here shows that these four conditions themselves are the result of the Psychological disposition effected by the emotional states of desire, etc. Hence he insists on recognising these Psychological states as the real and intrinsic condition of bondage. Whereas the above four are only subsidiary and external conditions. Without the ultimate condition of *rāga* there can certainly be no *Kārmic* bondage.

* Sanskrit rendering

हेतुश्चतुर्विकल्पोऽष्टविकल्पस्य कारणं भणितम् ।
तेषामपि च रागाद्यस्तेषामभावेन न वञ्चन्ते ॥१५६॥

The external conditions are called *Dravya Pratyayas* because they are directly associated with *Kārmic* matter and the ultimate Psychological conditions are called *Bhāva Pratyayas* because they refer to the disposition of *Ātma*

The conditions of bondage are enumerated thus in *Tattvaṁśa Sūtra*. Chapter VIII, Sūtra 1.

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकपाययोगाबन्धहेतवः ॥

It is to be noted that five conditions of bondage are enumerated here whereas the *Gūṭha* mentions only four. For the fifth and additional condition *Pramada* is also included in the above mentioned four.

Mithyatva is the opposite of right faith or *Samyak Darsana*. This *Mathyatva* may manifest in the form of belief in false doctrines and disbelief in the true one. *Avirata* is the opposite of right conduct or *Samyakcharitra*. This may manifest in an enthusiasm for the veil conduct and a hesitation for righteousness. *Kashaya* refers to the grosser emotions such as anger, Pride, deceit, etc., and *yoga* refers to the uncontrolled and useless activity of *Mana vachana Kāya*. These are the four *Dravya Pratyayas* or external conditions generating the eight *Karmās* which are—

- (1) *Jñānāvaranīya*.
- (2) *Darsanavarāṇīya*
- (3) *Mohanīya*
- (4) *Vedanīya*.
- (5) *Antarāya*
- (6) *Ayuh*
- (7) *Nāma*.
- (8) And *Gotra*

- (1) *Jnanavarāṇīya* is the veil round the pure consciousness
- (2) *Darsanavarāṇīya* is that which corrupts the faculty of perception and also of belief.
- (3) *Mohanīya* is a sort of spiritual intoxication interfering with cognition and will.
- (4) *Vedanīya* is the feeling of pleasure and pain

157—58. If the causal condition of *Karmās* disappears in the case of wiseman through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of *Karmās* get blocked. When the springs of *Karmās* thus get blocked the *Dravya Karmās* get repulsed. When the *Dravya Karmās* completely disappear then the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life

COMMENTARY

Through the instrumentality of the five *Labdhis* a *Bhavyātma* obtains the three jewels. On account of this acquisition he is able to get rid of the four-fold condition of Karma, *Mithyatva*, *Avirata*, *Kashaya* and *yoga*, both in their subjective and objective aspects. When he gets rid of *Dravya* and *Bhāva Pratyayas* or *Kārmic* adjuncts, then he attains the great *Samvara* or repulsiveness to *Kārmis*. This *Samvara* leads to the annihilation of *Kārmic* shackles. Thus ascends the ladder of higher life which leads to destruction of ignorance. This brings on the inner purity. Finally through second *Sukla Dhyāna* or the great meditation, the *Ghātiya Karmās* get burnt away. Then the self rises to eternal wisdom, eternal perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. This is *Anantachatushtaya*, the four infinite qualities. This is *Bhāva Moksha*, the spiritual freedom. When this *Bhāva Moksha* is attained the inevitable destruction of *Dravya Karmās* follows. With the attainment of *Bhāva Moksha* the person becomes a *Kevali* worshipped by men and *Devas*. He becomes really *Paramatma*

159

Then we have the description of *Dhyāna* or meditation which is the direct cause of repulsing and eradicating all *Karmās*.

दंसणणाणसमगं ज्झाणं णो अण्णदव्वसंजुत्तं ।

जायदि णिज्जरहेदू सभावसहिदस्स साधुस्स ॥१५९॥*

159 The meditation that is completely determined by right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and that is not

*Sanskrit rendering .

दर्शनज्ञानसमग्रं ध्यानं नो अन्यद्व्यसंयुक्तं ।

जायते निर्जराहेतुः स्वभावसहितस्य साधो ॥ १५९ ॥

related to objects alien to the self becomes the cause of *Nirjara* or annihilation of *Karmas* to the *Yogi* that is in the path of self realisation

COMMENTARY

The great meditation on the self is shown to be the condition of complete *Nirjara* or the absolute annihilation of the existing *Karmas*. In the previous *Gāthā Bhāva Moksha* was described. On account of this *Bhāva Moksha* the person becomes a *Kevali* with the four infinite qualities equipped with the infinite perception and infinite knowledge. The self no more becomes attached to any other alien ideal. The only object of attraction and adoration is the perfect self-consciousness. When meditation thus manifests in self rapture because of self purity and self perception, then it leads to the eradication of the remaining *Karmās*, i.e. it is the causal condition of complete *Nirjara*.

160

Dravya Moksha or the absolute emancipation is next described

जो संवरेण जुत्तो णिज्जरमाणोध सर्वकम्माणि ।
ववगदवेदाउस्सो मुयदि भवं तेण सो मोक्खो ॥१६०॥*

160 When a *Jīva* being rid of the four *Ghātiya* and being equipped with absolute repulsiveness to *Karmas* succeeds in eradicating the remaining *Karmas*, then he becomes freed from *Vedanīya* and *Ajīva* and finally from *Nāma* and *Gotra*. This eradication of the latter four *Karmas* means absolute and complete *Moksha* or *Dravya Moksha*.

COMMENTARY.

This *Gāthā* speaks of *Dravya Moksha* or the final and complete emancipation. After attaining *Bhāva Moksha* mentioned in the previous *Gāthas* *Jīva* has to obtain absolute emancipation from *Karmic* or physical conditions for the attainment of *Kevalajñāna* is still associated with the bodily condition. The person is merely

*Sanskrit rendering.

य संवरेण युत्तो निर्जरमय सर्वकर्माणि ।
व्यपगतवेद्यायुक्तो मुञ्चति भवं तेन स मोक्षः ॥ १६०॥

Sayogī Kevalī. No doubt he got rid of the four Ghātiya Karmās which lead to the corruption and degeneration of *Ātma*. Because they injure the soul they are called Ghātiya Karmās. These are *Jñāna Varāṇiya*; *Darsanāvarāṇiya*, *Mohanīya* and *Antaraya*. But still there are the other four Karmas known as *Aghātiya Karmas*. *Vedanīya Ayuh*, *Nama* and *Gotra*. These four also must be annihilated. When a *Bhava Moksha Jīva* has the perfect *Dhyana*, then *Vedanīya* and *Ayuh* first wither away and finally *Nama* and *Gotra* also. Then the *Mukta Jīva* becomes *Ayogī Kevalī* or a *Siddha*. *Ātma* has attained its intrinsic spiritual purity and is absolutely free from any kind of association with the matter. This state is *Dravya Moksha*.

Thus ends *Moksha Padārtha*

This is the end of the second Book of the great work dealing with *Sapta Tattva* and *Nava Padarthas*.

Next the Resume or the *Chulika* dealing with *Jīva* the great Victor and the perfect *Brahma* who is the ideal of *Moksha Padārtha*. This *Chulika* supplements the ideas already mentioned about heaven, and the path. The author indicates here, the importance of conduct leading to self realisation. Self and self alone is the goal. Anything other than self as an ideal would lead away the self from the path. All these facts are emphasized in the *Chulika*.

161.

The intrinsic nature of *Jīva* is described, thus indicating the path to *Moksha*

जीवसहावं जाणं अप्पडिहददंसणं अणणमयं ।
चरियं च तेषु णियदं अत्थित्तमणिंदियं भणियं ॥१५१॥*

161. Unlimited perception and unlimited knowledge are inseparable from the nature of *Jīva*. Permanently associated with that nature, spotless conduct is the path to *Moksha* because it is the immediate antecedent

*Sanskrit rendering

जीवस्वभावं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतदर्शनमनन्यमयं ।
चारित्र्यं च तयोर्नियतमस्तित्वमनिन्दितं भणितं ॥ १५१ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The characteristic of *Moksha* is described here Right conduct which is always associated with the intrinsic nature of self is the path to *Moksha* The intrinsic nature of *Jiva* is existence which is inalienable from *Jñāna* and *Darsana* Inalienability implies that the nature of *Jiva* manifests generically and specifically through knowledge and perception. The existence which is associated with such characteristics and which has the dialectic nature of activity is the intrinsic conduct of self. It is irreproachable because it is not influenced by either desire or aversion That same conduct is the path to emancipation.

Conduct in *Samsāra* *Jiva* is of two kinds, intrinsic conduct and extrinsic self-determined or other determined. Self-determined conduct is that which is based upon the intrinsic nature of self. The other determined conduct is that which is due to the influence of non-self The path then is related to self and is uninfluenced by non-self; hence it is the means to the realisation of self.

162.

That Jewel or *Ratnatraya* is internally distinguished as lower and higher, the lower aspect is associated with the ideal only indirectly whereas the higher is directly associated with it. One who has the lower jewel is known as *Parasamayi* or the self that is determined by the other. But the self which has the higher jewel is absolutely self conditioned and is called *Svasamayi*.

जीवो सहावणियदो अनियदगुणपज्जओध परसमओ ।

जदि कुणदि सगं समयं पढमस्सदि कम्मवंधादो ॥१६२॥*

162 The *Jiva* that is associated with the essential qualities is called *Svasamayi* or the self-determined whereas that which is associated with accidental and unessential qualities and modes is called *Parasamayi* or the other determined. The *Jiva* that has the former, i.e. the essential nature as its ideal, is able to get itself freed from *Karmic* bondage.

*Sanskrit rendering.

जीवः स्वभावनियत अनियतगुणपर्यायोऽथ परसमयः ।

यदि कुरुते स्वकं समयं प्रथमस्यैव कर्मबन्धान् ॥ १६२ ॥

COMMENTARY

The *Ratnatraya* which is self-determined has corresponding stages of development to the spiritual evolution of *Jīvā*. *Abhedādra-natraya* is certainly *Svasamayi*, but the early stages of this *Ratnatraya* when compared to the last stage of perfection would be considered as *Parasamayi*. It is not even necessary to mention the fact that faith in alien deity, etc., is distinctly *Parasamayi*, i.e. when *Samyaktva* itself in its earlier stage requires to be transcended much more therefore *Mithyatva*. But a person while still with *Karmic* bondage may have the thought 'I am *Siddha*' 'I am *Shuddha*' i.e. I am the realised, I am the pure. This contemplation is also called *Abhedaratrataya*, the pure jewel by convention. Such subtle distinctions in the nature of the path of Self-realisation can only be understood by the great Ones.

163.

Then the duality of the outer path or *Parasamayā* and also the duality of the other-determined or *Parasamayi*.

जो परदव्वम्मि सुहं असुहं रागेण कुणदि जदि भावं ।
सो सगचरित्तभट्टो परचरियचरो हवदि जीवो ॥१६३॥*

163. That *Jīvā* which through desire for outer things experiences pleasurable or painful states loses his hold upon Self and gets bewildered and led by outer things. He becomes the other determined.

COMMENTARY.

The author describes here the characteristics of the self that is still determined by the other. According to this view even the traditional worship of *Jana* orthodoxy would not escape this sweeping condemnation by the author. All that would be merely *Paracharita* conduct determined by the other. This other determined conduct must be transcended by one who perceives the ideal of Self.

164.

Next the author points out that the other determined-conduct is only the means to bondage and not to *Nirvana*.

*Sanskrit rendering

य परदव्वे शुभमशुभं रागेण करोति यदि भावं ।
स स्वकचरित्रभट्टः परचरित्तचरो भवति जीवः ॥ १६३ ॥

आसवदि जेण पुण्णं पावं वा अप्पणोध भावेण ।
 सो तेण परचरित्तो हवदित्ति जिणा परवन्ति ॥१६४॥*

164 On account of the pleasurable or the painful states of the *Ātma* there may flow in *Punya Karma* or *Papa Karma* Such an *Ātma* on account of such states becomes the other determined So say the *Jinas*

COMMENTARY

Conduct that is determined by outer things leads to bondage and blocks the way to liberation, for, the pleasurable mental states is the spring of *Punya Karma* and the painful mental state of *Papa Karma*, i.e. both merit and demerit in their subjective and objective aspects lead the soul to *Kārmic* bondage Therefore if a *Jīva* experiences those mental states which form the springs of those *Karma* then for that very reason his conduct becomes other determined He therefore becomes the other determined one

165.

Then the author describes the characteristics of the self-determined *Jīva* or the *Purshottama*

जो सव्वसंगमुक्को णणमणो अप्पणं सहावेण ।
 जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सो सगचरियं चरदि जीवो ॥१६५॥†

165 That *Jīva* which being free from relations to others, and from alien thoughts through its own intrinsic nature of perception and understanding perceives and knows its own eternal nature to be such, is said to have conduct that is absolutely self-determined

COMMENTARY

Here is the description of conduct that is self determined. First there should be no kind of relation to outward things through

*Sanskrit rendering

आस्रवति येन पुण्यं पापं वात्मनोऽथ भावेन ।
 स तेन परचरित्र भवतीति जिनाः प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ १६४ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

य सर्वसङ्गमुक्तः अनन्यमना आत्मानं स्वभावेन ।
 जानाति पश्यति नियतं स स्वकचरितं चरति जीवः ॥ १६५ ॥

णिच्चयणयेण भण्हिदो, तिहि तेहिं समाहिदो हु जो अप्पा ।
ए कुणदि किंचिवि अण्णं ण मुयदि सो मोक्खमग्गोत्ति १६८*

168 Whatever *Ātmā* through the three-fold jewel well-established in itself neither perceives alien things as its own, nor gives up its own intrinsic nature, that *Ātmā* is indeed called -the absolute path to Salvation.

COMMENTARY.

Belief, knowledge, and conduct so long as they are based upon other things besides self would only constitute the relative jewel. But if the same three are based upon intrinsic nature of self then they would form the real jewel. The former is the means of obtaining the latter.

169

According to the principle that the thing and its qualities are not distinct the *Ātmā* is described to be identical with the constitutive elements of perception, knowledge and conduct.

जो चरदि णादि पिच्छदि अप्पाणं अप्पणा अणणमयं ।
सो चारित्तं णाणं दंसणमिदि णिच्चिदो होदि ॥१६९॥†

169. Whatever perceives its own self-identical nature, knows its own subjective and objective nature, and experiences its own immediate existence, is identical with the very activity of perception, knowledge and conduct.

COMMENTARY.

Chāritra, *Jñāna* and *Darsana* (conduct, knowledge, and perception) constitute the *Ātmā*. These are also the path to *Nirvāna*. Hence the intrinsic nature and function of the Self are the real path, i.e. the real path is nothing but a real Self

*Sanskrit rendering *

निश्चयनयेनमणितस्त्रिमित्तैः समाहितः खलु यः आत्मा ।
—न करोति-किंचिदप्यन्यन् न मुञ्चति-स मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥ १६८ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering *

यश्चरति जानाति पश्यति-आत्मानमात्मनानन्यमयं ।
स चारित्र्यं ज्ञानं दर्शनमिति निश्चितो भवति ॥ १६९ ॥

170.

The *Samsâri Jîvas* do not as a matter of course all attain *Moksha* only some of them are said to have that privilege

जेण विजाणदि सव्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोखमणुहवदि ।
इदि तं जाणदि भविओ अभव्वसत्तो ण सद्वहदि ॥१७०॥*

170 Because of the fact that the Self perceives and understands all things without limit it also enjoys infinite bliss This fact that infinite knowledge and infinite bliss are inseparable is understood only by the *Bhavya*, The *Abhavya* cannot appreciate that, much less believe in it.

COMMENTARY.

All *Samsâri Jîvas* are not fit to obtain the state of self-realisation. Here happiness is the absence of any kind of hindrance to the intrinsic activity of the self. Perception and understanding are the intrinsic nature of the self. Hindrance to the nature of the self therefore would be a kind of obstruction to either perception or knowledge The perfected self is all knowing and all perceiving i.e., has no limit to its nature of perception and understanding The absence of hindrance naturally manifests in its positive aspect as infinite bliss. The logical consequence of *Kevala Jñâna* is *Ananta Sukha* This truth is appreciated and accepted only by the faithful The unfaithful ones are incapable of appreciating this truth Therefore the path to salvation is available only to the former. Therefore only some of the *Samsâri Jîvas* but not all are fit to walk the path to *Moksha*.

171.

Darsana, *Jñâna* and *Châritra* when conditioned by other things than Self may in a way lead to bondage But if they are determined absolutely by the self then they form the direct antecedent of emancipation.

*Sanskrit rendering

येन विजानाति सर्वं पश्यति स तेन सौख्यमनुभवति ।
इति तज्जानाति भव्योऽभव्यसत्त्वो न श्रद्धते ॥ १७० ॥

दंसण्णाणचरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गोऽति सेविदव्वानि ।
साधूहि इदं भणिदं तेहिं दु वंधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१७१॥*

171. Since *Darsana Jñāna*, and *Chârṭa* constitute the *Moksha Maṅga* they are adored by the wise. If they are determined be non-self they may lead directly to bondage or indirectly to *Moksha*. But if they are determined by Self then they may lead to *Moksha*.

COMMENTARY.

Intuition, knowledge and conduct produce effects according as they are determined by the associated things. If they are associated with external things they may get associated with desire and aversion and thus may bring about *hârmic* bondage. But if they are associated with intrinsic and pure nature of the self, then they may directly and immediately bring about liberation. A king for example because of his defective instruments political and military may lead to the strengthening of the enemy instead of annihilating him, or for example, *ghee* which is by nature of soothing effects may when associated with fire aggravate the *heat*. Similar is the case with the three jewels.

172

Next the characteristic of *Sukshma Parasamāya*, or the subtle non-self or other determinedness

अण्णाणादो णाणी जदि मण्णदि सुट्ठसंपओगादो ।
हवदित्ति दुक्खमोक्खं परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१७२॥†

127 If an *Ātma* through ignorance believes that through awe and reverence to *Arahanta* and others he may attain emancipation from misery then he is only the lover of non-self or *Parasamāya*.

* Sanskrit rendering *

दर्शनज्ञानचारित्र्याणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सेवितव्यानि ।
साधूभिरिदं भणितं तैस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥ १७१ ॥

† Sanskrit rendering *

अज्ञानात् ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।
भवतीति दुःखमोक्षः परसमयरतो भवति जीव ॥ १७२ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Arahanta and *Siddha* are free from every kind of perfection and are full of all good qualities. Love and devotion towards these may certainly be desirable but still by themselves they can never bring about *kármic* liberation. The hope to obtain salvation only through devotion is *Parasamaya*. The person who has that hope is *Parasamayi*, the other determined one. The other determined means to be away from the ideal of self. When love and devotion to the perfect beings cannot take us nearer the goal, we need not even mention the utter uselessness of ignorant worship of alien deities with all the *samsáric* paraphernalia. Thus the author emphasizes the fact that even the love and devotion towards the perfect beings form a subtle kind of obstacle in the way of self-realisation.

173

The above mentioned reverence and devotion as they some times lead to bondage, do not constitute the path to *Moksha*.

अरहन्तसिद्धचेदियपवयणगणणाभक्तिसंपण्णो ।

बंधदि पुण्णं बहुसो ण दु सो कम्मवखयं कुणदि॥१७३॥*

173 The person who has reverence and devotion towards *Arahanta*, *Siddha*, their images, *Sangha*, and congregations will invariably get bondage with *Punya karma*, hence he can never achieve absolute annihilation of *karma*.

COMMENTARY

The author minimises the importance of popular form of religious devotion and worship. The Traditional Jaina religion always emphasizes the value of faith and devotion towards the objects worthy of reverence. But our author views the popular faith from a higher point. From the true philosophical point of view such *Bhakti* will only lead to *Punya karma* and its consequent divine happiness. But *Punya karma* is still thralldom though the shackles are made of gold and *Deva* happiness is still *Sansari*. Therefore

*Sanskrit rendering

अर्हन्तसिद्धचैत्यप्रवचनगणनभक्तिसम्पन्नः ।

बन्धति पुण्यं बहुशो न तु स कर्मक्षयं करोति ॥ १७३ ॥

karmic annihilation cannot be achieved by the person who has such faith and devotion alone.

174

The main obstacle in the path of self-realisation or *Svasmaya* is said to be *Rāga* or affection.

जस्स हिदयेणुमत्तं वा परद्व्वं हि विज्जदे रागो ।

सो ण विजाणदि समयं समस्स सव्वागमधरो वि ॥१७४॥*

174 If in the heart of a *yogi* there is an iota of affection towards alien objects (even in an *Arahanta*) then, though he be well versed in all the *Sāstras*, he would be incapable of appreciating his true Self or *Paramātmā* through immediate experience.

COMMENTARY.

Devotion to external ideals may be useful up to a certain stage of development. The ideal of *Vitarāga* is distinctly related to self. Absolute freedom from attachment is the meaning of *Vitarāga*. Complete absence of *rāga* is certainly inconsistent with attachment and devotion to *Arahanta* or *Siddha*. So far as self is concerned these ideal personalities are indeed external. The right ideal must be to attain perfect *Siddha* state oneself. This realisation of *Siddha* state cannot be reached by having attachment to external objects, hence the author emphasizes the importance of effort to transcend even this subtle kind of attraction however worthy the object of the ideal be. self and self alone must be the final and the ultimate ideal of spiritual evolution. To have *Bhakti* which is a subtle attraction and then to believe that somehow the final good will be *Moksha* is to forget the importance of self-effort towards self realisation. According to the author then the traditional religious reverence, is only a stepping stone for the higher spiritual goal. He who shrinks from transcending the traditional orthodoxy is unfit to live in the higher plane. He is infected with the delusion that what is only a means is an end in itself. That what is merely relative is the absolute. That what is of temporary value has eternal value.

*Sanskrit rendering

यस्य हृदयेऽणुमात्रो वा परद्रव्ये विद्यते रागः ।

स न विजानाति समयं स्वकस्य सर्वागमधरोऽपि ॥ १७४ ॥

The author enumerates the train of several evils that may be generated by that little iota of affection, above referred to.

धरिदुं जस्स ण सक्कं चित्तुद्भामं विणादु अप्पाणं ।
रोधो तस्स ण बिज्झदि सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१७५॥*

175. To whomsoever there is no ability to bear the turmoil of the mind apart from and independent of the pure contemplation of self to him there is no possibility of preventing the *Karmas* born of pleasure and pain

COMMENTARY.

There can be no devotion to *Arahanta* and others apart from an affective state, when there is affection the disturbance of the mind cannot be avoided With the agitation of the heart the calm of the self is lost and if the calm of the self is disturbed, it is not possible to prevent the appearance of pleasure and pain and there is no escape from happiness and misery there can be no emancipation from *Samsara* Affection however little is therefore the cause of this series of undesirable events.

One who has the ideal of *Moksha* must therefore completely eradicate every kind of desire from his heart.

तस्मा णिव्वुदिकामो णिस्संगो णिम्ममो य हविय पुण्णो ।
सिद्धेसु कुणदि भत्तिं णिव्वाणं तेण पप्पोदि ॥१७६॥*

176. Therefore he who aims at *Nirvana* must not say "I love this, this is mine," Then he can very well be devoted to his own true self which is *Siddha* or the perfect one, Through that same self-realisation he will attain *Nirvana*.

*Sanskrit rendering

धनुं यस्य न शक्यश्चित्तोद्भामं विनात्वात्मानं ।
रोधस्तस्य न विद्यते शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मस्य ॥ १७५ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

तस्मान्निवृत्तिकामो निसङ्गो निर्ममत्वश्च भूत्वा पुनः ।
सिद्धेषु करोति भक्तिं निर्वाणं तेन प्राप्नोति ॥ १७६ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The great soul that understands the truth of the previous causal sequence from desire to turmoil of the mind, and from thence to *karma*, and finally to *Samsara*, struggles to escape from the attraction of the environment and from the idea of ownership of alien things. When the relation of self to alien things either through attraction or owning is severed, then there is no possibility of desire springing up in the heart. No desire means no spiritual discord; spiritual harmony, repels *karman*, prevention of *karman* means disappearance of *Samsara*. Absence of *Samsara* certainly implies its opposite *Moksha*, hence the person that longs for spiritual perfection and *kārmic* emancipation must never say "This I love, This is mine"

177

The attitude of worship towards *Arahanta* and others, though it interferes with the immediate realisation of perfection is not altogether valueless, for it may ultimately lead to *Nirvāna*

सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगदवुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।
दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपओत्तस्स ॥१७७॥*

177. One may understand the true nature of *Tuṭhankara*, who is the basis of nine *Padāsthas*. One may have interest in and devotion to the *Scripture*. One may have self control and penance. With all these if one is not capable of realising his own true self, to him *Nirvana* is beyond reach

COMMENTARY.

Even though a person is well versed in *Agamas** and well acquainted with the nature of reality, if he is ever much filled with devotion and worship to objective ideas, he will only secure the happiness of *Svarga* as the immediate fruit thereof. *Nirvana* or *Moksha* is very remote and he can obtain that only by a tedious process of spiritual development. The immediate and direct antecedent of *Moksha* is the realisation of the true self, worship

*Sanskrit rendering.

सपदार्थं तीर्थकरमभिगतवुद्धे सूत्ररोचिनः ।
दूरतरं निर्वाणं संयमतपः सम्प्रयुक्तस्य ॥ १७७ ॥

of and devotion to any other ideal however worthy it may be is only a circuitous path to reach the goal

178

Again the author emphasizes the fact that worship of the *Arahata* and others cannot be the immediate antecedent of *Mukti*.

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणभक्तो परेण नियमेण ।

जो कुणदि तवो कम्मं सो सुरलोगं समादियदि ॥१७८॥*

178. The person [who has love and reverence towards *Arahanta* and *Siddha*, their representations and the divine Word or *Agama*, however well he is engaged in the best form of *Tapas* so long as he is incapable of apprehending the true greatness of self on account of attachment to external ideals, will inevitably through his efforts enter only the world of the *Devas*.

COMMENTARY.

Whether now or hereafter the direct and immediate condition of *Moksha* is the apprehension of true self and not attachment to external ideals. The person who has not grasped the self through all his efforts associated with worship and reverence will only secure the happiness of *Devas*. This is merely a higher state of *Samsāra* and not *Moksha*.

179

Then the author mentions the direct and immediate path to *Moksha*, thereby indicating that that is the meaning of the present Work

तस्मा णिवुदिकामो रागं सवत्थ कुणदि मा किंचि ।
सो तेण वीदरागो भविओ भवसायरं तरदि ॥१७९॥*

*Sanskrit rendering.

अर्हत्सिद्धचेत्यप्रवचनमक्तः परेण नियमेन ।

य करोति तप कर्म स सुरलोकं समादत्ते ॥ १७८ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:

तस्मान्निवृत्तिकामो रागं सर्वत्र करोतु मा किञ्चित् ।
स तेन वीतरागो भव्यो भवसागरं तरति ॥ १७९ ॥

179 Because of this truth that even the subtle attachment to external ideals hinders *Nirvāna*, let not the person who desires *Mokṣha* have any kind of attachment to things, living or non-living, desirable or undesirable, then he becomes the *Vitarāga*, the non-attached. Thus will he be able to sail across the ocean of *Samsara*

COMMENTARY.

The essential ingredient of the direct and immediate path to *Mokṣha* is the state of *Vitarāga* or non-attachment. Attachment to alien persons and things deserving worship is something like burning sandal wood. It may smell sweet nevertheless it will burn. The subtle attachment to external ideals may lead to happiness but the very happiness will scorch the soul, hence the great person, who longs for freedom from *Samsara* must rid himself of any kind of attachment, must become a *Vitarāga*. Then will he be able to conquer the misery of Life and inherit the kingdom of *Nirvāna*.

This is the meaning of the above *Sutra* and the same is the purport of the whole book.

Pañchāstikāya, i. e. it is not only the *Sutra Tatparyā* but also *Śāstra Tatparyā*. This aims to apprehend the nature of *Jñesvara*, the great victor, the all-knowing of infinite qualities and the *Vitarāga* or the non-attached.

It is called *Prabhūta* "well filled with the meaning" because it treats about the nine *Padārthas* and thus describes the nature of the systems of reality. Since it deals with the *Dravyas* or the existences it is also called *Dravyaniyoga*. It clearly explains the five *Astikāyas* the six *Dravyas*, seven *Tattvas*, and the nine *Padārthas*. It also examines the nature of bondage and of the bound, of liberation and the liberated. Lastly in the *Chūlika* or the appendix there is a clear distinction between the absolute path and relative path, and also the indication of the fact that non-attachment is the direct and immediate condition of *Nirvāna*. Non-attachment and perfect peace of the heart is the central doctrine emphasized by an embodied in this *Pañchāstikāya Prabhūta*. This *Vitarāgatva* or the state of non-attachment is available only to that *Bhavya* or the right believer who appreciates the comparative merits of the two paths, relative and absolute *Vyavahara*, and *Nischaya*, but not to one who is incapable of appreciating the various aspects of truth and who clings to only a

particular and fractional aspect as the whole truth, i.e. one who believes in *Ekanta* aspect of reality is incapable of appreciating the ideal of *Vitarāga* and the difference between the absolute path and the relative path. He is far away from the goal. The true believer will certainly understand the compatibility and the harmony between the two paths and thus will try to realise the ideal of non-attachment or *Vitargatva* as the immediate condition of *Moksha*

180

The author ends the Work indicating his object in this composition

मगप्यभावणद्वं पवयणभक्तिप्पचोदिदेण मया ।

भणियं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं सुत्तं ॥१८०॥*

180. For the purpose of explaining the *Moksha Marga*, this work by the name of *Pañchāstikāya* containing the essentials of divine revelation is composed by me as actuated by *Bhakti* or devotion towards the divine Word.

COMMENTARY.

The author explains the purpose of his writing this work. The *Moksha Marga* or the path is revealed by Jina. But Divine revelation or the *SASTRA* is elaborate and extensive. In order to exhibit the path to the believers this short summary of the divine *WORD* is written with the name of *Pañchāstikāya Samgraha*.

Thus ends Book II of *Pañchāstikāya*.

*Sanskrit rendering .

मार्गप्रभावणार्थं प्रवचनभक्तिप्रचोदितेन मया ।

भणितं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं सूत्रं ॥ १८० ॥

